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Antonio Gramsci (1891–1937) is one of the most frequently referenced 
political theorists and cultural critics of the twentieth century. His 
pre-disciplinary ideas and especially his articulation of hegemony are 
commonly referred to in international relations, social and political 
theory, political economy, historical sociology, critical geography, 
postcolonial studies, cultural studies, literary criticism, feminism, new 
social movements, critical anthropology, education studies, media 
studies and a host of other fields. And yet, his actual writings are steeped 
in the complex details of history, politics, philosophy and culture that 
shaped Italy’s formation as a nation-state as well as in the wider turmoil 
of twentieth-century world history.
Gramsci began his practical and intellectual odyssey when he moved 
to Turin University (1911). This move to mainland industrial Italy raised 
cultural and political contradictions for the young Sardinian, whose 
identity had been deeply formed by the conditions of uneven development 
in the ‘South’. These issues were pursued by Gramsci whilst he devoted 
his energy to journalism (between 1914 and 1918) in the newspapers Il 
Grido del Popolo, Avanti! and La Cittá Futura. His activity centred on the 
Factory Council movement in Turin – a radical labour mobilization – 
and editorship of the journal L’Ordine Nuovo (1919–20). Exasperated by 
the Italian Socialist Party’s lack of leadership and effective action during 
the Biennio Rosso, Gramsci turned his attention to the founding and 
eventual leadership of the Italian Communist Party (PCd’I) as well as 
the organization of the workers’ newspaper L’Unitá until 1926. Gramsci 
spent from May 1922 to December 1923 in the Soviet Union actively 
involved in organizational issues within the Communist International 
(Comintern). This included functioning on the Executive Committee of 
the Comintern in Moscow as the representative of the PCd’I and as a 
member of various commissions examining organizational, political and 
procedural problems that linked the various national communist parties. 
During this period, Gramsci had direct contact with Leon Trotsky and 
led discussions on the ‘Italian Question’, including the united front 
tactics to tackle Fascism, the trade union relationship, and the limits of 
party centralism. These issues were developed by Gramsci through the 
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work of ideological hegemony carried out by the PCd’I and, following his 
Moscow period, as a central author and architect of ‘The Lyon Theses’ – 
a collection of positional statements on the tactics and strategies needed 
in response to Fascism. The theses are regarded as a major survey of the 
conditions of uneven development confronting social forces within Italy 
and the European states-system at the time.
By 1926, after drafting his famous essay ‘Some Aspects of the Southern 
Question’, Gramsci was arrested as a Communist Party deputy by the 
Fascist authorities and was incarcerated until a few days before his death 
in 1937. Gramsci wrote almost 500 letters in prison; over half were to his 
sister-in-law, Tatiana Schucht, who was living in Rome and became his 
key supporter and his most frequent visitor. She also conveyed Gramsci’s 
ideas to another significant patron, Piero Sraffa, the Italian economist 
then at Cambridge. These letters constitute a rich mixture of intellectual, 
cultural and political analysis as well as representing the daily struggle 
of prison life including Gramsci’s increasingly severe health problems. 
But the most enduring and influential component of his legacy is the 
33 notebooks penned between 1929 and 1936 that together constitute 
the Quaderni del carcere (Prison Notebooks). Tatiana Schucht hid 
these notebooks in a vault at the Banca Commerciale Italiana while 
she arranged for their transportation to Moscow. Publication of the 
Prison Notebooks in Italian ensued from the late 1940s onwards and has 
continued in various languages ever since.
The breadth of the above political and intellectual journey is perhaps 
matched by the depth of detail and coverage contained within Gramsci’s 
pre-prison and prison writings. The study of intellectuals in Italy, their 
origins and grouping according to cultural currents; his engagement 
with, and critique of, Italy’s most important intellectual of the time, 
Benedetto Croce; the study of comparative linguistics and the Italian 
language question; analysis of the Sicilian writer Luigi Pirandello and the 
potential his plays offered for transforming Italian culture and society; 
and discussion of the role of the serialized novel and popular taste in 
literature would be later expanded into a wider plan. This chiefly focused 
on Italian history in the nineteenth century, with special attention 
being directed to Italy’s faltering entrance into capitalist modernity 
under conditions of ‘passive revolution’, including the imposition of a 
‘standard’ Italian language; the theory of history and historiography; 
and the expansion of the capitalist labour process through assembly 
plant production techniques beyond the United States under the rubric 
of ‘Americanism and Fordism’. In summary, issues of hegemony, con-
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sciousness and the revolutionary process are at the centre of Gramsci’s 
attention. It is for such reasons that Antonio Gramsci can be regarded as 
one of the most significant Marxists of the twentieth century, who merits 
inclusion in any register of classical social theorists.
Reading Gramsci, however, is no easy task. He plunges into the 
complexities of debates of his time that are now obscure to many readers 
and engages in an enormous range of topics that at first seem unrelated. 
Moreover, the prison conditions and his own method yield a set of 
open-ended, fragmented and intricately layered Prison Notebooks whose 
connections and argumentation do not lead linearly from one note to 
the next, but seem to ripple and weave in many directions. This has 
sometimes led to aggravation on the part of Gramsci scholars when they 
see how often his name is invoked by those with quite partial or superficial 
understanding of these complexities. It has also generated frustration on 
the part of those who want to use Gramsci’s ideas to illuminate their own 
studies, analyses and political acumen. After all, while Gramsci himself 
was a meticulous researcher with a rigorous philological method, he 
was deeply committed to people understanding their own political and 
cultural contexts in order to engage and change them. These points, about 
the necessity of deploying an openness of reading Gramsci to capture the 
branching out of his thought and the necessity of deploying a practical 
interest in understanding the here and now of contemporary events, 
were central to Joseph Buttigieg’s original idea for initiating this ‘Reading 
Gramsci’ series. Buttigieg’s contributions to Gramscian scholarship 
extend also to his monumental and superbly edited and translated English 
critical edition of the Prison Notebooks (Columbia University Press), the 
final volumes of which are still in process. In keeping with Buttigieg’s 
initial goals, this series aims to provide expert guides to key features and 
themes in Gramsci’s writings in combination with the pressing political, 
social and cultural struggles of our time. Rather than ‘applying’ Gramsci, 
the point of the series is to provide monographs that think through and 
internalize Gramsci’s method of thinking about alternative historical 
and contemporary social conditions. Given that no single study can 
encapsulate the above political and intellectual depth and breadth, each 
volume in the ‘Reading Gramsci’ series is focused in such a way as to 
open readers to specific aspects of his work as well as raise new questions 
about our contemporary history.
Peter Ives 
Adam David Morton 
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PN3) and by the corresponding page number. For the notes contained 
in the subsequent notebooks (9–29), quotations are taken from various 
anthologies of Gramsci’s writings published in English: in the main they 
are taken from Selections from the Prison Notebooks (SPN), from Further 
Selections from the Prison Notebooks (FSPN) and from Selections from 
Cultural Writings (SCW). In those rare cases where a quotation is not 
to be found in any of the aforementioned editions, we have translated it 
into English ourselves: in such cases, the reference given is to the Italian 
critical edition of the Quaderni del carcere (QC) followed by the wording 
‘author’s translation’.
Existing translations have been amended on occasion, either when 
clearly wrong or when the choice of terms is deemed to impair the 
richness of Gramsci’s language: in such cases a note has been included 
indicating the amendment made.
Inside Gramsci’s quotations, square brackets are used to contain 
amendments designed to facilitate the reading of the text (e.g. [that]) 
or omitted words (e.g. […]), whereas angle brackets <…> are used to 
contain phrases present between the lines in Gramsci’s manuscripts, 
that is, phrases added by Gramsci after the initial drafting of the work 
in question.
Between 1931 and 1935, after having commenced drafting his notes 
in 1929, Gramsci began reorganizing those writings he had already 
written, classifying them within ‘special notebooks’. Thus, the writings 
are subdivided by convention, according to a classification introduced by 
Valentino Gerratana (QC: xxxvi–xxxvii) in the critical edition of the 
Prison Notebooks, between: rough writings (a), writings drafted just once 
(b), redrafted writings (c). In the latter case, Gramsci takes the previously 
drafted writings and re-writes them, often unifying them and sometimes 
changing the contexts to a significant degree.
Quotations from, and reference to, any secondary literature that has 
not been translated into English have been kept to a minimum where 
possible. Those who wish to further pursue the topics in question may 
avail themselves of a number of powerful digital tools, such as the Gramsci 
Foundation’s Bibliografia Gramsciana [Gramscian Bibliography] (bg.
fondazionegramsci.org) or the digital library www.gramsciproject.org 
(which in addition to Gramsci’s writings, also contains the Dizionario 
gramsciano [Gramscian Dictionary] and offers readers the opportunity 
to carry out a series of cross searches).
xiv . using gramsci: a new approach
The bibliography at the end of the volume makes no claims to be 
complete, but is designed to be of help in regard to the ‘uses of Gramsci’.
Readers interested in discovering whether there is an English 
translation of a given Gramscian writing may consult the extremely 
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In 1987, Eric J. Hobsbawm wrote an article for the Italian journal 
Rinascita, informing readers that Antonio Gramsci was among ‘The 
250 most cited authors in the Arts and Humanities Citations Index 
1976–1983’.1 Together with Gramsci, this ranking, which included 
famous names from the sixteenth century onwards, only included 
another four Italians: Giorgio Vasari, Giuseppe Verdi, Benedetto Croce 
and Umberto Eco. Gramsci died on 27 April 1937, and his fame was 
very much of a posthumous nature, starting at the end of the Second 
World War with the publication of the thematic volumes of his prison 
writings.2 So, what exactly happened during the thirty-year period from 
the late 1940s to the end of the 1970s? Well, during that period a leading 
political figure, the Secretary of the Italian Communist Party, who had 
been imprisoned by the Fascist regime and had subsequently died just a 
few days after his release, became not only a leading intellectual figure 
for the international left and for critical thought in general, but also a 
classic in political theory.3 This success was influenced in particular by 
the political-cultural atmosphere in Europe and the USA during the 
1960s and 1970s, as well as by an intense period of anti-colonial and 
emancipation movements in the rest of the world. During this period, 
Gramsci’s writings were divulged to the four corners of the world, in the 
wake of the publication of a famous anthology of the Prison Notebooks in 
English (SPN). This initial phase of the internationalization of Gramsci’s 
thought was characterized by the explicit political use of his writings 
within the context of emancipatory struggles that were quite different 
from the struggles Gramsci himself had been involved in: struggles 
against Latin American dictatorships, against colonial regimes in Asia 
and Africa, for civil rights in Europe and the USA and also in favour 
of Eurocommunism.
2 . using gramsci: a new approach
This initial phase has since been accompanied by a second phase 
coinciding with the start of the new millennium.4 In the last fifteen years, 
in fact, there has been a strong revival of interest in Gramsci’s work, thus 
marking a strong reversal in the trend that had characterized the final 
twenty years of the previous millennium. This second wave of interest 
appears not only more substantial, but also of a more far-reaching nature 
than the previous one. It has proven capable of reaching the most varied of 
cultural contexts and disciplines. While the first phase was characterized 
by its evocation of the historical experience of international communism, 
aided by the hagiography of the martyr of the Fascist regime, and based 
on the attempt to identify a version of socialism different from that of 
the USSR, the second phase has been distinguished by a less constrained 
approach to Gramsci’s historical experience. The focus this time around 
has been on the use of Gramscian concepts within various disciplines, in 
particular in the social sciences. Although this has at times led to inter-
pretations and ‘uses’ of Gramsci’s writings of a somewhat misleading 
or little documented nature, and the arbitrary disengagement of his 
concepts from the Marxist and materialist sphere in which they were 
forged, nevertheless in the majority of cases the ‘political character’ of 
Gramsci’s writings, together with their emancipatory and critical spirit, 
have been largely preserved.
The new approach to Gramsci’s work adopted in the present volume 
is set within the context of this ‘shifted’ use of Gramsci’s theoretical 
instruments in a broad range of disciplines (political science, education 
and pedagogy, language, cultural studies, international relations, 
subaltern and postcolonial studies, anthropology, geography). The 
present is an attempt to provide scholars of these disciplines with an inter-
pretation of Gramsci’s writings offering a precise historical/theoretical 
reconstruction that is, however, devoid of all the esoteric features that 
normally characterize a restricted and specific community of scholars. 
Hence, the decision to organize the book into a number of chapters, each 
of which is dedicated to a specific key theme, which at first sight may 
not appear to reflect the traditional instruments of Gramscian analysis, 
but which on the contrary refer to the central questions of political and 
social thought: ideology, the individual, collective organisms, society, 
crisis and temporality. Gramsci’s conceptuality, consisting of a series of 
well-known formulas – passive revolution, historical bloc, hegemony etc. 
–, is in the end based around these key themes, and will be analysed 
within this context. In contemporary debate, Gramsci’s concepts are in 
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danger of being diluted to such an extent that they are no longer useful, 
on the one hand, and of remaining hostage to the historical circum-
stances that produced them, on the other hand. To get around the first 
of these two problems, Gramscian discourse needs to be reconnected 
to the large-scale changes taking place at the time he wrote; however, in 
order to resolve the second problem, said discourse needs to be rendered 
available, as all classics, to contemporary analysis, which sees the present 
characterized by different, but nonetheless epoch-making, changes.
An indication of this kind was offered by Gramsci himself when he 
wrote that the ‘Search for the Leitmotiv, for the rhythm of the thought 
as it develops, should be more important than that for single casual 
affirmations and isolated aphorisms’.5 As rightly claimed by Alberto 
Burgio – a meticulous scholar who can afford to adopt this approach 
to Gramsci’s writings without risking the philologists’ ire – what is felt 
here is ‘the genuine concern that an overly respectful reader may prove 
the least well equipped to understand. Gramsci is aware of the paradox 
whereby the actual fetishism of writings may, in the case of the Prison 
Notebooks, produce perverse effects, causing the author to be attributed 
with positions and thoughts that in reality may be the exact opposite 
of those actually held’.6 One of the aims of this new approach is thus to 
follow the rhythm of Gramscian thought, and to provide a solid basis 
for those wishing to utilize his categories in the fields of sociology, 
political science and the social sciences in general. The path followed 
is somehow in an upward direction, from the individual to society, 
although the central theoretical problems remain the same, all of 
which are linked to the changes brought by the advent of mass politics, 
which had generated ‘social governance’ needs previously unheard of. 
Looked at from this point of view – that of a mass, politicized society 
– Gramsci reformulated the Marxist vocabulary of his time, and one 
century later has provided us with a conceptual toolkit that can be used 




Ideologies must become dramas if they are not to remain mere ink 
printed on paper.
Antonio Gramsci
13 October 1917 
the problem of ideology
In his study of ideology, Michael Freeden cites Karl Mannheim, Louis 
Althusser and Antonio Gramsci as the three twentieth-century figures 
who made the greatest contribution to the broadening of our under-
standing of ideology. According to Freeden, their merit ‘was that they 
transformed our conception of ideology from the transient epiphenom-
enon Marx and Engels had made it out to be into a permanent feature 
of the political’.1 This view, whilst perhaps somewhat reductive in regard 
to Marxian writings, nevertheless grasps a fundamental advancement 
witnessed in the social sciences during the first half of the twentieth 
century. It is not surprising that the disciplines that suffered this 
‘ideological tribulation’ were in fact those ascribable to the aforemen-
tioned three figures: that is, sociology, philosophy and political theory.
In the case of sociology, the transition from a purely instrumental 
conception of ideology to the establishment of a specific field of study 
regarding the formation of ideas – the sociology of knowledge – was 
completed without too much difficulty.2 In the case of philosophy, the 
process proved more uneven, and ended up grinding to a standstill when 
the attempt was made to interpret the effects and structure of ideology in 
a ‘constructive manner’, by considering ideology as a constantly coherent 
expression of social totality. In this case, the gap between ideological 
forms and economic structure was bridged, and ideology was reduced to 
the status of an objective function of the system.3 Finally, in the case of 
political theory, the transition to a more complex conception of ideology 
was attempted only occasionally, and in fact Gramsci remains, almost a 
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century later, the main source of ideas for those wishing to deal with the 
question from a non-reductionist Marxist point of view.4
Gramsci agrees with, or rather pre-empts, the Althusserian view of 
ideology as an organic part of a social totality (Gramsci’s ‘historical 
bloc’), whilst at the same time maintaining the flexibility of the concept, 
so that he can consider ideological, on the one hand, the disjointed senso 
comune5 that is not aimed at, or functional to, any specific historical 
bloc a priori; and, on the other hand, philosophy, which is, in fact, in 
keeping with, and functional to, political domination. The various levels 
of ideology that Gramsci analyses – common sense, folklore, religion, 
philosophy (and science in part) – can thus be arranged according to 
a scale of internal consistency, where common sense and philosophy 
represent the extremes of such a scale. This scale, as we shall see, 
coincides with the level of consciousness of the bearer of this ideological 
thought system. In Gramsci’s view, the knowledge, understanding and 
development of these ideological elements represent the core of revolu-
tionary political theory.
This approach to the formation of historical subjects – and thus to 
the various ideological forms that distinguish such – reveals Gramsci’s 
conviction that the historical bloc underlying each type of domination 
never derives mechanically from the morphological structure of society, 
but is, on the contrary, the result of the composition of elements that may 
be arranged in various different ways.
In order to deal with this tangle of problems, however, we need to 
first examine the context within which Gramsci wrote, and the level of 
debate on ideology at that time. His Prison Notebooks were written in 
the early 1930s, in a period in history that had only recently witnessed 
the introduction of the concept of ideology into the political vocabulary.
the historicity of the concept of ideology
The first evidence of Gramsci’s interest in defining ideology can be 
found in a note from Notebook 4, in which he muses on the origin of 
the concept:
‘Ideology’ is an aspect of ‘sensationalism’, that is, of the eighteenth-
century French materialism. It used to mean ‘science of ideas’, and 
since analysis was the only method recognized and applied by science, 
it meant ‘analysis of ideas’, that is, also, ‘search for the origin of ideas’. 
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Ideas had to be broken down into their <original> ‘elements’, which 
could be nothing other than ‘sensations’.6
From here, Gramsci goes back to the definition of ideology formulated 
by Destutt de Tracy, whom he considered to be the ‘literary propagator 
of ideology […], among the most renowned and popular, because 
of the ease of his exposition’.7 In Tracy’s original design, ideology is a 
genuine ‘political science of the social’,8 the aim of which is to deal sci-
entifically with the new field of study that actually has emerged with 
the advent of the French Revolution. The science that is to operate in 
this new field of study must provide answers to the questions: how are 
the ideas formed of those free, equal, fraternal individuals who, no 
longer being subjected to traditional or personal powers, produce ideas 
that are no longer foreseeable? What impact do such ideas have on the 
political order, and how can their effects be foreseen? In this case, the 
basis for the scientific study of ideas and their formation was laid by the 
historical circumstance that permitted such ideas to be ‘freed’ from their 
original, constant subjugation to traditional powers. That which, after 
1789, became unforeseeable for such traditional powers, which up until 
then had regulated the formation of ideas, could become predictable for 
a science.
Thus, Gramsci was aware of the transformation that the concept 
had undergone, and he immediately displayed a strong awareness of its 
historicity. In truth, it was the very semantic and political evolution of 
the term following the post-revolutionary watershed that Gramsci was 
interested in, that is, ‘How did the meaning of “ideology” change from 
“science of ideas” and the search for the origins of ideas, to “a system of 
ideas?”’.9 We know that this transition took place very early in the history 
of the concept, in a period somewhere between Napoleon’s famous 
attack on the Idéologues and the emergence of Marxist criticism,10 which 
Gramsci saw as a ‘distinct advance [superamento]’11 on sensationalism. 
But if ‘In logical terms, the process is easy to understand – Gramsci 
continued –, how did it come about historically?’12 Gramsci’s interest in 
this transition already marks an important point: ideology had followed a 
rapid process of formation, politicization and, finally, criticism, as a result 
of the historical process triggered by the French Revolution. Therefore, 
it did not possess any independent character, since it was modelled on 
its own connections with historical-political events. Thanks to historical 
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materialism, ideology thus took the form of the political element of the 
superstructure, to be analysed from a historical perspective. 
The distinction between the two meanings of the term is indicated 
in the Prison Notebooks by the use, or otherwise, of the capital ‘I’. The 
science of ideas, the capitalized ‘Ideology’ of the Idéologues and of Tracy, 
is the science of a physiological nature that studies the formation of 
ideas on the basis of their derivation from sensations;13 ‘ideology’ with a 
small ‘i’, on the other hand, refers to the system of ideas that each person 
possesses, which does not depend on physiological causes but on histor-
ical-political ones.
In this latter meaning of ideology, the concept becomes a vast 
analytical terrain that in the Prison Notebooks is broadened and specified 
to constitute a multitude of further concepts, whilst at the same time 
revealing an area of theoretical engagement in which debate rages over 
ideology’s independence or dependence, its cognitive richness or its 
mystifying aspects, the rigidity it entails or the movement it stimulates. 
In fact, while the Prison Notebooks also features a non-specific use of 
the term – often with ‘ideological’ employed as a negative adjective – 
there are also signs of a knowing, albeit incomplete, construction of 
an independent concept of ideology on Gramsci’s part.14 This process 
of construction begins with Gramsci distancing his analysis from two 
other attempts made to do likewise within the Marxist field: Bukharin’s 
venture to provide Marxism with a sociology, and a theory of ideology 
based on this sociology; and that of the so-called ‘reflection theories’ that 
perceive ideology as a variable that is closely dependent on the economic 
structure, thus nullifying its importance from the knowledge point of 
view. 
As far as regards the first of these two attempts, Gramsci’s criticism 
of Bukharin’s Historical Materialism: A System of Sociology submitted 
in Notebook 11,15 is that this work had remained tied to a concept of 
ideology similar to the one shared by the Idéologues, namely, a science 
that reconstructs the components of human thought, such components 
being taken as stable and uniform insofar as they are rooted in people’s 
consciousness and expressed by their common sense. Thus, Gramsci 
believed that Bukharin ‘really capitulated before common sense and 
vulgar thought, for he did not pose the issue in correct theoretical 
terms and was therefore practically disarmed and impotent’.16 The 
correct theoretical terms, on the other hand, are those of historical 
materialism, which compared to this meaning of ideology ‘represents a 
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distinct advance [superamento] and historically is precisely in opposition 
to Ideology [capital letter]’.17 Marx himself, Gramsci continues, in 
connoting the concept of ideology negatively, thus attributing a value 
judgement to it, had pointed out the historical – and thus criticizable – 
origin of ideas rather than their physiological origin. By linking ideology 
to historical elements and to social relations, Marx marked a transition, 
a historical achievement for historical materialism (the philosophy of 
praxis in Gramsci’s vocabulary).
The second Marxist attempt to define ideology that Gramsci criticized 
was that of the so-called ‘reflection theories’. In fact, in the 1920s Gramsci 
found himself faced with a use of the concept, particularly by Marxists, 
which, on the one hand, had adopted the originality of the historicity of 
the ‘system of ideas’, but which, on the other hand, tended to interpret 
ideology as mere appearance, that is, as a simple reflection of the 
economic structure, within a rigid framework that once again renders 
useless the development of a proper concept, at the very time when the 
notion of ideology had been freed from its naturalistic origins.18 Gramsci 
reacted against this simplification: 
For Marx, ‘ideologies’ are anything but appearances and illusions: they 
are an objective and operative reality; they just are not the mainspring 
of history, that’s all […]. Marx explicitly states that humans become 
conscious of their tasks on the ideological terrain of the superstruc-
tures, which is hardly a minor affirmation of ‘reality’ […]. This topic 
of the concrete value of superstructures in Marx should be studied 
thoroughly. Recall Sorel’s concept of the ‘historical bloc’. If humans 
become conscious of their task on the terrain of superstructures, it 
means that there is a necessary and vital connection between structure 
and superstructures, just as there is between the skin and the skeleton 
in the human body. It would be silly to say that a person stands erect 
on his skin rather than his skeleton, and yet this does not mean that 
the skin is merely an appearance and an illusion – so much so that the 
condition of a flayed person is not very pleasant.19
Reference is being made here to the human organism, something 
that we shall often encounter in the Prison Notebooks, to describe the 
workings of modern society. For now we are simply going to point out 
that Gramsci’s analogy between the relationship of skeleton to skin, and 
that of structure to ideology, serves not only to express the mutual inter-
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dependence of the pairs of terms, but also alludes to a general systemic 
function that ideology (like skin) performs within the overall mechanism. 
There can be no (living) skeleton without skin, and likewise there can 
be no skin (performing its function) without a skeleton. The two things 
only operate together, without, however, any necessary hierarchical 
relationship between them given that both, albeit in different ways, are 
determined by the presence of the other. This approach thus negates the 
simplistic vision of ideology as a mere instrument.
the complexity of ideology
A second characteristic of Gramsci’s conception of ideology is its 
complexity. In fact, for Gramsci ideology represents a ‘complex form 
of the social world’,20 not only in the sense of ‘complicated’, but more 
precisely – and etymologically speaking – in the sense of a non-linear 
object, composed of different parts and several elements, that depends on 
various determinations. Thus, ideology in the Prison Notebooks cannot 
be conceived as a unitary moloch, a pre-established, coherent block of 
ideas and positions, constructed in order to be instilled in the minds of 
subalterns by intellectuals, ideologists or party officers. On the contrary, 
in Gramsci’s view there are those who are privy to an ideology due to 
their standing in the world of production, or because of their position 
in the disjointed world of common sense; there are those who produce 
ideology from their position as major intellectuals, and those who do so 
as the ‘dominant group’s “underlings”’.21 There are also those who operate 
in a manner inconsistent with their own ideology, and thus who express 
an ‘ideology in practice’ that is different from that of their words: 
The average worker has a practical activity but has no clear theoretical 
consciousness of his activity in and understanding of the world; 
indeed, his theoretical consciousness can be ‘historically’ in conflict 
with his activity. In other words, he will have two theoretical con-
sciousnesses: one that is implicit in his activity and that really unites 
him with all his fellow workers in the practical transformation of 
the world and a superficial, ‘explicit’ one that he has inherited from 
the past. The practical-theoretical position, in this case, cannot help 
becoming ‘political’ – that is, a question of ‘hegemony’. Consciousness 
of being part of a hegemonic force (that is, political consciousness) is 
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the first stage on the way to greater self-awareness, namely, on the way 
to unifying practice and theory.22
This citation from Gramsci clearly alludes to the problem of class 
consciousness and its development. However, one thing that seems to 
be of a certain importance in this context is the refusal to consider that 
theoretical consciousness that is inconsistent with its own practice as 
mere mystification. The elements of this (allegedly false) consciousness, 
in fact, appear disjointed in common sense; they are the result of the strat-
ification of hegemonic intellectual traditions that have been transcended, 
producing what Gramsci calls the ‘folklore of “philosophy”’.23 At certain 
times these fragments condense and are rearticulated24 to form an 
integral part of a new historical bloc. A ‘hegemonic force’25 is such when 
it comprises, and manages to develop for its own purposes, this entire 
series of ideological ‘remains’.
The true/false model that economic reductionism applies to the 
ideological sphere is thus replaced by an approach based on the 
possibility/impossibility of an ideological element being included within 
a given historical bloc. This possibility/impossibility thus depends on the 
relationship that is established between two, mobile elements, rather than 
on the level of consistency of the ‘derived’ term with the ‘immobile’ term. 
The historical bloc, or rather its specific forms, are thus not determined a 
priori but depend on how the ideological elements present in society are 
politically designed (or able) to be combined (and developed).
The political openness of this approach is clear: ideology becomes the 
battlefield for the conquest of hegemony, whilst Gramsci’s image of the 
historical bloc replaces the Marxian base/superstructure metaphor. The 
study, modification and articulation of this stratification of still active 
ideological remains is the task that the philosophy of praxis must engage 
in, and also lies at the heart of the concept of ideology that Gramsci 
attempts to develop in the Prison Notebooks: 
Obviously, it is impossible to have ‘statistics’ on ways of thinking 
and on single individual opinions that would give an organic and 
systematic picture: the only thing possible is the review of the most 
widely circulated and most popular literature combined with the 
study and criticism of previous ideological currents, each of which 
‘may’ have left a deposit in various combinations with preceding 
or subsequent deposits. A more general criterion becomes part of 
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this same sequence of observations: changes in ways of thinking, in 
beliefs, in opinions do not come about through rapid and generalized 
‘explosions’, they come about, for the most part, through ‘successive 
combinations’ in accordance with the most disparate ‘formulas’. […] in 
the cultural sphere diverse ideological strata are variously combined, 
and what has become ‘scrap iron’ in the city is still an ‘implement’ in 
the provinces.26
The composition of this historical bloc depends first and foremost on 
the ‘relations of force’, upon which Gramsci formulates a genuine draft 
copy of revolutionary political theory in the lengthy note 17 to Notebook 
13.27 In this note, which gathers together and transcribes other notes 
previously drafted under the heading title Machiavelli. Relations of force 
(sometimes forces), Gramsci tries to ‘accurately pose […] the problem of 
the relations between structure and superstructure’,28 offering a dynamic 
interpretation of such in the light of a series of elements that are to remain 
key to the Prison Notebooks. They are all cited here together, within the 
space of a few pages.
The difference between organic and conjunctural (or occasional, cf. 
Chapter 5, section ‘The political science of crisis’) movements: the former 
are permanent and of historical significance, and are independent of 
individuals; the latter are occasional, cyclical and affect the small ruling 
groups;
• The two principles set out in Marx’s ‘Preface’ to A Contribution to 
the Critique of Political Economy (1859), according to which ‘no 
society sets itself tasks for whose accomplishment the necessary 
and sufficient conditions do not already exist’ and ‘no society 
breaks down and can be replaced until it has first developed all the 
forms of life which are implicit in its internal relations’ (cf. Chapter 
5, section ‘A new understanding of the crisis’).29
• The political realism of Machiavelli that demands for the ‘history 
maker’ ‘an objective and impartial analysis’ against ‘One’s own 
baser and more immediate desires and passions’.30
• The different levels of the relations of force, with the second level 
– the political one – presenting much wider space for manoeuvre: 
not conditioned by structure as the first level (tied to the base and 
independent of people’s will), nor conditioned by the contingency 
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of the battle as the third level (military relations of force, cf. Chapter 
5, section ‘Crisis and organization’).
• The relativization of the concept of crisis, freed from ‘collapse 
theory’ and reconsidered as the terrain of political struggle (cf. 
Chapter 5). 
Thus it can be argued, going back to these questions, that in Gramsci’s 
view the historical bloc is formed through an organic movement, within 
the context of the decline of a social form, by means of political action 
based on realism that can be deployed in political relations of force in 
particular, taking advantage of the crisis as a terrain of political struggle.
It is clear that the above is a constructive, almost geometric, model 
forcing the analysis in the direction of the production of a historical 
subjectivity capable, at the end of the process, of transforming the 
ideological elements found to be disjointed within society. In fact, the 
note ends with the following words:
 The decisive element in every situation is the permanently organised 
and long-prepared force which can be put into the field when it is 
judged that a situation is favourable (and it can be favourable only in 
so far as such a force exists, and is full of fighting spirit). Therefore the 
essential task is that of systematically and patiently ensuring that this 
force is formed, developed, and rendered ever more homogeneous, 
compact, and self-aware.31
However, the ‘ideological path’ of this force cannot be propelled 
forward by an image of ossified consistency between class position and 
class consciousness, a view that basically aims to bridge a presumed 
original gap and to achieve a ‘no-longer ideological’ condition. On the 
contrary, this force, if it wishes to be increasingly homogeneous, strong 
and conscious, must study and understand its existing forms, all of 
which are constantly undergoing transformation. The world of the ruled, 
in fact, is always impregnated with various different ideologies.
It is here that Gramsci’s realism moves a step forward from the other 
conceptions of ideology in existence at that time. In fact, he interweaves 
the study of the ideological reality curbing revolutionary action with a 
constant reflection on how the conditions of validity of this stable config-
uration can be surmounted. The analysis of society’s ideological network 
serves to realistically frame the analysis of the modern, complex forms 
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of consensus organization and of political mediation, in order to be able 
to pose the question: what are the practical and theoretical preconditions 
for a possible revolution in the West? At the same time, this analysis does 
not exhaust the Gramscian ‘question of ideology’ that works towards 
a change in premises designed to radically modify the meaning and 
practical consequences of ideological ‘conditioning’. Thus, far from being 
utopian, Gramsci’s thinking, within this interwoven process, is revealed 
to be a dynamic form of political realism that is careful to emphasize the 
contingency of ideological phenomena associated with specific power 
relations, and to negate the objectivity of such phenomena deriving from 
any indeterminate ‘human nature’. 
The development of ideologies in Gramsci thus takes the form of a 
circular movement that at certain moments is characterized by inten-
sification and organization, and at others by crisis and decay. The 
scale ranging from incoherence/disintegration at one end, to unity/
organicity at the other, sees ideology deriving from the latter of these two 
poles, in strict relationship with a given social group, before taking an 
independent, unforeseen direction, disintegrating and coming together 
again in another form when said social group declines. There are then 
many different types of ideological articulation within capitalism itself, 
and they operate as factors legitimizing the capitalist order, even in 
opposing ways. For example, in 1917, in an article entitled ‘Tre principii, 
tre ordini [Three Principles, Three Orders]’,32 Gramsci notes that each 
historically established liberal order is based upon one specific principle, 
as follows: the principle of freedom underlying the English order 
(economic liberalism and free competition); the principle of rationality 
underlying the German order (protectionism and organization). In 
liberal Italy, on the other hand, it has no guiding principle, because ‘Italy 
has missed out completely on that period of gradual development which 
made possible the England and the Germany of today’.33 Thus, in Italy 
there is no order in the rationalizing form to be found in the other two 
countries, because the ideological development of the bourgeois forces 
never happened, leaving Italian society’s ideological forms in a disjointed 
state. The ‘third order’ of Gramsci’s article is thus the one that the 
working class is to establish on the basis of the principle ‘that all citizens 
should be able to develop their own, human personality to the full’.34 In 
Gramsci’s view, there is thus no specific ideology of the capitalist class,35 
but simply a disjointed series of ideological remains held together by a 
hegemonic force, which differs from one country to another, and which 
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may only be overcome through a struggle for the coherence and unity of 
an opposing ideology.
Finally, it is interesting to note that the formation and development 
of that specific form of ideology represented by common sense, which 
Gramsci identifies in the subsequent sedimentation of the philosophies 
of intellectual groups representing social classes in decline, at least 
partly conflicts with the Marxian argument contained in The German 
Ideology, according to which ‘Morality, religion, metaphysics, all the 
rest of ideology and their corresponding forms of consciousness, […] 
have no history, no development; but men, developing their material 
production and their material intercourse, alter, along with this their 
real existence, their thinking and the products of their thinking’.36 While 
it is undoubtedly true that for Gramsci as well, men’s actions are what 
alter their consciousness, it is also true that common sense is character-
ized by some sort of development, albeit unguided, and a history, albeit 
disjointed, and that this is one of the primary reasons for its persistence, 
for its constituting an inexorable restraint on any higher, critical self-con-
sciousness organic to any political project. Investigating both the history 
of ideological forms and their complex contemporary stratification was 
one of Gramsci’s primary objectives when writing the Prison Notebooks.
the truth/falsity of ideology
Ferruccio Rossi-Landi, in what may be considered to be one of the most 
systematic discussions ever of the concept of ideology, identifies eleven 
meanings of the term that are then grouped into two categories: on the 
one hand, ideology as false consciousness (critical-negative meaning) 
and, on the other, ideology as a vision of the world (positive-descriptive 
meaning).37 In the theoretical tradition of Marxism, which has probably 
offered the greatest number of definitions of ideology, such a distinction 
may be boiled down (of course, by trivializing it just like the majority of 
twentieth-century Marxism has done, in fact) to the difference between 
the Marx of The German Ideology – in which ideology inverts real 
relations – and the Lenin of What is to be Done? – which on the contrary 
refers to the opposition of socialist and bourgeois ideologies.38 
If we had to place Gramsci in relation to these two positions, we 
would put him somewhere between the two: close to Marx’s position 
when he, Gramsci, acknowledges, in any case, the mystifying character 
of bourgeois ideologies, insofar as they are ‘instrument of government of 
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the dominant groups’.39 In this case, ideologies have a ‘rapid transience 
in that they tend to hide reality – namely struggle and contradiction’;40 
they do not mystify reality as such, but rather its intrinsic contradic-
tive nature, that is, the class struggle. Gramsci finds himself tending 
towards the latter position (that of Lenin), however, when, situating the 
concept within the framework of the class struggle – insofar as ideologies 
mainly ‘“organize” the human masses’41 –, he identifies a concept of 
truth that is not absolute, but is the result of political struggle. In fact, 
if the superstructures represent the level at which a ‘struggle of political 
“hegemonies”’42 is fought, which determines people’s consciousness, and 
if the connection between theory and practice is constitutive of social 
activity, rather than having to be artificially created, then the result of the 
ideological struggle itself establishes the reality of people’s lives.
At this point we encounter the Gramscian argument criticizing the 
concept of the ‘objective reality of the external world’ as exemplified 
by Bukharin’s book – but originating from Lenin’s Materialism and 
Empirio-criticism (1908) – which presupposes the existence of an 
‘objective’ external world that is independent of the subjects that inhabit 
it. In this conception, Gramsci finds traces both of the religious idea of 
God the Creator, who establishes the world before, and regardless of, 
Man, and of the naive metaphysics of philosophical materialism, which 
idealizes nature as an objective external entity.43 Here, reality is perceived 
as already formed, independent of and external to the subject, who can 
only try to perfect the cognitive means with which to master that reality. 
Gramsci’s opposition to this theory does not consist of any idealistic 
subjectivism – despite not being a reductionist, he nevertheless remains 
within the materialist ranks – but of an objectivity of the real that can 
only exist in relation to the practice of ideological struggle:
Objective always means ‘humanly objective’ which can be held to 
correspond exactly to ‘historically subjective’: in other words, objective 
would mean ‘universal subjective’. Man knows objectively in so far as 
knowledge is real for the whole human race historically unified in a 
single unitary cultural system. But this process of historical unification 
takes place through the disappearance of the internal contradictions 
which tear apart human society, while these contradictions themselves 
are the condition for the formation of groups and for the birth of 
ideologies which are not concretely universal but are immediately 
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rendered transient by the practical origin of their substance. There 
exists therefore a struggle for objectivity (to free oneself from partial 
and fallacious ideologies) and this struggle is the same as the struggle 
for the cultural unification of the human race.44
With the ‘ideological problem’ defined in these terms, the debate over 
the intrinsic truth or falsehood of ideologies loses not only its interest, but 
also its meaning. In fact, the element that establishes the objectivity-truth 
of ideology becomes historically determined, ultimately corresponding 
to that of historical efficacy. An efficacy that is to be evaluated on the 
basis of the distinction between ‘historically organic ideologies’ and 
‘arbitrary, rationalistic, “willed” ideologies’,45 as a counterpoint to the 
previously mentioned distinction between organic movements and 
conjunctural movements in relations of force: the former are necessary 
for a given structure – they constitute, as we have seen, its ‘skin’; the 
latter, on the other hand, are the result of ‘individual “movements”’46 
that do not organize or mobilize people, but merely serve the interests of 
individuals or small groups.
At this point however, the concept of ideology reaches its point of 
maximum tension, as it finds itself describing a series of phenomena 
that share apparently contradictory features. In fact, on the one hand, 
Gramsci sees common sense, folklore and religion as powerful forms of 
a mystifying ideology; on the other hand, shunning reductionism and 
economism, he argues that such forms of consciousness possess their 
own historical ‘truth’, insofar as they are effectual.47 Likewise, he perceives 
the dangers of conceiving socialist ideology as being true, scientific and 
immutable, without any direct interaction with the historical struggle 
that ‘renders it valid’.48
Gramsci’s conception of ideology is debated within this very space 
characterized by the confrontation of the effectuality of those ideologies 
present with the struggle of future ideology to ‘prove its truthiness’. It 
is a productive concept for the very reason that it is forced to contend 
with the duplicity of its content that is determined, in each case, by the 
political struggle. This characteristic also distinguishes the concept of 
hegemony, which in fact is applied both in the analysis of the West’s 
‘fortresses and emplacements’49 that prevent an East-style revolution 
and in relation to the transition to the hegemonic phase in the USSR 
with the New Economic Policy.50 It comes as no surprise to discover 
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that there is only one definition of ideology in the Prison Notebooks, 
where it is described as a ‘scientific, energetic, educational hypothesis 
that is verified <and criticized> by the real development of history, that 
is, it is turned into science’.51 This concise definition establishes certain 
fundamental principles, nonetheless:
• Firstly, it is a ‘hypothesis’, and thus it does not contain any principle 
of truth deriving from the position in the economic structure of 
the bearer of such ideology, but is open to a ‘truth procedure’.52
• It is of an ‘educational’ character, that is, it is strictly linked to the 
transformation of those subjects it affects, and is ‘energetic’ in that 
it acts as a stimulus to the transformational action.
• Thirdly, it is connected to the ‘real development of history’, and is 
thus susceptible to gradual adjustments and never formalized in 
any doctrine.
• Finally, ideology, during the practical ‘truth procedure’, must 
be ‘turned into science’, that is, it must contain all the elements 
required for scientific prevision, where the adjective ‘scientific’ 
means, as we shall see in the next section, a certain degree of 
objectivity (always understood as historically subjective).
At this point it should be noted that Gramsci’s pursuit of a suitable 
definition of ideology came at a time in history prior to the semantically 
heavy duty understanding of the concept that was to persist throughout 
the entire twentieth century – mediated by the famous Marxian metaphor 
– whereby ideology was seen as the inversion of reality.53 Ideology had 
not yet been conceived in such terms by Marxists writing during the 
period in which Gramsci drafted his notes. The concept in question was 
still undergoing formulation, its suggestive character still limited at that 
time, and as such it was open to other contiguous terms and concepts 
that placed the emphasis on other aspects of social reality, and that were 
utilized in the fields of philosophy, sociology or psychology. Thus, the 
Prison Notebooks offer a ‘conceptual constellation’ centring around the 
question of ideology. This constellation includes some of the concepts 
that have characterized Gramscian analysis, such as ‘hegemony’, 
‘historical bloc’, ‘folklore’, ‘religion’, ‘philosophy’ and ‘science’, which we 
shall now examine at the points where they intersect.
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the conceptual constellation  
of ideology including hegemony
Of the family of terms that gravitate around the concept of ideology, one 
stands out in particular, that is, hegemony: ‘the moment of hegemony 
and consent [must be understood] as a necessary form of the concrete 
historical bloc’.54 It is to be found, in fact, ‘in the organic life of civil 
society and the State’,55 and it expresses the socio-political capacity of a 
ruling class to construct a system of legitimization in which individuals’ 
actions are framed within those preordained forms of conduct permitted 
by the political powers that be. While hegemony is sometimes considered 
or used with a great emphasis on the organization of consent, Gramsci 
also consistently sees it as involving degrees of coercion. Hegemony, 
together with its coercive side that Gramsci, in reference to Machiavelli, 
calls dictatorship, in fact regards the ‘preservation and defence of organic 
structures’,56 and specifically includes ‘the State […] as an organism’,57 
that has to create ‘an equilibrium of parties within an organic whole in 
which the strongest party would be hegemonic’.58 Within this context, 
ideology with its political mobilizing power and its need to ‘be turned 
into science’ in practice becomes the terrain for the hegemonic struggle 
(‘ideological terrain’, not surprisingly, is one of the most common 
expressions to be found in the Prison Notebooks). Hegemony, in turn, 
becomes the political process that aspires to conquer the ideological 
terrain. ‘Ideological terrain’, which should not be confused with ‘opinion’, 
is strictly connected (the skin and bones metaphor applies once again) 
to a practical movement for the creation or reproduction of an order. 
Once such terrain has been seized, and ideology has been ‘verified 
<and criticized> by the real development of history’,59 as happened, 
for example, with the October Revolution, then according to Gramsci, 
another level is reached that is not only practical but also theoretical: 
‘The realisation of a hegemonic apparatus, in so far as it creates a 
new ideological terrain, determines a reform of consciousness and of 
methods of knowledge: it is a fact of knowledge, a philosophical fact.’60 
The theoretical-practical notion of ideology to be found in the Prison 
Notebooks is thus a precondition for the development of the theory of 
hegemony. Both concepts developed in an ambivalent, albeit productive 
manner, as the result of an analysis that not only predicted the forms of 
the new order, but also tried to investigate the resistance offered by the 
existing order.
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The concept of ‘historical bloc’, seen from the point of view of its 
connection to the concepts of ideology and hegemony, on the other 
hand, describes the capacity of a ‘social system’61 to conform and 
organically develop, accounting both for its complex structure – which 
in Gramsci’s view is embedded with ‘a succession of sturdy fortresses 
and emplacements’62 – and its duration. Gramsci borrows the concept 
from Georges Sorel – probably thinking of a summary of a passage 
from Reflections on Violence contained in a book by Giovanni Malagodi, 
given that it is absent in Sorel’s own works63 – and uses it to describe the 
successful result of the hegemonic attempt to conquer the ideological 
terrain. This action established (and continues to establish) a new 
ideological terrain on which a specific articulation of forces inscribes 
society’s movements.
The historical bloc is never definitively established, and it does not 
always manage to include – either through coercion or consent – all of 
the social forces expressed by society. This dynamic is also the concept’s 
strong point, and it derives from one specific feature of the historical bloc, 
namely, the organic character of the relations within that bloc. We have 
already come across the organic systematic ‘adjectivation’ of ideology, 
and we shall encounter it again when discussing the notions of party and 
intellectuals. We therefore need to specify straightaway the Gramscian 
use of the unique sociological opposition of organic and disorganic. In 
fact, in the Prison Notebooks the latter term does not seem to express 
the ‘inorganic’ nature of a relationship, its inherent ‘not-organic being’ 
(Gramsci rarely uses such expressions64 preferring the notion of the 
crisis of a given organicity, or of the allusion of a possible, but yet to be 
created, alternative organicity). Thus, in Gramsci’s view, social relations 
are always organic, and their disorganic character is only the result of 
the crisis of an organic unity, or from the impossibility to create another 
organic unity.
Gramsci thus appears to support a model of historical development 
based on the co-existence of moments of disintegration and organic 
recomposition, during which the two phases – the revolutionary phase 
(during an ‘organic crisis’65) and the ethico-political phase (‘the moment 
of hegemony’66) – must arise at the same time if a system of power is 
to be threatened. The new order may only derive from the sum of the 
objective disintegration of the society in crisis such as at times of war, 
and the subjective condition of the systematic organization of a new 
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social structure and order supported by a new historical bloc capable of 
organically reassembling the parts.
At this point, key to our discussion of ideology are the notions of 
‘common sense’ and ‘folklore’, which Gramsci defines in opposition 
to the notion of ‘philosophy’. However, this opposition differs in the 
two cases. While there is a fundamental difference between folklore 
and philosophy regarding the rigidity of the former compared to the 
latter, the difference between common sense and philosophy does not 
concern their theoretical constitution, but their respective coherence 
and systematic character:
Every social stratum has its own ‘common sense’ which is ultimately 
the most widespread conception of life and morals. Every philosoph-
ical current leaves a sedimentation of ‘common sense’: this is the 
document of its historical reality. Common sense is not something 
rigid and static; rather, it changes continuously, enriched by scientific 
notions and philosophical opinions which have entered into common 
usage. ‘Common sense’ is the folklore of ‘philosophy’ and stands 
midway between real ‘folklore’ (that is, as it is understood) and the 
philosophy, the science, the economics of the scholars. ‘Common 
sense’ creates the folklore of the future, that is a more or less rigidified 
phase of a certain time and place.67
Common sense is thus an intermediate entity lying between folklore 
and philosophy. It is changeable, and when it ‘sets’ it creates folklore in 
the true sense of the word, which is stronger and preserves a certain 
consistency as the remaining part of a certain way of thinking that has 
crystallized over time. Therefore, folklore inevitably has a negative, 
almost invariably reactionary value, which should be historically 
analysed as a sign of a previous dominance in the realm of thought.68 
Common sense, on the other hand, may contain progressive elements 
insofar as it is still a flexible expression of actual contradictions, an 
expression of emergent classes. Therefore, while folklore must be rejected 
and criticized as ideological terrain, common sense has to be considered 
the ‘raw material’ of a new conception of the world, since it also contains 
the seeds of the new ‘systems of ideas’ connected to the emerging classes.
However, common sense also contains elements of past conceptions, 
mainly derived from ‘religion’, another element that Gramsci identifies 
as characteristic of the ideology of the popular strata: ‘not only by the 
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religion that happens to be dominant at a given time but also by previous 
religions, popular heretical movements, scientific concepts from the 
past’.69 ‘Science’ is an antidote to these religious elements representing 
‘the most widespread and deeply rooted ideology’:70 science is the last 
element that Gramsci introduces in this semantic opening of the concept 
of ideology. A science that is not to be understood as ‘objective knowledge’, 
as the philosophical foundation of the philosophy of praxis, as Bukharin 
seems to understand it. Considering science as ‘the conception of the 
world par excellence, which lifts the veil formed by ideological illusion’,71 
reveals a double misunderstanding. On the one hand, with regard to the 
presumption of mechanically transposing natural scientific methods to 
the field of social phenomena: 
Since it ‘appears’, by a strange inversion of the perspectives, that the 
natural sciences provide us with the ability to foresee the evolution of 
natural processes, historical methodology is ‘scientifically’ conceived 
only if, and in so far as, it permits one ‘abstractly’ to foresee the future 
of society. Hence the search for essential causes, indeed for the ‘first 
cause’, for the ‘cause of causes’. But the Theses on Feuerbach had already 
criticized in advance this simplistic conception. In reality one can ‘sci-
entifically’ foresee only the struggle, but not the concrete moments 
of the struggle, which cannot but be the results of opposing forces in 
continuous movement.72
On the other hand, the misunderstanding concerns the theoretical 
constitution of science, which must be duly interpreted in order to 
relativize the ‘pure’ notion of objectivity that positivism has helped 
establish as the theoretical ‘armour’ protecting science.73 In describing 
the merits of science in disproving the most archaic, superstitious 
positions adopted by common sense and folklore, Gramsci describes, as 
we have seen, a ‘spurious’ notion of objectivity, which must be a char-
acteristic of science as well, or rather, a relative notion of objectivity in 
which ‘relative’ is meant to refer to those very people who create, use and 
falsify science itself:
One thus establishes what is common to everyone, what everyone 
can control in the same way, one independently from another, as long 
as each has observed to an equal degree the technical conditions of 
ascertainment. ‘Objective’ means this and only this: that one asserts 
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to be objective, to be objective reality, that reality which is ascertained 
by all, which is independent of any merely particular or group 
standpoint. But, basically, this too is a particular conception of the 
world, an ideology.74
Gramsci grasps, in a surprising manner, the philosophical meaning of 
the revolution in physics during the twentieth century, which radically 
altered the status of the hard sciences during the very years of Gramsci’s 
imprisonment. This revolution, which Gramsci followed from the 
outset from within his prison cell, was to increasingly question the 
clear distinction that classical physics had made between subject and 
object, and to move towards a probabilistic view of reality influenced 
by observation.75 The reflections on science contained in the Prison 
Notebooks may thus be considered part of a dual critique: that of 
Bukharin’s essay and of the naive positivism that transforms science into 
an objective totem; and that of the simplistic idealistic transpositions of 
scientific theories that trivialize the new knowledge by translating it into 
an extreme form of subjectivism.76
Science, given its ‘objective – corresponding to historically subjective’ 
character, is thus part of ideology, being, as it is, ‘the union of the 
objective fact with a hypothesis or system of hypotheses which go 
beyond the mere objective fact’.77 However, it is as a result of its very 
character as ‘a historical category’ rather than the philosophical basis of 
historical materialism that ‘can be accepted by the philosophy of praxis’.78 
It contributes towards challenging common sense and religion through 
principles that are falsifiable – one could say ‘contractual’ at this point – 
thus sharing what Gramsci perceived as one of the underlying principles 
of the philosophy of praxis, that is, the ‘absolute […] earthliness of 
thought’79 that defines the type of objectivity of which both science 
and philosophy of praxis are bearers: ‘The whole of science is bound to 
needs, to life, to the activity of humanity. Without humanity’s activity, 
which creates all, even scientific, values, what would “objectivity” be?’80
As well as science as such, the philosophy of praxis must adopt a form 
of politics that conveys conduct that is in keeping with such philosophy. 
On this level, on the other hand, religion – Protestantism in particular 
– represents a model that has to be encapsulated by a new conception of 
the world that wishes to impose itself in practice. According to Gramsci, 
the thing that religion emphasizes is that ‘of a unity of faith between a 
conception of the world and a corresponding norm of conduct’,81 a topic 
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that in lay terms remains key to any philosophy that wishes to produce 
a historical transformation. In this regard, Gramsci asks himself: ‘why 
call this unity of faith “religion” and not “ideology”, or even frankly 
“politics”?’.82 We know for sure that Gramsci had read the very first 
translation into Italian of Max Weber’s The Protestant Ethic and the 
Spirit of Capitalism.83 It is clear that Gramsci’s observation regarding the 
relationship between ideology, religion and politics is a reference to the 
German sociologist’s studies, and it contributes towards a non-reductive 
analysis of religion, as shown by the assessment Gramsci offers of the 
Protestant Reformation, which gave rise to the philosophy of praxis’ need 
to encourage an intellectual and moral reform: ‘Historical materialism, 
in its dialectic of popular culture-high culture, is the crowning point of 
this entire movement of intellectual and moral reform. It corresponds to 
Reformation + French Revolution, universality + politics’.84
Even from this perspective, ideology plays a fundamental role with 
regard to the central issue analysed by Gramsci in his Prison Notebooks, 
namely, that of the conditions and possibility of the revolution in the 
West. The consistency between theory and practice, between ethics and 
everyday conduct, and ultimately between the formation of a historical 
bloc and the break-up of a rival bloc, can only be obtained through this 
new theory of ideology.
2
The individual




the structure of the individual
In the first chapter, we saw how the ideological forms identified and 
analysed by Gramsci, rather than being dependent on the strict economic 
determination, are the result of the relations among individuals within 
society. However, this social formation of ideologies is based on an implicit 
premise, namely, a specific conception of Man whereby the relationship 
between the individual and society is perceived as a constituent element 
of the individual himself. In fact, Gramsci presupposes (and indeed 
states, as we shall see) a rather unusual conception of individuality 
that distinguishes him from the Marxists of his generation, and that 
reveals a sensitivity akin to that of the nineteenth-/twentieth-century 
social sciences.
However, no attempt shall be made here to identify a Gramscian 
‘political anthropology’ based on the liberal model,1 designed to 
generalize certain characteristics in order to render them universal. On 
the contrary, the focus shall be on identifying Gramsci’s approach to 
individuality as something concerning the structure of the individual, 
that is, the individual’s composition from a series of organic, but also 
conflicting, interconnected parts. In Gramsci’s mind, this structure 
depends on the individual’s social relationships, and is necessarily linked 
to the individual’s mass experience. Thus, this structure may generalize 
and universalize different contents, depending on relations among 
individuals and between themselves and society as a whole.
Gramsci’s investigation of this type of Man, where every individual 
is seen as a ‘mass-man’ or ‘collective man’,2 is based on the experience 
of the early 1920s, where, on the one hand, Soviet Russia attempted to 
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construct a ‘New Man’, while, on the other hand, Italy witnessed the 
emergence of Fascism, which produced and reproduced ‘social individ-
uality’ on the basis of a mechanism of mass inclusion that was original 
and unknown to the liberal order. Gramsci used this basis to outline 
the characteristics of a ‘new type of Man’,3 which may be reconstructed 
using the same approach adopted with regard to ideology, by means of 
certain concepts contained within Gramsci’s discourse, namely: Man, 
human nature, individuality and personality.4 We come across an initial 
definition in Notebook 10:
Man is to be conceived as an historical bloc of purely individual and 
subjective elements and of mass and objective or material elements 
with which the individual is in an active relationship. To transform the 
external world, the general system of relations, is to potentiate oneself 
and to develop oneself.5
The image is clear here: each individual is an aggregation of individual 
elements and mass elements, both subjective and objective, of personal 
characteristics and relational characteristics. Thus, each individual is not 
defined solely on the basis of his own specific characteristics, but owes 
his genesis to the complex interrelationship between specific subjective 
factors, on the one hand, and the general social relations in which he 
is immersed, on the other. The individual is a ‘centre of interaction’6 
between individuality, that is, the specific characteristics of each 
human being, and the outside world, that is, the individual’s relations 
with his peers and with society as a whole. This interweaving, given its 
dependence on general social relations, is of a dynamic character, and 
as such is not determined a priori by any ‘natural’ features, but on the 
contrary depends on the evolution of relations within society: ‘one must 
conceive of man as a series of active relationships (a process) in which 
individuality, though perhaps the most important, is not, however, the 
only element to be taken into account’.7
Thus, the reciprocal relationships among individuals are continuously 
redefined, and their only ‘nature’ identifiable a priori is that of their 
dynamic structure, that is, their potentiality understood as a space where 
forces and relations intersect. Gramsci developed these reflections on the 
basis of his criticism of both liberal anthropology and Catholicism:
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From the ‘philosophical’ point of view, what is unsatisfactory in 
Catholicism is the fact that, in spite of everything, it insists on putting 
the cause of evil in the individual man himself, or in other words that 
it conceives of man as a defined and limited individual.8
The image of the ‘individual in himself ’ – defined by nothing else, and 
solely responsible for the world’s ills – constitutes the basis of Catholic 
doctrine, and is systematically reflected also in secular philosophies: ‘It 
could be said of all hitherto existing philosophies that they reproduce 
this position of Catholicism, that they conceive of man as an individual 
limited to his own individuality and of the spirit as being this individual-
ity.’9 Here Gramsci clearly makes reference to the speculative philosophy 
of Benedetto Croce rather than to German idealism in general, given 
that Hegel remains one of the favoured sources of a relational definition 
of the individual for Gramsci.10
The perception of Man as a monad, on the other hand, which is so 
dear to both Christianity and to Croce’s philosophy, in Gramsci’s mind 
represents an attempt to formulate a general philosophy based on a unitary 
conception of the individual: a definitive, stable, reactionary theoretical 
project that is indifferent to social relations and their conflictual 
dynamics; one capable of advocating a return to the presumed unity of 
the human species that necessarily acts in a coercive manner in order 
to direct the sporadically subversive masses towards an abstract unity 
defended by professional philosophers – Gramsci maintains – who are 
totally disconnected from the people. On the contrary, ‘Man in general’ 
does not exist, and any proposal to suggest that he does represents 
the premise for a political programme designed to bend individuals’ 
multiplicity and contradictory character to its own purposes. Human 
nature, on the contrary, may only be identified with ‘the ensemble of 
social relations’;11 it is not a fixed concept but a developing one, not of 
unity but of inherent contradictions.
The image of Man portrayed by Gramsci is thus unrelated to either his 
physical or mental constitution, or to his singularity – his self-referential 
being. This dual negation, however, reveals two positive characteris-
tics of human beings: the historicity (or political quality) defining the 
contingency of each and every individual formation, and that presupposes 
the transformation of the world in order for people to fully express their 
individuality; and the sociality that sees social relations as a constituent 
element of an individual’s being. The openness of each individual 
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to others that this approach guarantees means that each individual is 
potentially capable of identifying with the entire human species and 
its contradictions, through ‘The humanity which is reflected in each 
individuality’.12 By thus maintaining that the link between individuals 
and the human species can be found within each individual, Gramsci 
confirms the Marxian idea, present in The German Ideology – a work 
that Gramsci did not know but which renders the comparison even more 
interesting – of the creation, through the development of capitalism, of 
empirically universal individuals:
only with this universal development of productive forces is a 
universal intercourse between men established […], and finally 
[this development] has put world-historical, empirically universal 
individuals in place of local ones.13
Man, historically determined and defined by his relationship with other 
men, thus finds himself potentially, and with the emergence of capitalism, 
effectively, related to humanity as a whole. Consequently, the individual’s 
constitution is established by the relationships that he/she establishes 
with other people and with the surrounding natural environment. Such 
relationships are not mechanical, but ‘active and conscious’,14 mediated 
through collective organisms (in the case of relations with other people) 
or by work and techniques (in the case of the natural world). Awareness 
of these relations, the relationship that the individual establishes with the 
world through such, comes about ‘organically’ rather than ‘by juxtapo-
sition’, and corresponds to ‘the greater or lesser degree of understanding 
that each man has of them’.15 Thus, Man is involved in his own formation 
and in that of his fellow men, and he does so in a more or less conscious, 
intentional manner.
When individuality, that is, the specific element of each individual, 
is combined with ‘sociality’, that is, the relation that determine said 
individual, and their union is recognized as the battleground on which 
an individual is effectively constituted, then in Gramsci’s mind that 
individual acquires his own personality: ‘to create one’s personality 
means to acquire consciousness of them [the relations], and to modify 
one’s own personality means to modify the ensemble of these relations’.16 
The fact that the acquisition of personality, and thus the critical under-
standing of one’s own constitution, is a necessary precondition for 
influencing the historical process, is shown by the way in which Gramsci 
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uses this reference not only in relation to individuals, but also with 
regard to collectivities such as the Nation – ‘The national personality (as 
the individual personality) is a mere abstraction if considered outside 
the international (or social) nexus’17 – or the State – ‘seeking and finding 
within itself, within its complex life, all the elements of its historical 
personality’.18 The key characteristic of this type of Man tied to the 
relationship between individuality and sociality is thus ultimately that of 
being transformable. 
This formulation is clearly indebted to the works of Marx and Engels. 
In fact, the sixth of the Theses on Feuerbach establishes that ‘the essence 
of man is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In reality, it is 
the ensemble of the social relations’,19 The German Ideology also reiterates 
these social origins of individuality.20 In the Prison Notebooks, however, 
we find a specific focus on the description of the individual as a stratified, 
contradictory being, in which the individual elements act upon the 
social elements, and vice versa. This focus on the social characteristics 
of individuality, on the one hand, and on its social determinants, on the 
other, is a sign that reveals a further influence on Gramsci’s perception 
of the individual, namely, the discursive field of French sociology led by 
its most influential theoretician, Émile Durkheim.
the social production of the individual:  
gramsci and durkheim
Gramsci was a careful scholar of French history, and the presence of 
French culture is clear in the Prison Notebooks.21 They contain numerous 
references to the positivism of Comte and to his ‘“organic” concepts’,22 and 
pay considerable attention to Charles Maurras and Action Française.23 
Gramsci also displayed an interest in the work of Henri-Louis Bergson,24 
who found himself at the centre of the reaction to positivism that was 
to lend an irrational tone to the majority of intellectual works produced 
during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. By 1921, in 
fact, in a polemical atmosphere produced by the imminent splitting of 
the Italian Communist Party from the Italian Socialist Party, faced with 
the positivist heritage of the Italian workers’ movement and comparing 
this with its French counterpart closely tied to Bergson’s ideas, Gramsci 
had no hesitation in admitting that ‘Bergson is a mountain while our 
positivists were nothing more than frogs in a swamp’.25 Finally, he was 
well acquainted with the work of Georges Sorel, who had used the 
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journals L’Ère Nouvelle [The New Era] and Le Devenir social [The Social 
Becoming] during the 1890s to divulge the themes of the emerging 
sociology within the context of Marxist debate.
Thus, from his earliest years in Turin, Gramsci had displayed an 
interest in the French experience during the Third Republic, in that 
cultural milieu that searched for answers to the organic crisis of the order 
in the analysis of society, dealing with the decline in solidarity within 
an increasingly dynamic society that was losing the binding power of 
its traditional values as a result, among other things, of France’s defeat 
in the war against Prussia. Gramsci’s analysis of how the different 
French schools of thought tried to understand the limitations, novelties, 
dynamics of, and divisions within, this new society, meant that the Third 
Republic became a favoured field of study and comparison, where the 
hegemonic methods employed by the ruling classes to govern society 
could be analysed together with the emergence of the social sciences as 
useful tools with which to deal with demands for order, social organicity 
and political direction.26
In Gramsci’s view, fifty years prior to the political turmoil witnessed 
in Italy, France had seemed one large ‘bourgeois laboratory’27 where 
solutions to the crisis of the liberal order were tested out. An attempt to 
govern society that took account of the new ‘collective men’28 produced 
by industrial development and mobilized by mass politics. Notwith-
standing their profound differences, the French republican-democratic 
system of the turn of the century, and the authoritarian Italian regime of 
the 1920s and 1930s, thus seemed to express the same need to respond to 
the changed relationship between individuals and society resulting from 
the crisis of the liberal order.
The one work that best represents France’s pursuit of social cohesion 
is without doubt Émile Durkheim’s The Division of Labour in Society, 
published in 1893.29 The thing that really stands out here is the way in 
which some of Durkheim’s theoretical perceptions are also to be found 
in Gramsci’s work, in particular the conception of Man deriving from 
the interweaving of organic and mechanical solidarity within the context 
of a complex society that perceives such as the two poles around which 
empirical reality is to be arranged.30 In fact, Durkheim submits that
there is in the consciousness of each one of us two consciousnesses: 
one that we share in common with our group in its entirety, which is 
consequently not ourselves, but society living and acting within us; 
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the other that, on the contrary, represents us alone in what is personal 
and distinctive about us, what makes us an individual.31
On this basis, Durkheim distinguishes between two types of solidarity: 
mechanical solidarity, such that ‘to the extent that the ideas and tendencies 
common to all members of the society exceed in number and intensity 
those that appertain personally to each one of those members’,32 and 
organic solidarity, which ‘assumes that they [the individuals] are different 
from one another’ and ‘is only possible if each one of us has a sphere 
of action that is peculiarly our own, and consequently a personality’.33 
The prevailing type of solidarity, and the type of relationship between 
the individual and society, depend on the proportion between these two 
consciousness.
The proximity of Durkheim’s analysis to Gramsci’s thoughts in the 
Prison Notebooks derives from the focus on a shared problem, namely, 
that of the formulation of an image of the individual that is suited to 
modern industrial society, where the dynamic relationship between the 
individual and social elements of individuality conditions the stability 
and reproduction of the system, and where this ‘social production of 
individuals’, who are differentiated from one another but rendered 
uniform in the masses, becomes a key element both for the preservation 
of the system and for the possibility of its eventual overturning. 
In Durkheim’s conception of modern industrial society, the differenti-
ation of individuals is generated by the division of labour, which in turns 
depends on the morphology of societies.34 Such individuals, however, are 
‘restrained’ by a principle of social cohesion that is inherent to society, 
that does not derive from the projection of the State over society and 
that is not available to single individuals or groups thereof. In this regard 
Durkheim, whilst placing the emphasis on the plurality of, and the at 
times conflicting dynamics between different parts of society – just 
like that between the corresponding parts of the individual – does not 
conceive of the possible existence of a power that is that of just one part 
of society, or rather, that is not the power of society as a whole. Gramsci, 
on the other hand, distances himself from Durkheim by acknowledging 
the political potential of the socially determined elements of the indi-
viduality of a specific part of society, that is, of that part connected to 
the new forms of industrial labour. In this way he galvanizes that side of 
the individual/society relationship that remains immobile in Durkheim, 
focusing on the relationship between the social part of individuality and 
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society itself, as the struggle to change the relations within society and, 
together with this, that very part of individuality that represents the 
individuation35 thereof: ‘So one could say that each one of us changes 
himself, modifies himself to the extent that he changes and modifies the 
complex relations of which he is the centre of interaction.’36
The propulsive force behind this change is seen as the conflicting 
relationship between personality (individuality + sociality) and general 
social relations. In an industrial society that develops a specific division of 
labour, this translates into class struggle. The working class’s acquisition 
of personality means acknowledging, whilst modifying, this division; it 
means overturning the aforesaid social relations. Class struggle is thus 
the characteristic of the acquisition of personality: 
To transform the external world, the general system of relations, is to 
potentiate oneself and to develop oneself. That ethical ‘improvement’ 
is purely individual is an illusion and an error: the synthesis of the 
elements constituting individuality is ‘individual’, but it cannot be 
realised and developed without an activity directed outward, modifying 
external relations both with nature and, in varying degrees, with other 
men, in the various social circles in which one lives, up to the greatest 
relationship of all, which embraces the whole human species. For this 
reason one can say that man is essentially ‘political’ since it is through 
the activity of transforming and consciously directing other men that 
man realises his ‘humanity’, his ‘human nature’.37
What Gramsci includes in the aforementioned passage – the political 
actions of part of society on society itself – is a process that can no longer 
be formulated using the categories of Durkheim’s sociology, which 
deliberately maintains society as a unified whole, as its chosen focus. 
However, the analysis of the new type of Man, based on the interrela-
tionship between his individual and social elements, appears to be based 
on an idea shared by both writers. And while, on the one hand, this 
means that Gramsci’s discourse displaces the political within the sphere 
of partiality rather than that of universality, on the other hand, Gramsci 
remains aware of the difficulties involved in such a dislocation. In 
accepting the theoretical moves and the concepts of the social sciences, 
Gramsci in fact also necessarily develops those political problems and 
questions to which such concepts refer. 
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‘man is a social worker’: gramsci and sorel
Georges Sorel, as we have already mentioned, represents an important 
juncture in the relationship between French sociology and Marxism. 
In fact, he can be considered to be one of the principal drivers of the 
influence that French sociology’s field of discourse had on the image of 
the individual and society outlined by Gramsci in his Prison Notebooks. 
Sorel is actually known above all as the theoretician of revolutionary 
syndicalism and in particular of the general strike: not as a utopian ideal 
– a purely intellectual product – but as a myth, that is, a pure expression 
of will: ‘Whilst contemporary myths lead men to prepare themselves for 
a combat which will destroy the existing state of things’ – Sorel wrote in 
a letter to Daniel Halévy in 1907 – ‘the effect of utopias has always been 
to direct men’s minds towards reforms which can be brought about by 
patching up the system’.38
As we know, Sorel’s myth of the general strike assigns a key role to 
class violence. It is perceived by Sorel as being the only way out of the 
bourgeois system, that is, a necessary step towards the creation of a new 
order: ‘Proletarian violence entirely changes the appearance of all the 
conflicts in which it plays a part, since it disowns the force organized 
by the bourgeoisie and wants to suppress the State which serves as its 
central nucleus.’39 Certain elements of Sorel’s well-known reflections play 
an important part in the drafting of the Prison Notebooks, as the literature 
concerning the two writers has often shown.40 A certain similarity may 
also be seen between Gramsci’s experience in the factory councils 
during the red years (1919–20) and Sorel’s writings on the autonomy of 
the producers. However, hardly anyone has bothered to reconstruct the 
possible influence on Gramsci of Sorel’s theoretical reflections prior to 
the highly influential Reflections on Violence.41
In the 1890s, in fact, Sorel had yet to develop his reflections on violence 
and the general strike. He had had a long career as a civil engineer in 
the Third Republic, and was influenced by the positivism that pervaded 
France at that time. He studied and published essays on psychology and 
criminology, but he also had a sound humanistic background influenced 
by major liberal-conservative thinkers such as Taine and Renan (as well 
as Tocqueville).42 His formation as a socialist thinker was thus still a 
fairly recent development at that time. In 1894 he published a number 
of reviews in the French journal Ère nouvelle [The New Era], the first 
French theoretical Marxist journal, together with an essay entitled ‘The 
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Old and the New Metaphysics’43 in which Durkheim’s recommenda-
tions from The Division of Labour in Society were combined with Marx’s 
class analysis. In the journal Le Devenir social [The Social Becoming] 
– a publication that Sorel promoted, and which was characterized by 
the attempted renewal of French Marxism through the introduction of 
elements taken, in fact, from the social sciences – he published other 
articles dealing with the same topic. The journal’s opening article, 
entitled ‘Mr. Durkheim’s Theories’, was a long essay on Durkheim’s The 
Rules of Sociological Method.44 During this period, Sorel was trying to 
establish a non-deterministic science of social facts that took on board 
the innovations of historical materialism, in the face of positivism’s 
structural decline. A ‘materialistic theory of sociology’45 embracing 1) 
the more advanced elements of French sociology (Durkheim), 2) the 
essential centrality of the class struggle (Marx), and 3) the experimental 
methods of the natural sciences. 
The themes focused on by Sorel’s particular form of revisionism were, 
not surprisingly, also dear to Gramsci who took the critique of economic 
dogmatism as his basis for the construction of a revolutionary political 
theory centred around the interaction between the social and the 
political. Gramsci discovered the echoes of the battle of ideas fought by 
Sorel during this period not only in his pre-prison readings, but also in 
the fundamentally important correspondence between Sorel and Croce 
published by La Critica [The Critique], which he read carefully and 
commented on at numerous points in the Prison Notebooks.46
In the lengthy essay entitled ‘The Old and the New Metaphysics’, Sorel 
examined the problem of determinism and individual freedom, and tried 
to establish a ‘real metaphysics’ connected to industrial development. 
This was at the time of Sorel’s initial relationship with Marxism, when 
the question of Marxism was still dealt with in a very orthodox manner; 
however, we can already perceive the key issues that, received from 
Durkheim and screened by Marx, reached Gramsci in the form of 
suggestions. Sorel criticized that ‘formal system’ that ‘appeared under 
the name of social economy’,47 and countered it with a real metaphysics 
that enabled people to know ‘the laws pertaining to economic concepts’.48 
This was the scientific socialism of Karl Marx, which combined social 
enquiry with a scientific theory capable of establishing class struggle as 
an intrinsic feature of bourgeois society.49 According to Sorel, Marx was 
among the few to understand the decisive influence of the environment 
on individuals’ actions; however, Marx – and this is his true strength – 
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did not reduce the environment to an external thing determined by the 
fatalism of natural and biological laws, as Durkheim seemed to do, but 
he always related it to Man and his actions:
It is virtually unnecessary to recall the importance of the man-made 
environment to Karl Marx’s doctrine. Just as a cell does not live in 
any immediate relationship with the cosmic elements, so Man does 
not develop in isolation. The environment is fabricated, constructed, 
constantly transformed by his activities, and any science that neglects 
this environment is a groundless anthropology.50
Sorel was thus searching for a new image of Man on which to base 
his analysis of social facts, of a new relationship between the individual 
and the environment. He found that image in the writings of Marx, 
and agreed with the definition of all milieus as artificial, and with the 
claim that such milieu could be transformed. The opportunity to create 
a science of social actions thus came about in Sorel’s case through his 
examination of labour: ‘Aristotle […] defined Man as a rational and 
social animal. Today […] the term worker comprises, for modern-day 
people, an expression of being alive and being rational, and thus we say 
that Man is a social worker.’51 Man’s working activity underlies both his 
individuality and his sociality: he is conceived as homo faber in the broad 
sense of creator and transformer of both his milieu and of himself. 
The words of Gramsci regarding Man as an ‘essentially “political”’ 
being,52 insofar as he is both transformer and director, re-echo here. 
However, the influence of Sorel on Gramsci, just like that of sociology 
on Gramsci’s Marxism, is not so much literal as mediated. These are 
topics, terms and concepts that in moving from one field to another, 
fortify the analysis to be found in the Prison Notebooks, rendering it 
capable of unexpected departures by means of which Gramsci succeeds 
in articulating (but not always resolving) those thorny political questions 
that the social sciences raise vis-à-vis political theory. Questions such as: 
what are the preconditions for socio-political order in mass societies?; 
what is the relationship between the individual and society in the age of 
the intensification of social relations?; what emplacements need to be 
conquered in order to break up this social formation of individuality and 
rebuild it on new foundations?
In this setting, for example, it is both surprising and yet in keeping with 
this reconstruction, to see Gramsci’s broad use of the term ‘environment’. 
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The ‘determined market’ – a concept that Gramsci uses to account 
for social regularities – is in fact defined as ‘an environment which is 
organically alive and interconnected in its movements of development’.53 
The ‘real philosopher’ who ‘cannot be other than the politician’, is, 
instead, ‘the active man who modifies the environment’;54 likewise ‘Every 
man, in as much as he is active, i.e. living, contributes to modifying the 
social environment in which he develops’.55 However, this equation also 
holds in the opposite sense, given that the environment is considered 
to be the specific agent of social coercion in forming individuality: ‘As 
if there has not always been some form of coercion! Just because it is 
exerted unconsciously by the environment and by single individuals, 
and not by a central power or a centralized force, does it cease to be 
coercion?’56
It is clear that such a repeated use of a characteristically sociological 
term by a Marxist thinker is somewhat unusual. In fact, Marxist doctrine 
has always preferred concepts such as ‘material conditions’, ‘relations 
of production’ or ‘ideological relations’, depending on requirements. 
Gramsci, on the other hand, makes ample use of the term ‘environment’, 
and further proof of this is given by the translation of the Theses on 
Feuerbach that Gramsci worked on whilst in prison, prior to the writing 
of his Prison Notebooks,57 where his translation of the third thesis into 
Italian from the original German reads as follows:
La dottrina materialistica che gli uomini sono il prodotto dell’ambiente 
e dell’educazione e che pertanto i cambiamenti degli uomini sono il 
prodotto di altro ambiente e di una mutata educazione, dimentica che 
appunto l’ambiente è modificato dagli uomini e che l’educatore stesso 
deve essere educato.58
[The materialist doctrine that men are products of their environment 
and education, and that, therefore, changed men are products of a 
changed environment and education, forgets that it is men who change 
the environment and that the educator must himself be educated.]
Gramsci’s translation is certainly not the best possible one, as in fact 
the editors of the Translation Notebooks themselves admit,59 but it 
is of particular interest owing to the use of the Italian term ambiente 
[environment] as the translation of the German term Umstände. Marx, 
in fact, uses this term in the German original,60 which literally speaking 
should be translated using the Italian word circostanze [circumstances, 
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the term that the Italian and English translations of the time in fact use], 
rather than Umwelt, a term introduced by the social sciences at the turn 
of the century, which corresponds to the Italian ambiente [environment]. 
This would seem to point to the influence of the French term milieu, 
which was to become extremely popular in French social sciences 
between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
Let us conclude our consideration of Sorel by emphasizing how the 
process whereby people are created, both inside and against one’s own 
milieu, is grafted onto Durkheim’s model that distinguishes between the 
individual and the social parts of Man: 
Language reveals to us, very clearly, that all of our actions are of a 
two-fold character; they are both individual and social: everywhere 
one finds a pair of expressions, one of which refers to a private force, 
the other to a public force: sin and crime, repentance and retribution, 
penitence and punishment, love and marriage, generation and family, 
agreement and contract, etc.61
It is here that the fundamental theoretical divergence from Durkheim’s 
work lies: the social aspect of individuality becomes society’s dynamic 
lever through his class analysis. Thus, ‘Producer-Man’ is a new type of 
Man: industrial labour creates a class of producers with political potential 
deriving from that part of individuality that is socially determined. 
Here Gramsci follows the same line when he affirms that ‘Today […] 
collective man is formed essentially from the bottom up, on the basis 
of the position that the collectivity occupies in the world of production’, 
reiterating that the focus of analysis of this emerging new world must 
be ‘the economic base of collective man: big factories, Taylorization, 
rationalization’.62 Consequently, Gramsci’s answer to the question ‘What 
is the reference point of the new world in gestation?’ is ‘the world of 
production, labour’.63
Thus we can summarize Sorel’s anthropology as follows: 1) Man is 
both an individual being and a social being (social worker); 2) the former 
cannot be scientifically analysed, whereas the latter can be (‘personal 
processes have no common measure and may only be considered in the 
individual; the objective effects of material transformations constitute 
phenomena of a similar nature, and may be compared’),64 3) the study 
and understanding of these social phenomena must result from the 
study of industrial development.65
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Sorel thus grafted onto Durkheim’s model a conception of society and 
of the individual that was centred around labour and was accompanied by 
the idea of class struggle. This no longer comprised the ‘de-subjectivized’ 
division of labour that Durkheim identified in modern societies as 
the result of morphological changes, but a definition of the individual 
founded on his labour, as in the case of the factory worker, and which 
thanks to this offers at one and the same time a world view, an ethics 
and a new society opposed to the existing one. In Gramsci’s view, this 
assumption finally clears the way for the political use of the terms and 
concepts adopted in the social sciences, thus showing that the ‘toolbox’ 
utilized by French sociology can be used to formulate a revolutionary 
theory articulated by a partisan subject capable of organizing itself 
organically to become the State.
the theory of personality and  
molecular transformations
Finally, let us go back once again to Chapter 1’s reconstruction of the 
broadened concept of ideology to be found in the Prison Notebooks. 
In Gramsci’s view, ideology is the environment, internally diversified 
into different levels of coherence and truth, in which individuals’ lives 
are structured together with their positions vis-à-vis other individuals. 
However, ideology is also the domain within which both the personality 
and the individuality of individuals is formed, either casually or in a 
structured political manner. Thus, we can use this basis to build a genuine 
Gramscian theory of personality formation,66 whereby the ideological 
field represents the space within which individuals are created.
As we have seen, Gramsci believed that each individual comprised a 
series of internal elements constituting his individuality – such elements 
often being of a contradictory nature – which in turn reflected the het-
erogeneity of society and said person’s relations with others. Thus, the 
individual and society reveal an isomorphism: each displays both unitary 
characteristics and internal conflicts, and neither can be interpreted on 
the basis of any one principle of coherency that determines them in a 
linear fashion. Therefore, the theory of personality and the theory of 
society are, in the Prison Notebooks, two expressions of the same problem. 
This finding means that the ideological struggle within society must also 
be fought at the level of the formation of individuals. 
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As with society, in the case of individuals the shifting elements 
constituting each individual may find their coherent equilibrium if one 
of them prevails thanks to its hegemonic capacity. It cannot be taken for 
granted, however, that this equilibrium is attained in this manner, on the 
basis of a coherent plan and through a coercive/consensual force applied 
in order to implement that plan. In fact, it may arise in an ‘incoherent’ 
form, as a hotchpotch of different, contradictory conceptions that 
co-exist: 
When one’s conception of the world is not critical and coherent but 
disjointed and episodic, one belongs simultaneously to a multiplicity 
of mass human groups. The personality is strangely composite: it 
contains Stone Age elements and principles of a more advanced 
science, prejudices from all past phases of history at the local level and 
intuitions of a future philosophy which will be that of a human race 
united the world over. To criticize one’s own conception of the world 
means therefore to make it a coherent unity and to raise it to the level 
reached by the most advanced thought in the world.67
As further confirmation of the isomorphism between the individual 
and society, this description of the possible individual contradictoriness 
is reflected in the social contradictoriness of common sense, which ‘is 
not a single unique conception, identical in time and space. […] it is a 
conception which, even in the brain of one individual, is fragmentary, 
incoherent and inconsequential, in conformity with the social and 
cultural position of those masses whose philosophy it is’.68
Thus, not everyone possesses a coherent individuality; indeed, 
it is much more likely that a person’s individuality is of a transient, 
fragmentary character, which however – and this is the key point – does 
not prevent individuals from ‘functioning’ as such, of being ‘mass active 
individual[s] operating in a practical manner’ even in the presence, as we 
have seen, of a ‘theoretical consciousness […] historically in opposition 
to [their] activity’.69 In this case, it should be emphasized, Gramsci is 
not describing a situation of disorder in which individuals are instable 
because of their contradictory natures – in view of their fragmentary, 
transient consciousness – but, on the contrary, a particular form of order. 
The individual – once again as with society, where no one organizational 
principle exists – rather than becoming anomic, in fact participates in 
a societal order that may be formed from a number of contradictory 
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individual orders.70 Thus, Gramsci’s analysis leads to an awareness of 
the fact that in addition to the sovereign order based on the principle of 
command and obedience, there is also another, truly social order that is 
apparently disorderly, but where conflicting individuals fit in perfectly.
The individual’s internal contradictoriness is thus reflected in the 
contradictory nature of society, in the form of conflict among different 
groups of people. However, this in turn affects individual personalities, 
which experience a form of internal conflict as a result. In a letter to 
his sister-in-law Tatiana, Gramsci wrote: ‘How many societies does each 
individual belong to? And doesn’t each one of us make continuous efforts 
to unify his conception of the world in which there continues to subsist 
heterogeneous fragments of fossilized cultural worlds?’71 The class 
struggle, in fact, is also a struggle that goes on within each individual, in 
the constant effort to render one’s own individuality coherent:
Having ascertained that, given the contradictory nature of social 
relations, the consciousness of men must also be contradictory, the 
problem arises as to how this contradiction manifests itself, and how 
unification can be gradually attained: it manifests itself in the entire 
social body, with the existence of group historical consciousness (with 
stratifications corresponding to diverse stages of civilization’s historical 
development and with antitheses in those groups that correspond to 
the same historical level) and it manifests itself in single individuals 
as a consequence of such a ‘horizontal and vertical’ disintegration.72
In this regard, it should be said that Gramsci understood the 
importance of the then emergent Freudian psychoanalysis, by including 
it in the process of construction of this ‘new Man’: ‘The most salutary 
and immediately acceptable nucleus of Freudianism is the need to study 
the unwholesome repercussions entailed in the construction of any 
“collective man”, of any “social conformism”’.73
The formation of this new man lies at the centre of Gramsci’s entire 
theory of personality, which thus applies to the three momentous 
phenomena that during his time best expressed this constructive 
endeavour: the creation of socialism in the USSR; the emergence of 
Fascist regimes in Europe; and the birth of Fordism-Taylorism in the 
USA. The connection with the ‘sociality’ of this new Man constitutes 
the crux of the emergence of these three different ‘mutations’. However, 
all three cases represent long-lasting processes that not only operate 
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coercively in contingent circumstances, but also produce effects that are 
felt over a lengthy period of time.
In this regard, Gramsci uses a specific concept to describe the manner 
in which a new personality emerges, and is subsequently consolidated, 
within the same individual. This concept is that of ‘molecular transfor-
mations’, which is to be found not only in Gramsci’s political reflections 
in the Prison Notebooks, but also in his private reflections contained in 
the Letters from Prison. The meaning of the term refers, in both cases, to 
the slow, yet inexorable mutation of single elements within an organism 
(be it individual or collective) that at a certain point metamorphose from 
quantitative to qualitative, and which redefine the nature and structure 
of the object in question: 
As I have begun to judge with greater indulgence the catastrophes of 
character […]. I say that who is changed ‘molecularly’ (where this is 
understood to be by force majeure) is ‘morally’ more justifiable than 
who changes suddenly […]. A typical example is that of cannibalism. 
One may say that, at the current level attained by civilization, 
cannibalism is so repugnant that a normal person is to be believed 
when they say that faced with the choice, they would kill themselves. 
In reality, the same person, if faced with exactly the same choice – ‘be 
a cannibal or kill yourself ’ – would no longer reason like this, because 
there would have come about such changes in the self that ‘killing 
oneself ’ would no longer present itself as a necessary alternative; those 
people would become cannibals without giving suicide the slightest 
thought.74
Acting in a molecular, almost imperceptible manner, at least until the 
transformation has largely come about, the force driving the mutation 
avoids any direct confrontation, fragmenting and deploying its action on 
various different fronts, and thus engaging in a genuine war of position 
in order to conquer the organism, whether a person or a social aggregate.
Gramsci experiments with such dynamics personally, during the 
more difficult moments of his detention. The hardships of prison life, his 
precarious state of health, the isolation in which he lives from one day 
to the next; all of this acts molecularly to cause that catastrophe of the 
character described when he uses the example of cannibalism. In a letter 
to Tatiana, Gramsci writes:
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the most serious thing is that in these cases there is a split in the 
personality: one part if it observes the process, the other suffers it, but 
the observing part (as long as this part exists there is self-control and 
the possibility of recovery) senses the precariousness of its position, 
that is, it foresees that it will reach a point at which its function will 
disappear, that is, there will no longer be any self-control and the entire 
personality will be swallowed by a new ‘individual’ who has impulses, 
initiatives, ways of thinking different from the previous ones. Well, I 
am in this situation. I don’t know what of me may remain after the end 
of this process of change that I sense is in the course of development.75
The splitting of the personality in this case indicates an awareness 
of the transition from one individual to another, from one personality 
(individuality + sociality) to another: but ‘This fact – Gramsci continues 
– from being individual may be considered collective’.76 The trasformismo 
[transformism] witnessed ‘from 1860 to 1900’ is therefore defined as 
‘molecular’ due to the fact that ‘individual political figures moulded by 
the democratic opposition parties were incorporated one by one into 
the conservative-moderate “political class”’.77 Likewise, also the Fordist 
mechanization and rationalization of production that ‘has determined 
the need to elaborate a new type of Man’78 was studied in terms of its 
molecular moulding of the workforce through high wages and the strict 
control over the private lives of workers. Hence, also all those processes 
that may be included within the category of passive revolution: 
One may apply to the concept of passive revolution (documenting 
it from the Italian Risorgimento) the interpretative criterion of 
molecular changes which in fact progressively modify the pre-existing 
composition of forces, and hence become the matrix of new changes.79
From the recognition that all major political and productive changes 
are the result of gradual, constant molecular changes, one cannot deduce 
that their development, just like their origin, cannot be influenced by 
the will of men, according to a form of fatalism that certainly does not 
pertain to Gramsci. On the contrary, he denies all forms of automatism 
or mechanicism when he reiterates, time and again, that there has always 
been a degree of will and hegemonic planning that drives and imposes 
such changes, and with the advent of mass politics this is now clearer 
than ever: 
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this fact [the molecular transformations] ought to be studied as 
it presently manifests itself. It is not that this circumstance has not 
arisen in the past, but it is clear that it has taken on a special and 
[…] calculated form at present. That is, now it is considered that 
this happens and the event is prepared systematically, which did not 
happen in the past (systematically, however, means ‘en masse’ without 
excluding, of course, special ‘attention’ to individuals).80
This molecular nature of historical change is not restricted to passive, 
that is, conservative transformations of society, but is of a general character, 
and also characterizes the war of position that one part of society engages 
in as it attempts to overthrow that society. Each ‘formation of a collective 
historical movement’ in fact proceeds in ‘molecular phases’,81 and this 
process is in no way mechanical or automatic, but depends directly on 
the political will of a hegemonic force.
The interweaving of individual transformation and social transfor-
mation that we have analysed here is, ultimately, the precondition for 
the question that we shall be looking at in the next chapter, that is, the 
question of collective organisms:
It will be said that what each individual can change is very little, 
considering his strength. This is true up to a point. But when the 
individual can associate himself with all the other individuals who 
want the same changes, and if the changes wanted are rational, the 
individual can be multiplied an impressive number of times and 
can obtain a change which is far more radical than at first sight ever 
seemed possible.82
Social cooperation, which in production creates a value that is greater 
than the sum of individuals’ labours, also creates a surplus in the social 
sphere that exceeds the mere sum of the individualities that come 
together. Collective organisms, their internal lives, their relations with 
individuals, are all Gramscian questions that go well beyond any theory 
of the political party.
3
Collective organisms
All Italians are capable of the occasional, theatrical heroic act, which 
may be productive, but which may also appear a fruitless waste of 
energy. The proletariat has shown itself to be better than this. It is 
capable of both things. It is a social organism, a living complexity.
Antonio Gramsci
8 September 1917
collective organisms between  
civil society and the state
The nature and workings of collective organisms – not only parties, 
but also trade unions, associations and intermediate bodies in general 
– represent a specific sphere of reflection in the Prison Notebooks, 
particularly in regard to the new relationship between State and society 
that in Gramsci’s view emerged during the age of mass politics. During 
the early years of the twentieth century, in fact, there was a growing 
gap between the exercise of power by the dominant elites, on the one 
hand, and the new requirements of ‘social government’ resulting from 
the political emergence of the masses, on the other. As a result of the 
First World War, not only had this crisis of the liberal order become 
increasingly evident, but it had reached a point of no return, in fact. 
Italy’s ruling classes had been legitimized by the national character 
of the political order established in 1861, which combined modern 
contractual legitimacy – whereby the command/obedience relationship 
was guaranteed by its originally contractual roots and was thereafter no 
longer challengeable1 – with a reference to the ‘community of destiny’2 
of a people, which in its various forms constituted further legitimization 
and created a link between governed individuals and the governing elites.
This model of national order, despite its fragile nature in a nation that 
had only recently been unified,3 had lent support to the creation of a 
unified administrative machine, of a shared feeling of belonging, and 
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of a bond between individuals and the national State, which was sub-
stantially effective from the point of view of the government of a nation. 
However, from the late nineteenth century onwards this model entered 
a period of crisis, with an aspect of non-governability resulting from 
the emergence of new players into the political space. In fact, these new 
players no longer related to the liberal order in their capacity as neutral 
individuals, but in a collective mode, that is, in the form of the masses 
or as emerging intermediate entities. The period bridging the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries was thus characterized by the realization of 
this disunity resulting from, among other things, the emergence of 
new institutions, hubs of interests and power, which removed certain 
spheres of mediation and representation from the State that up until then 
had been considered the only institution qualified to interact with the 
demands of those individuals under its power.
This problem of legitimacy was also tackled within the formal sphere 
of law that, during this process of relaxation of the principal channel 
of command, reformulated its own unitary system of construction. 
This period witnessed the emergence of the institutional theory of law, 
whereby law derives from society – in a bottom-up process – and not, 
on the contrary, from political power, in a top-down process designed 
to guarantee the conformity of society to a ‘legal design’. This approach, 
which acknowledges the phenomenon of the multitude of associative 
forms, also acknowledges, as a consequence, a plurality of existing 
and competing legal systems. Santi Romano, the Italian jurist who 
commenced this tradition, based his approach on the very consideration 
that the flourishing of organizations mediating between the State and 
individuals constitutes the key element of the ‘modern State […], [that] 
soon manifested itself to be inadequate in regulating, indeed often in 
failing to acknowledge, groupings of individuals’.4
Gramsci tried to reconstruct the origins of this change by going back to 
the foundation of intermediate organisms as the result of the consolida-
tion of the modern State, which needed to abolish ‘many autonomies of 
the subaltern classes’5 in order to create room for the new political-State 
entity. Modern politics thus ‘abolishes the state as a federation of classes 
– but certain forms of the internal life of the subaltern classes are reborn 
as parties, trade unions, cultural associations’.6 In re-writing these words 
four years later, Gramsci was even more explicit when he stated that ‘The 
modern State replaces the mechanical bloc of social groups by subordi-
nating them to the active hegemony of the ruling and dominant group, 
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thus abolishing some autonomies that however re-emerge in another 
form, as parties, trade unions, cultural associations.’7
The autonomy of social groups in the pre-modern age, in fact, 
permitted a certain freedom of movement and organization, the 
counterpart to which was the use of force by external powers as the only 
way of obtaining the obedience of such otherwise autonomous groups. 
This freedom of movement – which was real despite being constantly 
threatened by the use of violence – was first eliminated by the central-
ization of the power and the bureaucratic-administrative functions of 
the modern State, only to re-emerge in new forms within the State. The 
State thus became the mediator of specific, yet organized requests, by 
introducing consensus-based dynamics into its relations with society.
Within the context of this transformation, the new autonomies were 
(re-)established with the ‘State hallmark’: their organization, their 
action, their very existence was connected to the State, which enabled 
them to re-emerge within that State’s ‘own’ society. Hence, this autonomy 
existed, but its roots still lay in the political domination of State power. 
According to Gramsci, the essence of this problem was already present in 
the work of Hegel, with the transition from a ‘“patrimonial” conception 
of the State’8 to an ‘expansion of the State’9 that was to include, in fact, the 
private system of consensus:
Hegel’s doctrine of parties and associations as the ‘private’ fabric 
of the State […]. Government by consent of the governed, but an 
organized consent, not the vague and generic kind which is declared 
at the time of elections: the state has and demands consent, but it also 
‘educates’ this consent through political and trade-union associations 
which, however, are private organisms, left to the private initiative of 
the ruling class. Thus, in a certain sense, Hegel already goes beyond 
pure constitutionalism and theorizes the parliamentary state with its 
regimes of parties.10
Expanding the concept of the State in view of its relationship with 
organized consensus – not only that of the dominant, ruling classes, but 
also that of the subaltern classes – in Gramsci’s mind meant rethinking 
the separation of civil society, meaning the private, economic sphere, 
from the State, meaning the public, political sphere. In fact, Gramsci 
broke this dichotomy down further by introducing a third concept, 
that of ‘political society’, meaning the repressive, organizational and 
46 . using gramsci: a new approach
bureaucratic functions of dominion (‘official government’11), by using 
the term State – ‘in the integral sense: dictatorship + hegemony’12 – 
to describe the combination of political society and civil society. This 
arrangement also entails the necessary transformation of the concept 
of civil society: from being the sphere of private economic interests 
described by classical economists, it becomes the field of forces between 
individuals and collective organisms in their relations with the State, 
within which power is not only exercised, but also generated.13
This is a conceptual reconfiguration that cannot be considered final, 
as it is characterized by further oscillations generated by the inherent 
nature of the Prison Notebooks, that is, as a work in progress rather than 
the finished item. In fact, the same notion of the State is sometimes 
used by Gramsci to indicate the sum of civil society and political 
society (consensus + coercion), and at other times as a synonym of 
political society only (coercion).14 However, once the non-final nature 
of Gramsci’s writings is recognized, several observations may be made 
regarding this conceptual reconfiguration. On the one hand, in fact, 
calling the organizational features of the State itself ‘political society’ has 
a specific meaning that marks the ‘incursion’ of society into the coercive 
mechanisms governing the political order. Gramsci, in fact, appears 
more interested in the degree to which the ‘order of society’ figures in 
State mechanisms than in the State’s coercive involvement in society. The 
latter measure is considered inversely proportional to the ruling classes’ 
ability to ‘regulate’ society.15 On the other hand, calling the ‘State’ the sum 
of the coercive element (political society) and the consensual element 
(civil society) makes it possible to broaden the range of figures entrusted 
with keeping order, through a conception of ‘officials’ that include those 
individuals who ‘“acting spontaneously”, [their] action is identified with 
the aims of the state’.16 Finally, by also referring to civil society as the 
‘State’, Gramsci aims to relativize and historicize the unity of social life, 
thus opening the way to the challenging of an order that is only such if 
perceived from the viewpoint of a ‘particular social group’.17 Society, as 
we have seen with human nature, does not contain any inherent eternal, 
transcendent principle; its unfolding depends on the constant recompo-
sition of its unity by the dominant, ruling classes.
The collective organisms that are formed within this State in the 
integral sense are thus of a dual nature: on the one hand, they remain 
the principle vehicle for the actions of the subaltern classes, while, on 
the other hand, they constitute the means by which the dominant, ruling 
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classes exercise their hegemony. It should be pointed out here that this 
is a case of dual nature, and not of alternate operation. In fact, these 
collective organisms are never the exclusive product of the autonomy of 
one social group, and similarly they are never only the instruments by 
means of which the dominant, ruling classes exercise their hegemony. 
On the contrary, they perform both functions concurrently within the 
framework of the interweaving of civil society and State. What does 
change is the prevalence of the one over the other in their everyday 
course of action, or rather, the political capacity to subordinate one 
interest to another through hegemonic action. 
What emerges here once again is the discrepancy between the 
sociological discourse, which postulates the unity of the social sphere 
through its reification, and the Gramscian argument, which, whilst 
adopting various insights into the nature of social phenomena taken 
from sociology itself, nevertheless considers the division of labour to 
be a source of conflict as well as an organizational principle. Taking 
up a position outside the conservative organicism of the majority of 
French sociology, Durkheim himself had acknowledged, in regard to the 
‘class war’, that ‘No similar phenomenon is to be observed within the 
organism’.18 However, the fact that social reality expresses and contains 
something more than the organic projection of the dominant, ruling 
elite, and that this discrepancy may conceal the seeds of a new social 
order, represents the challenge posited by Gramsci. The dual nature 
of collective organisms, in fact, enables them to be ‘made to operate’ 
both as organic mechanisms rebalancing the power system and as an 
independent expression of subaltern, potentially revolutionary demands.
The aforementioned terminological oscillation at this point may 
allude to something more than just non-completion of the argument. 
In fact, it would appear to refer to an inherent ambivalence in the 
concept of State (and consequently in that of civil society), which reveals 
its ‘educational’ face when the civil society within moves in harmony 
with the State’s plans, but reveals its coercive nature when civil society 
moves independently in challenging the State. It is no surprise to find 
that Gramsci writes of an ‘identity-distinction between civil society and 
political society’.19
This categorical reformulation is of prime importance not only in 
terms of the present discourse, but also because Gramsci’s very theory 
of revolution manifests itself within said reformulation, by indicating a 
series of theoretical steps that evoke this transition: the pre-eminence 
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of the war of position over the war of manoeuvre; the distinction 
between organic and traditional intellectuals; hegemony as a strategy 
of class struggle in the age of mass politics.20 All of these formulations 
acknowledge the presence of an epochal event consisting in the trans-
formation of the organization of power, of the mechanisms legitimizing 
that power, and of its relationship with society: a society that no longer 
consists of an external terrain of conquest and disciplining,21 but also an 
internal terrain that determines (and in turn produces) power. A space 
where, going beyond the perception of the State as a machine, on the 
one hand, and the individual as a monad, on the other, the collective 
organisms perform the fundamental function of maintaining (or 
overthrowing) the social and political order. 
bureaucracy and officials: gramsci and weber
Taking Gramsci’s approach to collective organisms seriously entails 
first of all distancing oneself from the idea that they are simply ‘parts of 
society’ as opposed, on the one hand, to single individuals, and, on the 
other, to the State as ‘monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force’.22 
On the contrary, collective organisms are both a projection of the ‘social’ 
characteristics of individuality and a projection of the very organization 
of the State. This dual nature gives rise to a fundamental question, namely, 
that of the connections, the procedures and the relationships that emerge 
between individuals and the collective organisms, and also within the 
same organisms. Gramsci deals with this question through his analysis 
of ‘organic centralism’ and ‘living philology’, which shall be examined in 
Chapter 3, section ‘Organic centralism and living philology’. However, 
a preliminary observation should be made with regard to the question 
of bureaucratization as a defining feature of the process of formation of 
increasingly large and complex apparatuses.
With the advent of mass politics, in fact, bureaucratic organization 
became a characteristic of all collective organisms, raising a series of 
problems not only in technical-administrative terms, but also from the 
strictly political point of view when it overlaps with questions of repre-
sentation, decision making and freedom. As was seen with the formation 
of collective organisms, reconstructed from the advent of the modern 
State, once again Gramsci deals with the problem by tracing its origins:
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As political and economic forms develop historically, a new type of 
official is increasingly being produced – what could be described as 
‘career’ officials, technically trained for bureaucratic work (civil and 
military). This is a fact of prime significance for political science, and 
for any history of the forms taken by the State. Has this process been a 
necessary one, or, as the ‘pure’ liberals claim, a degeneration in respect 
of the ideal of self-government? Certainly every type of society and 
State has had its own problem of officials, which it has formulated 
and resolved in its own way; every society has had its own system of 
selection, and its own type of official to be trained. The reconstruction 
of how all these elements have evolved is of capital importance.23
The argument regarding the new type of Man is taken further here 
as far as regards the relationship with collective organisms, to become a 
discourse on the ‘new type of official’ who imposes himself socially, and 
who must guarantee, within bureaucratic organizations, the reproduction 
of relations among individuals.
It was Max Weber, some of whose writings Gramsci knew of,24 who 
pointed out that the unique characteristic of the modern State was the 
emergence of the professional official as the result of the quantitative and 
qualitative evolution of bureaucracy. This type of official represented a 
new form of domination (authority),25 or rather, a specific form of the 
legitimization of such. This was no longer of the traditional variety, that 
is, guaranteed by the historical continuity of royal lineage, but of the 
rational-legal variety, that is, based on the formal legality of procedures 
(Weber’s third type of legitimate domination, the charismatic variety, 
lacked in continuity, which is indispensable if the State’s organization 
is to be preserved). The legal-rational form of legitimacy consequently 
results in certain persons being vested with powers of command on the 
basis of the provisions of law, thus creating a specific type of official. 
Organized as such, bureaucratic domination ‘inevitably accompanies 
modern mass democracy’, insofar as it ‘usually come[s] into power on the 
basis of a levelling of economic and social differences’.26
The interest in the concept of ‘official’ – a concept insofar as for 
Gramsci it ‘is a fact of prime significance for political science’27 – 
emerges from the question as to whether the formation of said officials 
is a necessity or simply a perversion of historical development. In this 
case, it may be asserted that the creation of a group of officials whose 
task it is to administer organized living is a necessity in Gramsci’s view, 
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as shown by his assertion that ‘every type of society and State has had 
its own problem of officials’.28 Gramsci reiterates this stance in another 
note when, no longer dealing with the question of the necessity of the 
bureaucracy – having already stated that ‘Bureaucracy […] has become 
a necessity’ – he examined the question of the relationship between 
bureaucracy and politics: ‘the issue that needs to be raised concerns the 
formation of an honest and impartial bureaucracy that does not abuse its 
role in order to make itself independent from the control of the represen-
tative system’.29 This problem arises further in a note in Notebook 14, in 
regard to the criticism of parliamentarianism:
That the representative system may politically ‘be a nuisance’ for the 
career bureaucracy is understandable; but this is not the point. The 
point is to establish whether the representative and party system, 
instead of being a suitable mechanism for choosing elected officials to 
integrate and balance the appointed civil servants and prevent them 
from becoming ossified, has become a hindrance and a mechanism 
which operates in the reverse direction – and, if so, for what reasons. 
Moreover, even an affirmative reply to these questions does not 
exhaust the problem. For even allowing (as it must be allowed) that 
parliamentarianism has become inefficient and even harmful, it is not 
necessary to conclude that the bureaucratic system must be rehabili-
tated and praised.30
The question of the relationship between the representative form of 
politics and the bureaucracy thus transcends that of the crisis of the 
liberal system and of parliamentarianism, and as such is something that 
those wishing to construct a new order also have to deal with.
In this sense, Weber’s analyses are further, and rather unexpectedly, in 
keeping with those of Gramsci. Weber believed that the process of democ-
ratization that levels out differences is both upstream and downstream 
from bureaucratic development, and constitutes both a precondition for, 
and a consequence of, such development, even if the two phenomena 
may find themselves opposed to one another once they become rooted 
in specific apparatuses of power: 
the democratization of society […] is an especially favourable basis 
of bureaucratization […] [but] ‘democracy’ as such is opposed to the 
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‘rule’ of bureaucracy, in spite and perhaps because of its unavoidable 
yet unintended promotion of bureaucratization.31
Thus, the two powers may find themselves in a struggle against each 
other, while there is a substantial affinity between the two processes, 
consisting in the levelling effect of the shared submission to an authority. 
For Weber, this ‘levelling of the governed in face of the governing and 
bureaucratically articulated group’ is the key feature of democratiza-
tion, which ‘does not necessarily mean an increasingly active share of 
the subjects in government’.32 His analysis focuses on what he calls the 
‘process of “passive” democratization’.33
Gramsci’s use of the term ‘passive revolution’ – originally coined by 
Vincenzo Cuoco34 – is widely known. He employed this expression 
throughout the Prison Notebooks to describe those historical changes 
that had occurred in the absence of any strong popular action, as a form 
of transition managed and guaranteed by those classes already holding 
power.35 The phenomenon that most interests both Gramsci and Weber 
would thus appear to be the passivity of the masses that makes history, 
as the result of that powerful process of ‘social disciplining’ involving 
all aspects of human existence; and perhaps it is a coincidence, albeit 
a revealing one, that both writers use the term ‘passivity’ to describe 
this process.
However, the difference between Weber’s passive democratization 
and Gramsci’s passive revolution is a reminder of the difference in the 
two writers’ field of discourse. In Weber’s case, the problem remains, in 
fact, that of democracy, a problem that unfolds within the context of an 
‘unstoppable […] advance of bureaucratization’, in the attempt ‘to salvage 
any remnants of “individual” freedom of movement in any sense’.36 In 
Gramsci’s case, on the other hand, the question is one of revolution: that 
is, it is the problem of how to break with the association of bureaucracy 
with passivity, starting from an awareness of the processes leading to the 
development of the bureaucracy, but offering to a collective organism, 
rather than to individuals, the opportunity to be agents, and not just 
passive subjects, of the historical process.37
In Weber’s work, the impossibility of escaping from the confines of the 
bourgeois order in the attempt to conciliate liberalism with increasing 
bureaucratization – thus resolving this contradiction by remaining 
within the liberal tradition – becomes clear when the extreme edge of 
such tradition is recouped with the reactivation of charisma, as shown by 
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the proposal in favour of a presidential, plebiscitary republic for post-war 
Germany.38 In this regard, Gramsci, on the other hand, shows that he 
has fully embraced the shift in focus concerning the subject of political 
action, which can no longer take the form of individuality – each single 
individual, vis-à-vis society, in fact can only suffer the coercive pressure 
of that society, as witnessed in Durkheim’s analysis – but only that of a 
collective organism. The revolutionary problem thus manifests itself as 
the type of relationship to be established between the leading element 
within this organism and the masses composing such, in the context of 
the gradual decline of this distinction during the course of the revolu-
tionary process, ‘until the demise of political society and the advent of 
regulated society’.39
Despite focusing on the same transformations, Gramsci’s and Weber’s 
respective analyses produce different outcomes. In Weber, the political 
man capable of dealing with the transformations of the existing is 
described in tragic terms, and is basically the heroic man capable of 
conciliating the apparently incompatible charisma and bureaucracy. 
In Gramsci, the party, as the only possible political actor, is willing to 
promote the construction of a non-fetishistic relationship between 
the individual and the collective organism, thus creating a new ‘mass 
intellectual’ capable of combining technical qualities and strictly political 
ones.
the political party and the political class
The analysis of collective organisms conducted so far brings us to the 
role of the party in modern mass politics. In fact, Gramsci saw the 
political party as the only body that could enable the subaltern classes 
to get organized and to fight against, and overturn, the capitalist system 
so as to subsequently establish a new order. His insistence on the 
classical question of organization should not be allowed to overshadow 
the specific perspective from which Gramsci viewed the phenomenon 
of organization, covering a much broader series of features than just 
the traditional requirements of decision making and coordination that 
characterized the communist parties of his time. Gramsci’s discourse 
on the political party, in fact, fits into the framework of the analysis of 
collective organisms conducted so far: in other words, it is in keeping 
with those epoch-making processes regarding the form of mass politics, 
the structure of the State and of society, the process of bureaucratiza-
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tion, and consequently the type of relationship among individuals in a 
post-liberal age.
In Gramsci’s view there are two new vitally important aspects that 
need to be understood in order to deal with the question at hand. 
These are: 1) the shifting of the directive function from individuals to 
collective organisms; 2) the transition from a random standardization 
to an organized one – whereby, thanks to ‘communications, newspapers, 
big cities […] the pace of the molecular processes is faster than in the 
past’.40 This is something that evaded both Sorel and his conception of 
myth – ‘a “passive activity”’ as opposed to the ‘“active or constructive” 
phase’41 of the political party –, and Benedetto Croce with his vision of 
politics as a ‘passion’ that reduces ‘parties to “individual” party leaders 
whose “passion” motivates them to construct the instrument that would 
carry them to victory’.42 By distancing himself from these two writers, 
following among other influences the early sociological studies of the 
matter (especially those of Michels, who was influenced by Weber), 
Gramsci began to describe certain characteristic traits of modern politics 
that affect the way the political party is perceived.
First of all, there is the ‘Growing complexity of political work, as a 
result of which party leaders increasingly become professionals’.43 This 
quotation is, in truth, part of Gramsci’s summary of an article written by 
Robert Michels,44 which, however, stands testimony to the attention paid 
to a phenomenon that was also perceived as a problem for communist 
parties. The danger of bureaucratization, in fact, is ‘the most dangerous 
in terms of habitude: if it organizes itself as a separate body, compact 
and independent, the party will end up being anachronistic’.45 This 
was a problem that had emerged in those parties analysed by Michels 
due to the creation, in Gramsci’s opinion, of a ‘class division within the 
organization’,46 whereby the leaders not only did not enjoy the trust of 
the led, but had ended up by representing diverse interests dictated 
in the main by their own privileged position. In the political party 
foreseen by Gramsci, given the absence of any such internal division, 
the organizational and centralization requirements permitted, on the 
contrary, the creation of a close link ‘between great mass, party and 
leading group; and the whole complex, thus articulated, can move 
together as “collective-man”’.47
However, it is clear (also to Gramsci) that the question cannot be 
circumvented so easily. Indeed, the strength of Michels’ analysis lay 
precisely in his demonstrating that bureaucratic perversities also occur 
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within the parties of the working class, when such parties’ fundamental 
characteristics should be political involvement and democratic control. 
The very size of note Q2§75 regarding Michels and the aforesaid problem, 
despite the caustic criticism contained therein, indicates an unresolved 
problem that Gramsci continued to reflect upon at length throughout the 
Prison Notebooks. This is a problem that, as Gramsci clearly understood, 
has no intrinsic or formal solution resulting from any sociological 
analysis designed merely to overturn Michels’ analysis. On the contrary, 
it needs to be dealt with through that revolutionary praxis that modifies 
the very premises of Michels’ discourse, such as that of the insurmount-
able division between the rulers and the ruled.48 The description of social 
reality offered by political science in fact captures an element of truth 
in the realistic representation of the persistence of the division between 
the rulers and the ruled49 also in ‘voluntary’ (non-government) organi-
zations such as political parties; but by ignoring the fact that this division 
refers to a historically determined relationship between individuals and 
collective organisms, which may take other forms, the opportunity is lost 
to grasp developments other than those of a fetishistic nature.50
In this regard, the party of the working classes is not only asked to 
create its own leadership, but also to ‘educate’ one such group that, 
given the existing conditions, does not reproduce the divisions between 
intellectual and manual labour, between those representing and those 
represented, between command and obedience, which characterize 
those societies divided by class:
In the Modern Prince [the political party], the question of the collective 
man; in other words, the question of ‘social conformism’ or of the goal 
of creating a new level of civilization by educating a ‘political class’, 
the ideation of which already embodies this level. Hence the question 
of the role and attitude of every physical individual in the collective 
man.51
It is clear that this quote points to the need to foresee in present 
society those features that are to characterize future society, starting 
with a realistic analysis of the mechanisms governing that society.52 In 
fact, what the working class needs is a ‘political class’, ‘the ideation of 
which already embodies this [new] level’53: a level characteristic of the 
new order that must create a different relationship between ‘the single 
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individual’ and ‘the collective organism’,54 along the lines of the ‘living 
philology’, as we shall see.
For Michels the needs of the organ (the leading entity) compared 
with those of the organism (the party in the broadest sense of the term) 
represented a hindrance to the masses’ participation in the latter’s 
decisions. In Gramsci’s view the needs of the former – the existence and 
operation of which are established, and which provide the undeniable 
scientific achievement of political science – may result in a non-oligar-
chic outcome on the basis of a dynamic, fluid, hegemonic relationship 
between the masses and the elite. Managing to keep both democracy 
and technical-administrative processes together is a central problem of 
political action Gramsci intends to reconsider ‘after the expansion of 
parliamentarism and of the associative systems of union and party, and 
the growth in the formation of vast State and “private” bureaucracies’.55
So, if the level of civilization of the new order has to be foreseen, in 
some way, in the party, the question becomes: ‘which party for which 
new order?’ Once again, Gramsci’s writings attempt to provide a series 
of reflections and warnings regarding a process that can only find any 
‘truth’ through its actual unfolding. One such reflection concerns the fact 
that the continuity of these voluntary organisms needs to be guaranteed, 
without losing that dynamism deriving from the close relationship with 
the group the party represents, which is constantly transformed during 
the course of its development: 
there is an aspect of the issue that pertains to the organizing centre 
of a grouping, namely, the question of ‘continuity’ that tends to create 
a ‘tradition’ – not in the passive sense of the term, obviously, but in 
an active sense, as continuity in constant development, but ‘organic 
development’. This problem contains in a nutshell the entire ‘juridical 
problem’, that is to say, the problem of assimilating the whole 
grouping to its most advanced fraction; it is a problem of education 
of the masses, of their ‘adaptation’ according to the exigencies of the 
end pursued.56
Hence, the need to guarantee the continuity of the political 
organization, but without interrupting the organic development of 
the grouping, which by its very nature is dynamic: ‘There exists, to 
be sure, the danger of becoming “bureaucratized”, but every organic 
continuity presents this danger, which must be watched. The danger of 
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discontinuity, of improvisation is much greater.’57 Gramsci terms this 
principle of continuity an essential ingredient in both ‘public’ structures 
and ‘private’ organizations such as political parties, ‘State spirit’:
does there exist something similar to what is called ‘State spirit’ in 
every serious movement, that is to say in every movement which 
is not the arbitrary expression of more or less justified individual-
isms? Meanwhile ‘State spirit’ presupposes ‘continuity’, either with 
the past, or with tradition, or with the future; that is, it presupposes 
that every act is a moment in a complex process, which has already 
begun and which will continue. The responsibility for this process, of 
being actors in this process, of being in solidarity with forces which 
are materially ‘unknown’ but which nevertheless feel themselves to be 
active and operational – and of which account is taken, as if they were 
physically ‘material’ and present – is precisely in certain cases called 
‘State spirit’.58
The elitist critique of democracy formulated in that period by Michels, 
Mosca and Pareto from an a-democratic viewpoint,59 in Gramsci gets 
transformed into a theory of the ‘rationality, historicity or concrete func-
tionality’60 of elites, that is, of their capacity to effectively respond to the 
needs expressed by social groups who already inherently possess, in their 
economic activity, a political programme that may only be implemented 
‘through the mediation of an élite for whom the conception implicit in 
human activity has already become to a certain degree a coherent and 
systematic ever-present awareness and a precise and decisive will’:61
Among the many meanings of democracy, the most realistic and 
concrete one, in my view, is that which can brought into relief through 
the connection between democracy and the concept of hegemony. In 
the hegemonic systems, there is democracy between the leading group 
and the groups that are led to the extent that <the development of 
the economy and thus> the legislation <which is an expression of that 
development> favours the <molecular> transition from the groups 
that are led to the leading group.62
The key feature of democracy, that is, the masses’ participation in 
the political decision-making process, which in Michels’ view has 
been lost forever, which according to Mosca would be a catastrophe if 
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achieved, and which Pareto believed to be pure theoretical abstraction, 
is on the contrary reformulated by Gramsci, within the framework 
of a revolutionary theory characterized by these new hegemonic-
democratic coordinates.
organic centralism and living philology
Further evidence of Gramsci’s specific problematization of the political 
party as a collective organism can be found in the classification of the 
party’s internal components, based on what Gramsci calls the ‘theorem 
of fixed proportions’:63
for a party to exist, three fundamental elements (three groups of 
elements) have to converge: 1) A mass element, composed of ordinary, 
average men, whose participation takes the form of discipline and 
loyalty, rather than any creative spirit or organizational ability. […] 
2) The principal cohesive element, which centralizes nationally and 
renders effective and powerful a complex of forces which left to 
themselves would count for little or nothing. […] 3) An intermediate 
element, which articulates the first element with the second and 
maintains contact between them, not only physically but also morally 
and intellectually.64
The proportions in which such elements are to be found is given 
by historical conditions and the political contingency. However, the 
second element, which identifies the leaders capable of coordinating and 
centralizing the ‘collective wills’65 that would otherwise be dissipated, is 
the one that always plays the key role in the modern political party. If, 
given favourable ‘objective material conditions’, such an element exists, 
then in Gramsci’s view ‘the other two are bound to exist’.66
However, this ‘key’ element is also the main barrier to the bureaucra-
tization of the party. In fact, how can the political line be maintained 
if the technical position is imposed for organizational reasons? In this 
regard, Gramsci makes the distinction, with regard to the organization of 
a political party, between organic centralism and democratic centralism. 
The contraposition of these two approaches was originally formulated 
in the course of the long-standing debate with Amadeo Bordiga – the 
first ever secretary of the Italian Communist Party and a leading figure 
among the party’s left-wing faction – who in the 1920s argued the need 
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for an ‘organic relationship’ between the masses and the party, and for 
an ‘organic centralism’ in the governance of the party. Bordiga employed 
these expressions to basically regiment the party and to indicate an 
immediate (and presumed) correspondence between leadership and 
class, and thus the significant autonomy of the former. Gramsci began to 
write the initial notes of his Prison Notebooks by countering this organic 
centralism with democratic centralism, criticizing organic centralism 
with its underlying principle of ‘“co-optation” around a “possessor of the 
truth”’,67 implying ‘a caste and priestly type of leadership’68. However, in a 
note in Notebook 9 his view changes:
The most accurate name [for organic centralism] would be bureaucratic 
centralism. ‘Organicity’ can only be found in democratic centralism, 
which is so to speak a ‘centralism’ in movement – i.e. a continual 
adaptation of the organisation to the real movement, a matching of 
thrusts from below with orders from above, a continuous insertion 
of elements thrown up from the depths of the rank and file into the 
solid framework of the leadership apparatus which ensures continuity 
and the regular accumulation of experience. Democratic centralism is 
‘organic’ because on the one hand it takes account of movement, which 
is the organic mode in which historical reality reveals itself, and does 
not solidify mechanically into bureaucracy; and because at the same 
time it takes account of that which is relatively stable and permanent, 
or which at least moves in an easily predictable direction.69
Thus, organicity cannot be a characteristic of a static, authoritarian 
vision of political organization, but of political organization operating 
in a dynamic, democratic manner. From here on, Gramsci always uses 
the term ‘organic centralism’ as a synonym of ‘democratic centralism’, 
whereas he replaces the preceding (negative) notion of organic centralism 
with that of ‘bureaucratic centralism’.70
Thus, organic centralism refers to a form of unitary, yet plural 
and conflicting, organization, requiring the constant adjustment of 
organization and class, through the enhancement of the multiplicity of 
individuals’ claims:
A collective consciousness, which is to say a living organism, is 
formed only after the unification of the multiplicity through friction 
on the part of the individuals; nor can one say that ‘silence’ is not a 
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multiplicity. An orchestra tuning-up, every instrument playing by 
itself, sounds a most hideous cacophony, yet these warm-ups are 
the necessary condition for the orchestra to come to life as a single 
‘instrument’.71
The possibility of influencing the establishment of the collective 
organism, in a conflicting, organized manner through those forms of 
mediation present in every organization, becomes a prerequisite of the 
collective will: ‘the vital question is not one of passive and indirect but 
active and direct consent, and hence that of the participation of single 
individuals, even though this gives an impression of disintegration and 
tumult’.72 Gramsci’s words re-echo those of Machiavelli in his Discourses 
on Livy, namely, that ‘where the matter is not corrupt, tumults and other 
scandals do not hurt’.73 In fact movement, conflict and disagreement are 
not necessarily perceived as signs of decadence, but as potential factors 
of strength and liberty, if the organism within which they operate is 
‘healthy’; that is, going back to Gramsci, if there is the right relationship 
between individuals and the collective organism. In this regard, Gramsci 
coined an expression that characterizes that healthy relationship in which 
the individual is not nullified by the collective organism, but where the 
two interact without being opposed to one another, thus ensuring that 
they are both reciprocally enhanced through their interaction: 
With the extension of mass parties and their organic coalescence with 
the intimate (economic-productive) life of the masses themselves, 
the process whereby popular feeling is standardized ceases to be 
mechanical and casual […] and becomes conscious and critical. 
Knowledge and a judgment of the importance of this feeling on the 
part of the leaders is no longer the product of hunches […]. Rather it 
is acquired by the collective organism through ‘active and conscious 
co-participation’, through ‘compassionality’, through experience 
of immediate particulars, through a system which one could call 
‘living philology’.74
It is this system of living philology that needs to underlie the formation 
of a collective organism capable of meeting the need to organize the 
potentially no longer passive ‘great masses of the population’.75 The 
tumultuous process by which this organism is created and enhanced 
is thus the element that characterizes the method of living philology, 
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within the Gramscian assumption of organicity as a metaphor to be used 
to redefine the semantic field of the revolution. Organicity as a symbol 
of the centralism of a party, on the one hand, and living philology as 
an approach to the internal relations of that party, on the other hand, 
thus paint an initial overall picture of the party according to Gramsci. 
Given such premises – and given the assumption that the historical 
actors are now collective organisms rather than individuals – Gramsci 
can imagine the party as the modern Prince, in reference once again to 
Machiavelli’s work.
machiavelli and the modern prince
With the exception of Benedetto Croce, Niccolò Machiavelli is the 
Italian most frequently mentioned in the Prison Notebooks,76 despite the 
fact that four centuries of history, innumerable institutional forms and 
diverse systems of political power separate the age of Machiavelli from 
that of Gramsci. This objective gap notwithstanding, there is one specific 
element that permits not only communication, but also a political dialogue 
between the two writers and their respective conditions. This element 
is, in fact, the particular form that modern politics has taken in Italy, a 
place that is fully integrated into Western modernity – in a Europe where 
the bourgeoisie have triumphed and where first liberal, then democratic 
conceptions have come to the fore – but that continues to preserve its 
own specific backwardness, as a result of which each innovation that 
emerges is of a dubious, mediated, ‘corrupt’ form compared to the 
ideal (and idealized) model of development. This backwardness is in 
turn the product of a gap that is, paradoxically, due to the precocity of 
certain developments – such as economic growth, the history of Italy’s 
Communes, the Renaissance – that has destroyed the possibility of any 
political development in the ‘classical’ sense such as that seen in France 
and Britain. This backwardness/precocity has conditioned Italy’s entire 
political history (and that of the dominions prior to Unification), thus 
providing a unique field of application for concepts that lie within the 
bounds of modern development, but are decentralized in relation to its 
principal axis. Machiavelli and Gramsci thus formulated a politics that 
could be said to lie at the edge of modernity, forced by history, as Althusser 
puts it, ‘to think the conditions of possibility of an impossible task, to 
think the unthinkable’,77 by elaborating the conceptual instruments of 
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modern politics within a terrain that lies outside the traditional sphere 
of European modernity.
Machiavelli and Gramsci can also be perceived as sharing a common 
ground in terms of their respective conditions for potential political 
action: Gramsci wrote the Prison Notebooks at a time when he could 
no longer be a ‘politician in action’,78 finding himself in a Fascist prison 
following an epochal defeat, that of the working class in the face of 
Fascism; Machiavelli wrote his most important works after having been 
expelled from the Florentine Republic’s political sphere. This potential 
identification with Machiavelli, together with the recouping of a politics 
aimed at the mobilization of the popular strata, establishes Machiavelli as 
a benchmark over and beyond his classical status as a political thinker. In 
fact, in the Prison Notebooks Machiavelli is first a heading title grouping 
together a series of notes on political matters, and then the name of an 
entire notebook79 in which Gramsci collects and reformulates many of 
his previous notes; finally, Machiavelli is the inspiration for Gramsci’s 
proposed solution to the problem of the relationship between individuals 
and collective organisms in the age of mass politics, with the formulation 
of a conception of the party as the modern Prince.
The interpretation of Machiavelli over the course of centuries has 
constituted the focal point of a genuine political challenge, ranging from 
the inclusion of The Prince in the Catholic Church’s Index Librorum 
Prohibitorum (List of Prohibited Books) to Frederick II’s Anti-Machiavel, 
up to its ‘republican’ re-reading in recent times.80 Gramsci mentions the 
liberal-romantic interpretation of The Prince offered by Ugo Foscolo in 
his work Sepulchres, in which Foscolo perceived The Prince’s main aim as 
being that of exposing the secrets (arcana) of power: ‘that great man, who 
even as he tempers the sceptre of the rulers, strips them of their laurels, 
and lets the people see how it drips with tears and blood’.81 Machiavelli 
was thus deemed to have spoken to the people and to have taught them 
not to fall into the trap of the powers that be, thus implementing a form of 
negative education whilst falling short of dealing with the problem of the 
positive organization of political power by the emerging classes. Gramsci 
likened this reading of Machiavelli to the one offered by Rousseau: 
Rousseau saw in Machiavelli a ‘great republican’, who was forced by 
circumstances – without his moral dignity suffering as a consequence 
– to ‘déguiser son amour pour la liberté’ [disguise his love of liberty], 
but while feigning to give lessons to monarchs, he had really given 
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them to the people. Filippo Burzio has noted that such an interpreta-
tion, rather than morally justifying Machiavellianism, in truth foresaw 
a ‘Machiavellianism to the n-th power’: since the author of The Prince 
not only gave advice on fraud, but also fraudulent advice, to the 
detriment of those at whom such advice was aimed.82
These interpretations, although having the merit of reassessing 
Machiavelli after centuries of oblivion, during which the Florentine 
secretary had been perceived exclusively as an extoller of the Princes’ 
unscrupulousness and ferocity, in Gramsci’s view fail to give due credit 
to Machiavelli’s position. While it was true that Machiavelli spoke on the 
people’s behalf, he did not do so in a negative manner. On the contrary, 
he alluded to the potentially positive form that a ‘people’s politics’ 
could take: 
One may therefore suppose that Machiavelli had in mind ‘those who 
are not in the know’, and that it was they whom he intended to educate 
politically. This was no negative political education – of tyrant-haters 
– as Foscolo seems to have understood it; but a positive education 
– of those who have to recognise certain means as necessary, even 
if they are the means of tyrants, because they desire certain ends. 
Anyone born into the traditional governing stratum acquires almost 
automatically the characteristics of the political realist, as a result of 
the entire educational complex which he absorbs from his family 
milieu, in which dynastic or patrimonial interests predominate. Who 
therefore is ‘not in the know’? The revolutionary class of the time, the 
Italian ‘people’ or ‘nation’, the citizen democracy which gave birth to 
men like Savonarola and Pier Soderini, rather than to a Castruccio or 
a Valentino.83
Savonarola was, for Machiavelli, a model of political abstraction, 
whereas Pier Soderini had come to symbolize the Florentine Republic, 
that is, its first incarnation, a ‘son of the people’ who as such lacked the 
‘characteristics of the political realist’; as was seen at the siege of Prato 
in 1512, where he failed to take advantage of a possible agreement with 
the Spanish troops who were threatening the town, thus exacerbating 
matters and provoking the ransacking of Prato. This, in turn, was to lead 
to the fall of the Florentine Republic and the return of the Medici.84
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Machiavelli thus wished to teach the people about the reality of 
modern politics, not in order to warn it of the injustices of tyrants, but to 
educate the emerging classes, and in particular their leaders, in the use 
of such politics. In Machiavelli’s mind, this was the only way of fighting 
the all-important battle for political power and for an organization of 
society that was in keeping with the interests of the emerging classes. In 
this regard, Gramsci wrote:
For Machiavelli ‘educating the people’ could only have meant 
convincing it, and making it aware, that there can only be one politics, 
realistic politics, to achieve the desired end, and thus it is necessary to 
gather around, and obey, that very Prince who uses such methods to 
achieve the end, because only he who wants the end wants the means 
required to reach that end.85
The Prince, Gramsci continues, ‘is written for a hypothetical “Man 
of Providence”’ who is capable of understanding people’s demands; it is 
written for the people, as is manifested in the final part thereof: ‘The 
conclusion of The Prince justifies the whole book, also in the view of 
the popular masses who in reality forget the means employed to achieve 
an end if this end is historically progressive’.86 Thus, Machiavellianism 
may be valuable both for the emerging classes and for the ruling classes. 
However, in its disenchantment with the mechanisms of modern politics, 
it acts as a driver to the emerging classes, who of course do not acquire, 
through the continuity of the ruling classes, the knowledge required 
to govern. 
Gramsci continues by arguing that ‘This position in which Machiavelli 
found himself politically is repeated today for the philosophy of praxis’, 
which develops ‘a theory and technique of politics which – however 
strong the belief that they will in the final resort be especially useful to 
the side which was “not in the know”, since that is where the historically 
progressive force is to be found – might be useful to both sides in the 
struggle’.87 Machiavelli thus becomes the forerunner of the philosophy 
of praxis as far as regards the emerging classes’ means of political 
education, and also the source, rediscovered by Gramsci, by which new 
instruments can be conceived that are capable of fighting the political 
battle to govern society. 
The theorists of the philosophy of praxis, just like Machiavelli, ‘have 
tried to construct and divulge a popular, mass “realism”’,88 as a living 
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force for a new type of Prince. Thus, Gramsci believed that the time was 
due for
a study of the real connections between the two [Marx and 
Machiavelli] as theoreticians of militant politics, of action; and a book 
that extracts from Marxist thought an orderly system of actual politics 
along the lines of The Prince. The topic would be the political party 
in its relations with the classes and with the state – not the party as a 
sociological category but the party that wants to establish the state.89
While the new twentieth-century Prince’s task remains the same, 
namely, to embody the political aspirations of an emerging class, this 
new Prince can no longer be the charismatic figure portrayed in Machi-
avelli’s writings. Mazzini was no such Prince, nor could Marx himself 
play such a role:
The modern Prince, the myth-Prince, cannot be a real person, a 
concrete individual. It can only be an organism, a social component 
[…]. Historical development has already produced this organism, and 
it is the political party – the modern formation that contains the partial 
collective wills with a propensity to become universal and total.90
Thus, if the ‘“Prince” could be translated in modern terms as “political 
party”’,91 in Gramsci’s view a new The Prince needed to be written 
as a basis for Marxism. Such a study ‘must have a section devoted to 
Jacobinism […], as an example of how a concrete and operative collective 
will is formed’.92 The Jacobins, in fact, ‘were a “categorical” “incarnation” 
of Machiavelli’s Prince’.93 They were capable of creating a collective will 
that worked, that was politically effective; they were realists, political 
militants, partisans with weighty passions, just as the leadership of the 
working-class ‘modern Prince’ party should be. Here, Machiavelli is 
once again, in Gramsci’s view, the symbol of modern politics, of that 
leadership of an emerging class that on the contrary, by its very nature, 
should not be a leading class.
4
Society
But society, like Man himself, always remains an irreducible historical 
and ideal entity which develops by continually contradicting itself and 
surpassing itself. Politics and the economy, the human environment 
and the social organism are one and the same thing, and always will be.
Antonio Gramsci
9 February 1918
the organicity of society
Along the path we have traced from the individual to the collective 
organism and the State, the key role that Gramsci sees society playing in 
an age of mass politics has clearly emerged. From the social characteris-
tics of individuality, to the social features of the ‘expanded’ State, society 
thus becomes the subject of enquiry of Gramscian analysis. Gramsci does 
not see society as a ‘middle’ ground between the aforesaid levels, but the 
place where the principles of order, as well as the revolutionary potential 
of these levels, are created. To understand the structure and operation of 
society’s various different aspects, Gramsci thus analyses diverse terrains 
– the new type of Man of mass society, the rationalization introduced 
by Taylorism and Fordism, the increasingly important role played by 
collective organisms – mainly through a classical metaphor of political 
thought, namely, the biological reference to the organism. He does so 
mainly through the use of the adjectival form, that is, by characterizing a 
series of relations existing within society as ‘organic’.
Thus, the linking up of the references to organicity to be found in the 
Prison Notebooks is not only a question of philological reconstruction, 
but it also has a specific meaning for the interpretation of the entire body 
of Gramsci’s thoughts. In fact, it is also the metaphor of the organism, 
and the adjectival form of the term, that represents the starting point for 
Gramsci’s rethinking of society, and therefore of the theory of revolution 
‘in the West’.
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There are numerous examples in the Prison Notebooks of the use 
of terms associated with the concept of organicity. All of such terms 
reintroduce the opposition between a positive pole, represented by the 
term ‘organic’, and a negative pole identified with all that is disorganic. 
The first group contains terms such as ‘coherent and co-ordinated’1 
or ‘conscious and critical’.2 Likewise, the ‘semantic field’ of organicity 
includes those concepts expressing the organizational and constructive 
level of politics. First and foremost, the concept of ‘conformism’, given that 
the ‘organic development’ of a group necessarily encounters the problem 
of the ‘“conformation” [of the masses] according to the exigencies of the 
end pursued’.3 Then there is the concept of the State, which in Gramsci’s 
view ‘permits a certain organic equilibrium in the development of the 
intellectual group’.4 The concept of hegemony itself is defined by a 
close relationship with the strategies of preservation of organicity (cf. 
Chapter 1, section ‘The conceptual constellation of ideology including 
hegemony’).
At the opposing end of the semantic spectrum we encounter 
expressions linked to disorganicity: ‘incoherent’5 – with regard to 
language –, but also ‘“paternalistic”, formalistic, mechanistic’ in regard to 
a ‘non organic, non systematic’ political position.6 Twice disorganicity is 
linked to a pulviscolo (‘an unstable scattering’ and ‘specks of dust’ in the 
English translation)7 and to a ‘formless state’.8 The lack of organicity is, 
finally, a characteristic of the ‘sporadic and disorganic rebelliousness of 
the popular masses’.9
Such adjectivizations contribute towards our understanding of 
Gramsci’s use of the specific sociological opposition between organic 
and disorganic. In fact, the latter term does not appear in these cases to 
express the ‘inorganic character’ of a relationship, its structurally ‘non-
organic’ essence, but rather a critical situation of a given organicity, or a 
hint of an alternative organicity that while possible, is not yet real. Thus, 
social relations are always organic, and their disorganicity is only visible 
as a result of a crisis in a given organic entity, or due to the incapacity 
of another organic entity to develop.10 Gramsci thus seems to support a 
model of historical evolution based on the co-existence of moments of 
disintegration and moments of organic recomposition, during which the 
two phases – the revolutionary phase (during an ‘organic crisis’11) and 
the ethical-political phase (the ‘moment of “hegemony”’12) – must occur 
together in order to undermine a system of power.
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Thus, the new order may only emerge from an objective state of dis-
integration of a society in crisis, such as that of a war, which is combined 
with a subjective state of systematic organization of a new social 
structure, supported by a new historical bloc capable of organically 
recomposing the fragmented elements.13 The continual references in the 
Prison Notebooks to the concept of organicity may thus be interpreted 
as a sign of the need to build the initial elements of a new society and of 
a new organic relationship14 within the context of the organic crisis of 
the liberal order, which may be identified as a crisis of a given organic 
structure. In this case, Gramsci’s references to the war of position and 
to the importance of the hegemonic struggle,15 both genuine strategies 
aimed at the recomposition of society marked by a different hegemony, 
prove useful. In analysing the sphere of political struggle, of the stability 
or crisis of the State, Gramsci thus adopts the ‘semantic field’ of organicity, 
and reformulates it in revolutionary terms in the attempt to describe the 
social level of mass politics.
organic intellectuals and mass intellectuality
The most famous use of the adjective ‘organic’ in the Prison Notebooks, 
however, is probably the one referring to intellectuals when Gramsci 
discusses the distinction between organic intellectuals and traditional 
intellectuals in a long note from Notebook 4, later reformulated with 
certain modifications at the start of Notebook 12. The intellectual is 
organic, according to Gramsci, insofar as he links a ‘social group’16 to 
society, and through the latter to the State. The series of intellectuals 
organic to a social group thus constitute an intermediate body with a 
‘function [that] is precisely “organizational” or connective’.17
Whilst at first reading this distinction may appear to be that between 
a new class of intellectuals – organic intellectuals – linked to a social 
group in the ascendancy – the proletariat – and a series of old intellectual 
groups – traditional intellectuals – linked to social groups in decline – the 
bourgeoisie and the clergy, first and foremost –, upon closer examination 
one sees that this division refers to the distinction between the political 
function of intellectuals and their technical (that is, cultural, intellectual, 
specialist, scientific and organizational) functions. This also introduces 
the question of their problematic composition.
Proceeding in an orderly fashion, first we shall examine those passages 
in the Prison Notebooks that reveal the key problem Gramsci raises: 
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Are intellectuals an autonomous and independent social group, or 
does every social group have its own particular specialised category 
of intellectuals? The problem is a complex one, because of the variety 
of forms assumed to date by the real historical process of formation of 
the different categories of intellectuals.18
During the same period, this question was answered by Karl 
Mannheim, who considered intellectuals as, at one and the same time, 
both bearers of the demands of a given social group and as a relatively 
independent group committed to the reproduction of social norms. 
Thus, Mannheim saw them as both representatives of the intellectual 
functions of a specific social group and as a function of the social system 
as a whole. A group that ultimately performs the task of preserving the 
social order: ‘it subsumes in itself all those interests with which social life 
is permeated […] for the fulfilment of their [the intellectuals] mission as 
the predestined advocate of the intellectual interests of the whole’.19
Gramsci could be said to have analysed this same dual function of 
the intellectuals, but to have historicized it and divided it in two, in the 
attempt to break up its recomposing mechanism:
1) Every social group, coming into existence on the original terrain 
of an essential function in the world of economic production, creates 
together with itself, organically, one or more strata of intellectuals 
which give it homogeneity and an awareness of its own function not 
only in the economic but also in the social and political fields. […] 
2) However, every ‘essential’ social group which emerges into history 
out of the preceding economic structure, and as an expression of a 
development of this structure, has found (at least in all of history up to 
the present) categories of intellectuals already in existence and which 
seemed indeed to represent an historical continuity uninterrupted 
even by the most complicated and radical changes in political and 
social forms.20
Therefore, Gramsci’s problem does not seem to be that of the estab-
lishment of a group of intellectuals that is organic to the working class, 
a process that occurs for all emerging groups. The problem appears to 
be that of the relationship between the intellectuals from this new group 
and the pre-existing categories of intellectuals who are no longer the 
direct expression of the interests of given social groups, but represent the 
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historical sedimentation of political and social transformations of the 
past. Thus, the latter groups of intellectuals are not completely organic to 
the interests of the governing class, which they may even find themselves 
challenging,21 but could be considered organic to society in general, 
which they help reproduce through their mediation.
Traditional intellectuals, through Gramsci’s separation of the two 
functions (in Mannheim’s view, on the contrary, the two are connected), 
thus represent the function of the general reproduction of the system, in 
the form of an autonomous, independent group that perceives its own 
‘uninterrupted […] historical continuity’22 that mirrors the continuity of 
the existing social order.
This leads Gramsci to state that ‘The formation of traditional intellec-
tuals is the most interesting problem historically’,23 because both during 
the pre-revolutionary phase and during the initial governance of the new 
social order, albeit in different ways, the problem of the reproduction 
of society, which regards intellectual mediation, has to be resolved, and 
the solution cannot be immediately provided by the emergence of the 
new social group. The mediation of traditional intellectuals, their role in 
the reproduction of the system, is in fact partially independent from the 
mediated object, that is, from society’s internal relations. This relative 
independence permits their specific persistence vis-à-vis any changes, 
even sudden ones, of the object of their own mediation. This is why, in 
Gramsci’s view, the existing links between traditional intellectuals and 
the dominant group need to be broken ‘before attaining power’.24 At 
the same time, this terrain needs to be garrisoned after power has been 
conquered, since the objective continuity of such mediation requires 
that a relationship be established, at least provisionally, with these classes 
‘reproducing’ the social order.
It is the party, conceived as the seed of the organicity of the new order, 
that is to perform both such duties:
The political party, for all groups, is precisely the mechanism which 
carries out in civil society the same function as the State carries out, 
more synthetically and over a larger scale, in political society. In other 
words it is responsible for welding together the organic intellectuals of 
a given group – the dominant one – and the traditional intellectuals.25
The emergent social group is thus called upon to link with a part of 
the pre-existing society, namely, that part entrusted with the function 
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of intellectual mediation, in order to break its remaining organicity 
and create the conditions under which said emergent group may inde-
pendently take over this very function. This is why one of the most 
important indicators of the crisis of the liberal order is the behaviour of 
the traditional intellectuals who ‘detaching themselves from the social 
grouping to which they have hitherto given the highest, most compre-
hensive form […] [perform] an act of incalculable historical significance; 
they are signalling and sanctioning the crisis of the state in its decisive 
form’.26 Gramsci also describes this process in a note regarding the 
category of officials, endorsing an analogy between intellectuals and 
officials that is reiterated on several occasions in the Prison Notebooks:
Each new property relationship has needed a new type of official, 
that is, each new ruling class has formulated its problems of officials 
in a new way, but for a certain period has not managed to disregard 
tradition and vested interests, that is, the group of officials already 
in place on its arrival […]. This problem partly overlaps with the 
problem of the intellectuals.27
The reference is clearly being made here to the Soviet situation, where 
following their coming to power, the Bolsheviks had to deal with the 
problem of having to rely on ‘bourgeois technicians  and specialists’ 
to maintain the bureaucratic, economic and scientific apparatuses 
in working order.28 In addition to the problem of stripping society’s 
organicity of part of that society (cf. Chapter 2, section ‘The social 
production of the individual: Gramsci and Durkheim’), there is now 
also the problem of the technical aspect of the reproduction of the new 
order. The importance of intellectual mediation, which is identified 
as the key terrain in the age of mass politics, is thus made clear in the 
difficult mixture of the organic/political element with the traditional/
technical element, until the emerging class has attained its own complete, 
independent technical capacity.
Thus, the problem that Gramsci poses here – as we have already seen 
in the case of the political class that the modern Prince has to build – is 
not that of a new group of intellectuals linked to an emergent social class, 
but rather that of the environment that this group finds itself in, that 
is, its relationship, on the one hand, with the need to foresee in current 
society those elements that are to be part of the new order, and, on the 
other hand, with the ‘viscous parasitic sedimentations left behind by 
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past phases of history’.29 Therefore, the focus is placed on the transfor-
mation of the historical conditions in which ‘the theoretical aspect of the 
theory-practice nexus’30 finds itself – the intellectuals in other words – 
operates. This transformation starts from a given premise of Gramsci’s 
analysis: the dominance or centrality of one social group in the world of 
production is not enough to establish the necessary preconditions for the 
overthrowing of social relations, nor for what is the most important and 
difficult task, namely, that of exercising and maintaining power.31 The 
development of a group of organic intellectuals – that social stratum that 
gives a given group ‘homogeneity and an awareness of its own function’32 
prior to the heads-on clash with the dominant group – is not sufficient 
either. In order to run the entire course of the mediations starting from 
the social group in question through to society and ultimately to the 
State, there is also a need to strike the organicity of society itself, which 
is innervated by various groups of traditional intellectuals who must be 
countered, on the one hand, and won over to the new hegemony, on 
the other, otherwise the organic process leading from the emergent 
social group to the State will be interrupted. The class struggle thus also 
includes this endeavour to destroy and conquer, which in Gramsci’s 
vocabulary is also known as the ‘war of position’ of an increasing 
duration and intensity.
Therefore, Gramsci’s innovative understanding is that a revolution is 
inconceivable without the mediation of the intellectuals that are organic 
to the emergent social group, and is likewise inconceivable without seizing 
the function of general mediation, which is provisionally identified 
with the groups of (traditional) intellectuals who are already organic to 
society. Traditional intellectuals, in fact, represent the technical capacity 
to maintain the formal structure of society’s dominance, and in doing so 
they perform the political function of maintaining order. Organic intel-
lectuals, on the other hand, emerge as a political element of an ascendant 
social group, but they are also characterized by the technical specializa-
tion of that group (industrial labour). The innovative aspect of Gramsci’s 
analysis thus lies in this dual identification of the political role and the 
technical capacity of both figures, particularly in view of the ‘education’ 
of the new intellectuals of the ascendant group, who in addition to their 
political function deriving from their association with the emergent 
group must also perform the technical function of preserving the (new) 
order, and ultimately become the means driving the power that flows 
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through the new society. This technical function must be linked to 
industrial labour, in Gramsci’s view:
The traditional and vulgarised type of the intellectual is given by the 
man of letters, the philosopher, the artist […]. In the modern world, 
technical education, closely bound to industrial labour even at the 
most primitive and unqualified level, must form the basis of the new 
type of intellectual. On this basis the weekly Ordine Nuovo worked.33
The insistence on the productive sphere in Gramsci’s definition of the 
new intellectual in this case shows the consequences of the political and 
social importance, as well as the economic significance, of the growth 
of material production in the USSR at that time. Therefore, Gramsci’s 
new ‘mass’ intellectual – an amplified version of the soviet ‘new Man’ 
in a certain sense – is to be found and constructed within the universe 
revealed by the industrial model: 
The mode of being of the new intellectual can no longer consist in 
eloquence, which is an exterior and momentary mover of feelings and 
passions, but in active participation in practical life, as constructor, 
organiser, ‘permanent persuader’ and not just a simple orator (but 
superior at the same time to the abstract mathematical spirit); from 
technique-as-work one proceeds to technique-as-science and to 
the humanistic conception of history, without which one remains a 
‘specialist’ and does not become a ‘leader’ (specialist + political).34
Thus, the horizons opened up by Gramsci – for a revolutionary 
strategy in the West, on the one hand, and for the emergence in the 
USSR of figures capable of reproducing the new order, on the other 
hand – were those of an intellectual combining the characteristics of the 
specialist with those of the politician: the former derives from industrial 
labour, while the latter originates from the organic link with the intellec-
tual’s own group.35 However, this horizon is not only characterized by the 
transition from the status of intellectual based on eloquence and on the 
function of preserving the liberal order, to that based on the technical 
education implicit in labour and designed to construct a new order. It 
also implies a tendency to broaden the category of intellectual itself, in 
a historical, truly revolutionary transition away from single individuals 
towards an intellectual function of the masses as a whole:
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the nature of the philosophy of praxis is in particular that of being a 
mass conception, a mass culture, that of a mass which operates in a 
unitary fashion, i.e. one that has norms of conduct that are not only 
universal in idea but ‘generalized’ in social reality. And the activity 
of the ‘individual’ philosopher cannot therefore be conceived except 
in terms of this social unit, i.e. also as political activity, in terms of 
political leadership.36
Thus, in addition to the central function of social mediation 
performed by intellectuals/officers, which is a key aspect of the Prison 
Notebooks, there is also the potential dissolution, within the revolution-
ary process, of the ‘rank’ of specialists performing this specific function. 
In fact, the masses now become the key players in their own movement, 
given that their norms of conduct are already foreseen in existing social 
reality, as the result of their practical activity: ‘The problem of creating a 
new stratum of intellectuals consists therefore in the critical elaboration 
of the intellectual activity that exists in everyone at a certain degree of 
development’.37
This oscillation between the disenchanted analysis of the division 
leaders/led, which also emerges within a homogeneous social group, and 
the need to overcome such a division during the course of the revolu-
tionary process is what characterizes Gramsci’s rethinking of the figure 
of the intellectual. 
how society works
Gramsci’s use of expressions that refer to the semantic field of the social 
sciences is extended further if we take into consideration two specific 
terms that are frequently encountered in the Prison Notebooks, and are 
employed when examining the forms of integration within society: these 
two terms are ‘coercion’ and ‘conformism’.
The term ‘coercion’ generally takes on a negative meaning in 
Gramsci’s writings, when it represents the violent, mechanical element 
accompanying the State’s actions, defined firstly as ‘hegemony protected 
by the armor of coercion’, or ‘political society + civil society’.38 If we 
consider this division in the narrow sense (however, as we have seen, 
the relationship between the two concepts is much more complex than 
that of a simply dichotomy), then political society comprises all State 
institutions and organizations exercising coercion directly, namely, 
74 . using gramsci: a new approach
the bureaucracy, the armed forces, schools, prisons and so on. Within 
this context, social organicity is guaranteed by procedures manifesting 
themselves in administrative decisions implemented by the State in 
its capacity as sole guarantor of legitimacy through force. However, 
alongside this definition, as we have already seen in the case of the term 
‘environment’, Gramsci uses ‘coercion’ in another sense, that of an envi-
ronmental force that imposes itself indirectly, that is, a characterizing, 
inescapable aspect of every social relation: ‘As if there has not always 
been some form of coercion! Just because it is exerted unconsciously by 
the environment and by single individuals, and not by a central power or 
a centralized force, does it cease to be coercion?’39
Once again, it is useful to identify the presence in Gramsci’s discourse 
of a similar evolution to that to be found in Durkheim, namely, that 
endorsing the independence of social facts, which thus represent a 
separate field of study.40 In fact, in Durkheim’s view, social facts require 
causal explanations that remain within the social field, and in order to 
do so coercion must be identified as a distinguishing characteristic of 
such facts: ‘A social fact is identifiable through the power of external 
coercion which it exerts or is capable of exerting upon individuals.’41 
Society, the source of this coercive power, is thus a historically produced, 
unnatural ‘fact’, but is not isomorphic to the individual, upon whom it 
imposes itself through coercion: facts are considered to be social when 
they are ‘capable of exercising a coercive influence on the consciousness 
of individuals’.42 The theoretical steps that Durkheim takes are thus: the 
autonomization of the field of social facts, the recognition of coercion 
as a characteristic of their identification and the acknowledgement that 
society is an autonomous source of this coercion.43
In point of fact, Gramsci extends the meaning of the term in this very 
direction, shifting the emphasis from the State/governmental context to 
the social context. Consequently, he formulates a notion of coercion that 
is not immediately ascribable to political power, since such coercion is 
exercised through dynamics of society as a whole, as the result of the 
random interaction of individual wills through reciprocal behaviour 
and adaptation. However, this coercion, expressed ‘by the environment 
and by single individuals’,44 remains in Gramsci’s view, contrary to what 
Durkheim believes, ultimately the expression of the ruling class. In fact, 
it is a form of coercion that is not neutral and refers to a single entity 
such as society, but is always an expression of the power of a historical 
bloc representing specific interests which in turn organize an organic 
society . 75
system, or of a new organic system that wishes to break up and replace 
the previous system. This is another reason why the concept of coercion 
in Gramsci does not necessarily carry a negative connotation. It may 
serve not only to maintain a given order, but also to rationalize a social 
grouping that wishes to defeat and replace the existing historical bloc.
Once again Gramsci places the focus – like the social sciences of his 
time, and in particular Durkheim’s sociology – on new and decisive 
relevance of social facts.45 And once again, using the language of the social 
sciences and dealing with the problems raised by those same sciences, 
Gramsci moves away from them, reformulating the (revolutionary) 
political theory that not only the crisis of the liberal order, but also the by 
now clearly evident inadequacies of orthodox Marxism call for.
The second term adopted by Gramsci from sociology is that of 
‘conformism’: the ‘tendency toward conformism in the contemporary 
world’, he writes, ‘is more widespread and deeper than in the past’.46 
This expansion of conformism, in Gramsci’s view, is. on the one hand, 
horizontal since it ‘extends across nations and even continents’,47 as shown 
by the American-style rationalization of production that was creating ‘a 
new type of worker and of Man’48 and was to spread right across Europe. 
On the other hand, it is of a vertical nature, that is, it deepens because 
the ‘collective man’49 produced by this conformism is different from the 
type that had existed up until then: initially this collective man ‘was 
produced by extraneous factors and once formed would disintegrate, 
repeatedly’, whereas now he ‘is formed essentially from the bottom up, 
on the basis of the position that the collectivity occupies in the world of 
production’,50 through lengthy processes stabilizing forms of behaviour 
and guaranteeing a previously unheard of efficiency of that political 
power capable of governing such behaviour.
The conformism that Gramsci focuses on must therefore be interpreted 
as an attempt to open political theory up to an idea that the more aware 
of the social science scholars of the time had already elaborated. This 
concerned the fact that the turn of the century, as previously mentioned, 
marked the advent of mass politics. This important change in the political 
scenario led Gramsci to reflect on the types of social action exercised by 
social classes and groups; in doing so, he took account of Durkheim’s 
model of social coercion, probably through the mediation of Sorel who, 
at the end of the nineteenth century, had introduced Durkheim’s theories 
into Marxist debate.51 For example, Gramsci reiterates the fact that 
‘conformism […] means nothing other than “sociality”’,52 in a process 
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of identification that appears to follow that between coercion and social 
fact established by Durkheim in The Rules of Sociological Method. In 
Gramsci’s view, the only expression of sociality is that of a certain degree 
of conformism, and it is only created as a result of the coercive thrust of a 
certain force external to the individual. The difference lies in the degree 
of conscious elaboration of the conformism with which one is imbued, 
and in particular in the actual nature of this conformism: ‘We are all 
conformists of some conformism or other, always mass-men or collective 
men. The question is this: of what historical type is the conformism, the 
mass-man to which one belongs?’53
Besides constituting a means with which to investigate society, 
conformism is thus also the means by which ‘new possibilities for 
freedom, including individual freedom’54 ought to be imagined. Thus, 
the interpretative approach already proposed for coercion also holds for 
conformism. This approach involves the Gramscian use of the term that, 
on the one hand, is analytic, and is to be used to investigate the form of 
current society; and, on the other hand, it is programmatic and is to be 
employed to deal with the problem of the constitution of a new sociality 
within the new order.
Relations between conformism and socialism, and between coercion 
and socialism, are however some of the questions that Gramsci was not 
able to develop in full, as they are necessarily linked to the practical 
processes of the construction of socialism that the Bolshevik leadership 
was tackling during the years of Gramsci’s imprisonment. Nevertheless, 
the Prison Notebooks set out the problem of their possible development 
within the context of the new order, not in the brief critical remarks on 
Trotsky’s ‘coercive’ positions,55 but in the analysis of the law, understood 
as an instrument with which the ruling group rationalized itself while 
at the same time getting as much of society as possible to ‘conform’ to a 
model designed to achieve the interests of that ruling group.
In Gramsci’s view, by analysing the law one can identify both the 
genealogy of the ruling class and its ambition, expressed through the 
legal system, to ‘conform’ society.56 To do so, the focus must be shifted 
from the ‘negative or repressive aspect of this activity [which] is, 
precisely, penal justice, criminal law’, to the positive aspect, that is, to law 
as a ‘meritorious activity’.57 Gramsci writes:
If every State tends to create and maintain a certain type of civilisation 
and of citizen (and hence of collective life and of individual relations), 
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and to eliminate certain customs and attitudes and to disseminate 
others, then the Law will be its instrument for this purpose (together 
with the school system, and other institutions and activities).58
It was Durkheim, once again, who identified ‘restitutory law’ – ‘that 
it is not expiatory, but comes down to a mere restoration of the “status 
quo ante”’59 – as the very heart of the social integration of a society 
characterized by the advanced division of labour. In fact, while at first 
sight ‘domestic law, contractual law, commercial law, procedural law, 
and administrative and constitutional law’60 all appear to go towards 
loosening society’s coercive pressure on individuals, not establishing 
offences punishable with criminal penalties, in practice the very exercise 
of such personal rights is connected to the pre-eminent role played by 
society in regard to such: ‘it is far from the case that society is absent 
from this sphere of legal activity […], its intervention is none the less 
the essential cog in the mechanism’, given that ‘if a contract has binding 
force, it is society which confers that force’.61
Gramsci and Durkheim thus share the belief in the importance of law 
in the definition of ‘society’s power’, in regard to the ‘free’ acceptance of 
conformism as expressed in the rules of law. However, while in regard 
to the transition from a punitive form of law to a strictly regulatory 
form, Durkheim places the emphasis on the importance of restitutory 
law compared to criminal law, Gramsci, on the other hand, appears to 
go beyond this. In fact, in confirming the transition of coercion from a 
forced and centralized element to a widespread element in society, and 
thus one that individuals increasingly introject, and that is imposed by 
the threat of punishment increasingly less frequently, Gramsci further 
expands his notion of law to include
those activities which are at present classified as ‘legally neutral’, 
and which belong to the domain of civil society; the latter operates 
without ‘sanctions’ or compulsory ‘obligations’, but nevertheless exerts 
a collective pressure and obtains objective results in the form of an 
evolution of customs, ways of thinking and acting, morality, etc.62
Therefore, the concept of law ‘will have to be extended’63 to comprise 
not only those spheres where the penalty is restitutory rather than 
criminal, but also those in which by not intervening, the State devolves 
the task of getting society to conform to civil society (which, it should 
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not be forgotten, is a constituent part of the State), thus implementing 
the ‘soft’ side of the disciplining process.64
Gramsci’s divergence from Durkheim’s analysis regards the ultimate 
aim of law as conceived above, which clearly shows its relationship with 
class rule:
The law does not express the whole of society (if it did, those who 
break the law would have to be considered antisocial beings by nature 
or mentally deficient); the law, rather, is an expression of the ruling 
class, which ‘imposes’ on the whole of society those norms of conduct 
that are most tightly connected to its own raison d’être and expansion. 
The greatest function of the law is the following: to presuppose that 
insofar as all citizens can become members of the ruling class, all of 
them must freely accept the conformity set down by the law.65
The forms of law that Gramsci takes into consideration thus reflect the 
various means by which the ruling class gets society to conform. These 
means vary depending, on the one hand, on diverse contingencies, such 
that direct coercion is used more often in periods of organic crisis, and 
coercion mediated by society during phases of ruling class expansion. 
On the other hand, they depend on the subject that needs to be made to 
conform: so that ‘A social group dominates antagonistic groups, which it 
tends to “liquidate”, or to subjugate perhaps even by armed force; it leads 
kindred and allied groups’.66 Within this framework, with its unavoidable 
duplicity, the characteristic feature of mass politics appears to be that of a 
gradual transition from ‘brute coercion’67 to ‘Social coercion’,68 and thus 
to an accentuation of the mediated forms of coercion, which remain the 
focal point of Gramsci’s interest, particularly with regard to the manner 
in which they spread.
gramsci’s ‘sociological operators’
Alongside the notions of coercion, conformism and the new under-
standing of law in the analysis of society and its movement, Gramsci also 
utilizes more specific terms, which in the Prison Notebooks emerge as 
genuine ‘sociological operators’. The first of these is the term ‘regularity’.
The note introducing the question is entitled Regularity and Necessity, 
and is to be found in Section VI (Miscellaneous notes) of Notebook 
11, which is the same one that contain the criticism of Bukharin’s 
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Historical Materialism. Gramsci starts by wondering where Marx’s 
ideas of ‘regularity and necessity in historical development’69 originated 
from, deeming that such a source was more likely to have been political 
economics rather than the natural sciences. More specifically, Gramsci 
focuses on the concept of ‘determined market’, which he defines as:
the scientific discovery that specific decisive and permanent forces 
have risen historically and that the operation of these forces presents 
itself with a certain ‘automatism’ which allows a measure of ‘predict-
ability’ and certainty for the future of those individual initiatives 
which accept these forces after having discerned and scientifically 
established their nature.70
Thus, one could say that Gramsci sees the concept of the determined 
market as the theoretical framework within which the social sciences 
operate in relation to capitalist society. This framework includes not 
only a ‘‘determined relation of social forces in a determined structure 
of the productive apparatus’, but also ‘a determined political, moral 
and juridical superstructure’.71 Within these coordinates, it is therefore 
possible, thanks to the repetitive nature of social phenomena and to 
‘their relative independence from individual choices and from arbitrary 
government interventions’,72 to identify certain regularities that enable 
events to be foreseen to a noticeable degree.
The mistake made by classical economics is to naturalize these 
elements and consider the regularities of one determined market to be 
natural, eternal features of the phenomena themselves. Gramsci, instead, 
places the conditions of such regularities within their historical context:
It is from these considerations that one must start in order to establish 
what is meant by ‘regularity’, ‘law’, ‘automatism’ in historical facts. It 
is not a question of ‘discovering’ a metaphysical law of ‘determinism’, 
or even of establishing a ‘general’ law of causality. It is a question 
of bringing out how in historical evolution relatively permanent 
forces are constituted which operate with a certain regularity and 
automatism.73
The determined market thus describes the same object and the 
same dynamics that were seen at work in regard to the concept of 
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the historical bloc and to the analysis of competing organic systems: 
regularity in a determined context and discontinuity among diverse 
contexts; uniformity of phenomena and internal contradiction among 
competing organic systems. If ‘the law of causality and the search for 
regularity, normality and uniformity’74 is taken without any reference to 
this contextual framework, which in the Prison Notebooks is formulated 
in diverse ways but which always has the same meaning, then as far 
as Gramsci is concerned, one either commits the mistake of the ‘pure 
economists [that] conceive of these elements as “eternal” and “natural”’,75 
or that of naive mechanicism resulting in ‘the flat vulgar development 
of evolutionism’.76 In both cases ‘the “overthrow” of praxis’ becomes 
impossible, since ‘In mechanical terms, the effect can never transcend 
the cause or the system of causes’.77
The problem of how praxis is to be overthrown, however, is only 
partly resolved in Gramsci’s writings through the theory of organic crises 
perceived as moments when contradictions defy the balance of society 
(cf. Chapter 5, section ‘The political science of crisis’). However, it is 
clear that there is a thorny question here that Gramscian analysis fails 
to completely resolve. While, on the one hand, Gramsci reformulates the 
concept of revolution in correspondence to the advent of mass politics, 
as a process rather than an event, he nevertheless fails to clearly specify 
the forms that the overthrowing of the existing order is to take during a 
war of position in the West.78 This impasse is ingrained in the reflections 
laid out in the Prison Notebooks, which can no longer take the form of 
youthful subjectivism, and which therefore have to deal with the tangled 
question of revolution in an age of mass politics. 
In this case, one can only allude to a possible direction that is not further 
developed in the Prison Notebooks, but which takes into consideration the 
fact that at times of the organic crisis, disequilibrium and disintegration 
of the system, genuine opportunities may be created for the disorganiza-
tion and reorganization of forces, of historical blocs, of different power 
relations, and thus of a new equilibrium, a new organicity that replaces 
the old one. However, this is still to happen through a traditionally insur-
rectional phase, because the ‘war of manoeuvre’, ‘which before used to be 
“the whole” of war’, is not entirely replaced by the ‘war of position’, but is 
rendered ‘merely “partial”’.79 The study of regularities, starting from this 
scenario, is clearly an integral part of this theory of revolution.
In analysing the term ‘regularity’, we have already seen a second 
sociological operator being used by Gramsci in the Prison Notebooks, 
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namely, ‘automatism’. Once again there is a note dedicated entirely to the 
topic, which starts by pondering the question: ‘Is freedom in conflict with 
so-called automatism?’80 Gramsci’s reply is that ‘Automatism is in conflict 
with free will, not with freedom. Automatism is a group freedom, in 
opposition to individualistic free will.’81 This understanding of the term 
reveals a link with the concepts of coercion and conformism, specific 
phenomena of mass politics that the construction of the first workers’ 
State must necessarily have to deal with. With regard to automatism, 
however, Gramsci analysed the question in greater detail: 
given the collaborative and co-ordinated activity of a social group that, 
following certain principles accepted (freely) out of conviction, works 
towards certain goals, a development then occurs which may be called 
automatic and which may be considered as the development of certain 
recognizable laws that can be isolated using the methods of exact 
sciences. At any moment a free choice is made according to certain 
basic orientations that are identical for a great mass of individuals or 
single wills, in so far as these latter have become homogeneous in a 
determined ethico-political climate. Nor is it the case that everyone 
acts in the same way; individual free wills are, rather, manifold, but the 
homogeneous part predominates and ‘dictates law’.82
Automatism, understood not as the result of any external, coercive 
imposition, but as a homogeneity achieved politically through hegemony, 
creates identifiable laws that acquire scientific value. The final reference 
to the group that ‘dictates law’, not coincidentally placed in inverted 
commas, clearly points to the dual nature of this automatism: it is a law 
insofar as it creates an automatism that can be scientifically studied, 
and it is a law insofar as it is ‘dictated’ by one group, as a result of its 
successful political activity vis-à-vis society. The intentional activity of 
this organized section of society is in fact the precondition for the estab-
lishment of the automatism; and this is why there can be no universally 
valid automatism, since ‘regularity or automatism can be of different 
types at different times’.83
The third ‘sociological operator’ taken into consideration is ‘predict-
ability’, and this is linked to regularity and automatism. Once again, the 
provisional nature of the notes in the Prison Notebooks should be borne 
in mind here: in this case, this provisional nature emerges in the form of 
the ambivalent character of the formulations marking a still incomplete 
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thought process. What Gramsci attempts to do, therefore, is to formulate 
a concept of predictability permitting political action within an organic 
system, without slipping into the teleologism of a prognosis conceived on 
the basis of the natural sciences.84 In fact, on the one hand, he criticizes 
Croce’s argument that social facts cannot be predicted: ‘If social facts 
cannot be predicted, and the very concept of prediction is meaningless, 
then the irrational cannot but be dominant, and any organisation of men 
must be anti-historical, a “prejudice”.’85 On the other hand, he challenges 
the claim of positivist sociology ‘to derive “experimentally” the laws of 
evolution of human society in such a way as to “predict” that the oak 
tree will develop out of the acorn’.86 Gramsci reiterates, on the contrary, 
the teachings of the Theses on Feuerbach, according to which ‘one can 
“scientifically” foresee only the struggle, but not the concrete moments 
of the struggle, which cannot but be the results of opposing forces in 
continuous movement, which are never reducible to fixed quantities 
since within them quantity is continually becoming quality’.87
Following the competing ‘organic systems’ model, the aforemen-
tioned stances can only be considered consistent with one another when 
considered characteristics of two different phases: a period of relative 
stability of an organic system whereby a certain predictability of social 
facts may be observed and studied; and a period of organic crisis, which 
on the contrary is characterized by contrasting forces that constantly 
change quantity into quality, and do not permit any homogeneous 
behaviour to be established. The crucial point of both concepts in 
Gramsci is thus a notion of predictability linked to the material forces 
competing within society in an attempt to impose their own regularities 
and their own automatisms, and thus together with these the predictabil-
ity of social facts. When one of these forces wins the hegemonic battle 
– at least temporarily – and establishes its own organic system, then by 
doing so it creates an automatism, that is, a certain, objective predict-
ability of social facts. At this point such facts may be studied by a science 
that, however, is tied to the organic system created: ‘science is the union 
of the objective fact with a hypothesis or system of hypotheses which go 
beyond the mere objective fact’.88 If, on the other hand, the situation is 
one where the forces in play are still competing with one another, in a 
period of organic crisis in which the old system is breaking up – that is, 
it loses its regularity and predictability – but the new system has yet to be 
organically created, then ‘Prediction reveals itself […] not as a scientific 
act of knowledge, but as the abstract expression of the effort made’.89 The 
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prediction in this case is nothing more than the will of the historical 
actor who wishes to impose its own regularity: ‘one can “foresee” to the 
extent that one acts, to the extent that one applies a voluntary effort and 
therefore contributes concretely to creating the result “foreseen”’.90
Summing up then, account has to be taken of two considerations 
that Gramsci makes in an effort to relativize the field of study of the 
regularities of social phenomena, and these concern the validity of such 
regularities under a specific condition, ‘an historical fact, corresponding 
to certain conditions’,91 that he deems to be historically determined and 
surmountable: the condition whereby ‘the great masses of the population 
remain (or at least are reputed to remain) essentially passive.’92 In this note, 
Gramsci is historicizing statistics as one branch of social science, noting 
two aspects of historical development that seem to confirm the need to 
make critical use of it, avoiding considering it ‘as an essential law operating 
of necessity’.93 The first aspect is the advent of an age in which planned 
policies replace those based on free, conflicting individual initiative: 
‘even the demand for a planned, i.e. guided, economy is destined to break 
down the statistical law understood in a mechanical sense’.94 The second 
aspect, directly connected to the first, is ‘the replacement by political 
organisms (parties) of single individuals and individual (or charismatic, 
as Michels calls them) leaders’, hence ‘the process whereby popular feeling 
is standardized ceases to be mechanical and casual (that is produced by 
the conditioning of environmental factors and the like) and becomes 
conscious and critical’.95 These two historically important phenomena, 
which appear to sweep across both the USSR and the rest of the capitalist 
world, are in Gramsci’s view an expression of an ongoing development in 
which ‘Human awareness replaces naturalistic “spontaneity”’.96
So while, on the one hand, Gramsci warns against the universal, 
dogmatic use of the social sciences, in an age of collective organization 
in the forms of both State and political party, with the advent of mass 
politics, on the other hand, he points to the utility of these sciences within 
the context of a given organic order, which in this case appears to be of a 
medium-term nature. Within this context, the study of the regularity of 
social facts is not only theoretically plausible, but also politically useful. 
In fact, the note from which numerous quotes have been taken also 
contains the following: 
If philology is the methodological expression of the importance 
of ascertaining and precising particular fact in their unique and 
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unrepeatable individuality, one cannot however exclude the practical 
utility of isolating certain more general ‘laws of tendency’ cor-
responding in the political field to the laws of statistics or to the 
law of large numbers which have helped to advance various of the 
natural sciences.97
Likewise, the statement that the ‘planned economy’ should ‘break 
down the statistical law understood in a mechanical sense’ is immediately 
followed by the warning: ‘although such an economy will have to be 
based on statistics, it does not, however, mean the same thing’.98
Ultimately, considering sociological laws as a surrogate of the 
collective will in historical development, as the Marxism of the Second 
International had done – which is probably the real target for Gramsci’s 
criticisms –, does not necessarily mean ignoring the practical utility and 
predictive capacity of such laws. Moreover, ‘the process whereby popular 
feeling is standardized’99 in modern political parties, which is the second 
historical development perceived by Gramsci as moving towards a 
non-mechanical application of the laws of sociology, provides for its own 
laws of tendency, and Gramsci’s interest in the study of elitism is proof of 
the cogency of such historical development.100
This analysis of what we have termed the ‘sociological operators’ 
used and reformulated in the Prison Notebooks clearly reveals Gramsci’s 
interest in the political value of social relations. This interest, which 
remains a fundamental characteristic of all Gramsci’s writings, 
constitutes a novel feature of contemporary political and sociological 
thought, representing not so much a shift ‘from the political to the social’, 
as what may be termed a repositioning of the political within a social 
context. Gramsci follows this direction when he adopts a broader notion 
of causality of social phenomena than the one adopted by the Marxism 
of his time. In this regard, Gramsci moves closer to the more visionary 
sociological tradition that, particularly with Weber, takes the concept of 
cause beyond the homo oeconomicus, that is, beyond the confines of the 
calculation of economic interest and the constriction of economic laws, 
to also include the ethics corresponding to a given conduct of life.
The problem that a philosophy of praxis has to deal with is therefore 
that of the mechanisms controlling the transition from a philosophy 
conception of the world to its praxis, conceived, however, in at least 
two partially different ways: as the subjective capacity to implement a 
political-philosophical programme, and in this case the main point of 
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reference is the party-Prince; but also as the identification of the ethics 
corresponding to the human type that one wishes to transform, and the 
ethics that is created in the new order. An ethics that is not subjectively 
imposed (whereas the order in question is subjectively determined to 
a certain extent), but that derives from the transformations of society. 
This is why the reflection on the overcoming of the separation of the 
rulers from the ruled, that is, on a cultural revolution of the same 
importance as the Renaissance, the Reformation or the Enlightenment, 
is accompanied by a disenchanted analysis of the effects on the new 
human type of the objective phenomena of Taylorism and bureaucra-
tization. This interweaving of a subjective, albeit not singular force (the 
political party) and an objective force, the outcome of which, however, is 
not fully determined (Taylorism-Fordism and bureaucracy), was to form 
the backdrop to Gramsci’s entire reflections in the Prison Notebooks.
5
The crisis




a new understanding of the crisis
Gramsci’s political education, his coming round to socialist ideals, and 
his early experience as a journalist and political leader, all occurred 
during the period of the greatest crisis that Italy’s liberal order had ever 
experienced: the crisis stretching from the First World War to the advent 
of Fascism.1 During this period, the classical economic definition of 
‘crisis’ was no longer capable of accounting for the series of political and 
social upheavals that together seemed to point to a genuine ‘systemic 
crisis’, that is, a ‘catastrophic crisis besetting European civilization’.2
The crisis of authority of the leading classes, the crisis of legitimacy 
of State institutions, the crisis of parliamentarianism, the international 
crisis triggered by the October Revolution, all condition the use of 
the concept in Gramsci’s writings of that period. In this specific case, 
Gramsci’s analysis perceives crisis as an exceptional, unique and in some 
way definitive event. An event that can certainly not be foreseen – and 
the outcome of which cannot be guaranteed, contrary to what a certain 
economistic Marxism believed – but one that is certainly exceptional 
compared to the normal, albeit contradictory, development of the 
capitalistic system. The perception of an ‘epochal systemic crisis’ was 
thus very much present in Gramsci’s writings during, and at the end of, 
the First World War, and his reflections on the construction of a new 
order is the natural consequence thereof: ‘There can be no doubt that 
the bourgeois State will not survive the crisis. In its present condition, 
the crisis will shatter it.’3
The subsequent phases of stabilization of Fascism – from that of 1921 
when the movement organized to form a party, until the end of the crisis 
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triggered by the assassination of Italian socialist politician Giacomo 
Matteotti in 1924 – saw Gramsci’s understanding of crisis lose some of 
the ‘epochal’ characteristics that had distinguished it during the turbulent 
years of the delegitimization of the liberal order at the end of the war. In 
fact, the crisis was portrayed increasingly less as a historical watershed. 
The concept of crisis appeared to Gramsci less capable of accounting 
for a whole series of heterogeneous phenomena contributing towards 
the dissolution of the existing social order. Indeed, the concept began 
to be seen as an attribute of given elements identified as being ‘in crisis’. 
Such elements included the Fascist Party, the middle classes, industrial 
production, the People’s Party and so on.
The first observations challenging the understanding of crisis as an 
irreversible event already began to appear in the mid-1920s:
At this moment in time, the country is going through a crisis that is 
undermining the entire State apparatus from its very roots upwards. 
This crisis may be decisive, although any hypothesis of this kind is 
hazarded in view of the fact that this is the bourgeois State that has 
achieved the greatest organization and power ever achieved, during 
the course of human history, by any form of State.4
There is a gradual semantic shift here, one full of overlapping elements. 
However, during the early 1920s the concept of crisis in Gramsci’s writings 
slowly lost not only its irreversible character, but also its specificity, that 
is, its reference to an event triggered by a specific circumstance: ‘Italian 
society is afflicted by a crisis, a crisis rooted in the inherent character-
istics of that society, and in the irreconcilable conflict between such 
characteristics: there is a crisis that the war has precipitated, exacerbated 
and rendered insuperable.’5 War is no longer the event triggering this 
crisis of hegemony (as it was later to be called in the Prison Notebooks) of 
the leading classes, but merely a factor accelerating an ongoing process.
The period between the end of the 1920s and the mid-1930s, at a time 
when Gramsci was reflecting once again on this matter in the Prison 
Notebooks, saw the stabilization not only of Italy through Fascism, 
but also of the international system that revolved around Nazism in 
Germany, around Stalinism in Russia and around the New Deal in the 
USA. The latter nation in particular was offering an effective political 
response to an extremely damaging economic crisis, through the 
creation of a specific series of ‘fortresses and emplacements’ that the 
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USA did not originally possess (and which had not been necessary up 
until then), thanks to their ‘rational demographic composition’, that is, 
to the absence of ‘numerous classes with no essential function in the 
world of production’.6 Gramsci completely rethinks the concept of crisis 
in this context. Crisis is no longer a specific, definitive historical fact, but 
a given dynamic of the capitalist system. So what Gramsci creates in his 
Prison Notebooks is a genuine dynamic theory of crisis that perceives it as 
a process rather than as an event, more as a contradictory development 
of the system than as an aspect of that system’s breakdown.
In the Prison Notebooks this dynamic theory of crisis is accompanied 
by a mapping of the forms that crises take within specific contexts. Thus, 
crises are analysed within economic, political and social contexts, and 
also from the generational and gender points of view. The concept of 
crisis therefore changes substantially, and can no longer be employed in a 
teleological sense within a definitive, immutable theoretical framework. 
On the contrary, thanks to its dynamic characteristics, its polysemic 
quality, it permits the identification of an open field of inquiry, of a mate-
rialistic interpretative framework, by means of which the capitalistic 
system as a whole may be studied and challenged.7
In the majority of cases, Gramsci’s use of the concept of crisis in the 
Prison Notebooks is therefore not the canonical form adopted by the 
Marxism of his time, which on the contrary is based on the sequence: the 
emergence of a social class –> the development of a social order –> the 
emergence of contradictions –> the separation of structure and super-
structure –> the crisis of this social order and the establishment of a 
new order. In Gramsci, on the other hand, crisis is a more or less evident 
condition of capitalist development, embraced by the two principles that 
Marx sets out in his ‘Preface’ to A Contribution to the Critique of Political 
Economy (1859):
(1) the principle that ‘no society sets itself tasks for the accomplish-
ment of which the necessary and sufficient conditions do not already 
exist’ <or are not in the course of emerging and developing>; and (2) 
that ‘no society perishes until it has first developed all the forms of life 
implicit in its internal relations’.8
What is represented within the confines of these two principles, 
however, is no linear development constituted by the accumulation of 
those contradictions that find their revolutionary outlet in the crisis. 
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The space circumscribed by the aforesaid principles opens up a field of 
possibilities having both a temporal extension (the war of position) and 
a spatial dimension (the expanded notion of the State), within which 
capitalist dynamics may either continue to develop – overcoming the 
crisis as in the case of ‘The passage of the troops of many different parties 
under the banner of a single party’9 – or be replaced by a new social 
organization. For this very reason, according to the famous Gramscian 
adage, ‘The crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and 
the new cannot be Born’.10 The oscillation between the old and the new 
that Gramsci refers to is therefore not relegated to transitional status, 
but is a constant factor that opens up possibilities for the political action 
of an organized body. The further observation that ‘one can “scientif-
ically” foresee only the struggle, but not the concrete moments of the 
struggle’11 expresses this very meaning of crisis as an opportunity for 
political struggle, rather than as a given point at which existing contra-
dictions erupt.
The perception of crisis as the non-correspondence of structure and 
superstructure – as has already been seen with regard to the concept of 
ideology – thus fails to take account of the richness of the concept of 
crisis to be found in the Prison Notebooks. It is in this very relationship, 
or rather within the force field generated by the clash between different 
competing historical blocs, that the crisis is played out each time. It 
is no coincidence that having expounded the limits within which the 
moments of transition may be conceived (those of Marx’s ‘Preface’), 
Gramsci then introduces the very question of the relations of forces, that 
is, of the political battle to be fought within the crisis, in the genuinely 
political space created by Marx’s two principles.
Thus, what is not present in Gramsci’s writings is the ‘model of 
collapse’, or a conception of crisis as the culminating point at which ‘the 
contradictions come to a head’. On the contrary, in anticipation of what 
could be considered the definitive note on the question to be found in 
the Prison Notebooks, Gramsci does not believe the crisis to be the end 
point of capitalism, but rather that ‘the development of capitalism has 
been a “continual crisis”’.12
The fact that in the Prison Notebooks, the concept of crisis makes 
no reference to a definitive, general event at this point permits it to be 
utilized differently, in the form of more precise references describing the 
crisis as the ‘crisis of a particular element’. In fact, in Gramsci the crisis 
is always a crisis ‘of authority’, ‘of hegemony’, ‘organic’, ‘generational’, ‘of 
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libertinism’, and is never a ‘crisis of the capitalist social order’ in general. 
The only note in the Prison Notebooks in which the concept of crisis 
and that of capitalism are brought together is in fact that of the quote 
regarding capitalism as a ‘continual crisis’.
Gramsci never refers to capitalism when dealing with the question of 
crisis, almost as if it were superfluous to mention that the object of the 
crisis, and not its subject, is represented by the dynamics of the capitalist 
social order itself. The various types of crisis, on the other hand, all refer 
to, and are dependent on, the type of development of society imposed 
by the capitalist system, and for this reason their underlying causes are 
to be found in the mechanisms governing that system, that is, in their 
object. However, this is no reason to consider the capitalist system, in 
its entirety and as a subjective element, as being ‘in crisis’. In Gramsci’s 
view, the object of the crisis, its contents and its causes are all to be found 
in capitalist development, whereas economistic Marxism had always 
perceived capitalism as the subject of the crisis, that is, as the element 
which at that given moment in time was ‘in crisis’. The difference between 
the two interpretations of crisis – between Gramsci and economistic 
Marxism – is of fundamental importance to understand the entire Prison 
Notebooks. In the 1930s, Gramsci appears to have raised the question of 
why, after more than fifty years of organic crisis, the capitalist system 
continued to be so strong; of why that system’s internal contradictions 
had not led to its collapse, but on the contrary had indeed strengthened 
it; and finally, of how to reformulate the concept of crisis, and thus of 
struggle, in keeping with this acknowledgement of capitalism’s strength.13
the multiple meanings of ‘crisis’
The concept of crisis takes on various meanings in the Prison Notebooks. 
In order to substantiate this reading of the nebula of meanings that 
the concept of crisis is given, we can start by examining the only note 
that deals with the question directly. This consists in a writing drafted 
just once (b), dating from mid-1933, of note number 5 of Notebook 
15, entitled Past and present. The crisis. Gramsci immediately specifies 
that ‘Whoever wants to give one sole definition of these events […] 
must be rebutted’, and then states that ‘We are dealing with a process 
that shows itself in many ways, and in which causes and effects become 
intertwined and mutually entangled. To simplify means to misrepresent 
and falsify.’14 The crisis is thus presented as a ‘complex process […], and 
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not a unique “fact” repeated in various forms through a cause having one 
single origin’.15
The central topic of the note in question is clearly the ‘crisis of ’29’, 
the effects of which, following its onset in the USA, had already been 
felt throughout Europe. When interpreting this event, Gramsci was 
concerned with avoiding taking the obvious shortcut consisting in 
the identification of a starting point, a specific event that triggers, and 
therefore accounts for, the crisis: ‘We may say that there is no starting 
date as such to the crisis, but simply the date of certain of the more 
striking “manifestations”’.16 Gramsci continues by arguing that in fact 
‘The whole post-war period is one of crisis’, before proceeding to claim 
that ‘For some (and perhaps they are not mistaken) the war itself is a 
manifestation of the crisis’, and concluding that the crisis ‘began at least 
with the war, even if this was not its first manifestations’.17
The search for the origin or triggering cause of the crisis is thus 
represented as necessarily misleading. On the contrary, the phenomenon 
of crisis needed to be analysed starting from these elements: ‘1) […] the 
crisis is a complicated process, 2) […] it began at least with the war, […] 
3) […] [it] has internal origins, in the modes of production and thus of 
exchange’.18 Thus, Gramsci formulates a theory of crisis based around 
the following ideas: 1) a crisis is a process rather than an event; 2) a 
crisis always has remote origins that, however, do not alone explain its 
subsequent development; 3) crisis is an inherent feature of the capitalist 
mode of production.
In the second section of the note, Gramsci further deepens the divide 
between himself and his Marxist contemporaries:
We might, then, say – and this would be more exact – that the ‘crisis’ 
is none other than the quantitative intensification of certain elements, 
neither new nor original, but in particular the intensification of 
certain phenomena, while others that were there before and operated 
simultaneously with the first, sterilizing them, have now become 
inoperative or have completely disappeared. In brief, the development 
of capitalism has been a ‘continual crisis’, if one can say that, i.e. an 
extremely rapid movement of elements that mutually balanced and 
sterilized one another. At a certain point in this movement, some 
elements have gained predominance and others have disappeared or 
have become irrelevant within the general framework. Events that 
go under the specific name of ‘crisis’ have then burst onto the scene, 
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events that are more or less serious according to whether more or less 
important elements of equilibrium come into play.19
The passage in question is highly suggestive and permits a more precise 
reformulation of the concept Gramsci was in the process of developing 
at that time. The crisis, in fact, is described through the ‘language of 
disequilibrium’, as a form of an imbalance caused by the intensification 
of certain existing phenomena that fail to find a counterparty capable 
of ‘immunizing them’ or of counterbalancing them.20 According to this 
view, it could be said that crisis is ever-present – in a latent or explicit 
form – within the context of a balancing game played out between 
conflicting forces. In the former case in particular – that of a latent form 
of crisis – it is continuously neutralized by the advent of opposing forces 
that rebalance the system and permit it to develop. On the other hand, 
a crisis becomes explicit when certain elements become more intense 
or others suddenly fall dormant. Thus, the unbalancing of the capitalist 
order’s ‘zero sum game’ reveals the existence of a crisis, albeit one that is 
inherent to the functioning of that system as it is constantly rebalanced. 
The dynamics of this balancing movement entail long periods during 
which the crisis is not immediately visible, but nevertheless remains a 
fundamental element underlying the functioning of the capitalist system. 
The ‘passive revolution’ – a transformation that, as we have seen (Chapter 
3, section ‘Bureaucracy and officials: Gramsci and Weber’), arises in the 
absence of any strong popular action and is controlled by the classes 
already in power – is the term that Gramsci uses to describe this ‘critical’ 
balancing game when it proves successful, that is, when equilibrium 
is re-established by the dominant class. To put it briefly, the passive 
revolution is the form taken by the process of transformation when the 
crisis is played out through the leading class actions, in the absence of 
any competing subjective elements that upset said equilibrium, or in 
their presence but accompanied by their continual rebalancing: ‘Hence 
theory of the “passive revolution” not as a programme, as it was for the 
Italian liberals of the Risorgimento, but as a criterion of interpretation, in 
the absence of other active elements to a dominant extent.’21
The emphasis placed on the problem of equilibrium and on the forces 
guaranteeing it leads to an analysis of the real nature of these forces in 
the historical period of the post-war years. In fact, what does Gramsci 
mean when he talks of the ‘intensification of certain phenomena’?22 It is 
at this point that he begins to specify the nature of the crisis:
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At a certain point in their historical lives, social groups become 
detached from their traditional parties […]. In every country the 
process is different, although the content is the same. And the content 
is the crisis of the ruling class’s hegemony, which occurs either 
because the ruling class has failed in some major political undertaking 
for which it has requested, or forcibly extracted, the consent of the 
broad masses (war, for example), or because huge masses (especially 
of peasants and petit-bourgeois intellectuals) have passed suddenly 
from a state of political passivity to a certain activity, and put forward 
demands which taken together, albeit not organically formulated, add 
up to a revolution. A ‘crisis of authority’ is spoken of: this is precisely 
the crisis of hegemony, or general crisis of the State.23
The concept of crisis is specified in this political context as a ‘crisis 
of hegemony’ or a ‘crisis of authority’. As already mentioned, two 
phenomena may cause such a crisis: 1) the ‘passivity’ of certain forces, 
that is, the historical absence of the rebalancing role that the leading 
classes should have exercised and that, given the defeat in the war, are no 
longer capable of exercising; 2) the intensification of opposing forces, that 
is, the advent of mass politics witnessing ‘huge masses […] [that] have 
passed suddenly from a state of political passivity to a certain activity’.24 
In both cases, the existing equilibrium is at risk. In the post-war period 
the two phenomena arose concurrently, whereby Gramsci formulated a 
concept of ‘definitive’ crisis. The contradictions inherent in the capitalist 
system were not balanced and enhanced, but became merely destructive, 
and in this situation – we are still dealing with the historical analysis 
of Italy during the immediate post-war years – two possible solutions 
were envisaged within this impasse characterized, among other things, 
by the absence of any strong organization of the subaltern classes (the 
Italian Communist Party was only founded in 1921): ‘The passage of the 
troops of many different parties under the banner of a single party’, or 
the ‘solution […] of the charismatic leader’.25
Both solutions raised the same problem in Gramsci’s eyes, namely, the 
use of such time of acute crisis to advance the struggle of the working 
class and its allies. In this context the crisis does not become the event 
marking the death of capitalism and the birth of a new order, but the 
field of political battle on which the working class and its allies have to 
be capable of playing. At this point the discourse regarding the concept 
of crisis becomes a genuine ‘political science of crisis’, thanks to which 
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the dynamics of the periods of crisis can be established, together with 
the role of the economic element and the diverse forms this takes in 
different contexts, the dangers inherent in times of imbalance and the 
political force required to shatter the contradictory dynamics of social 
relations. A political science of crisis, therefore, that describes the 
conditions and rules of development of the crisis, but which also alludes 
to the requirements to be met in order to take action within the context 
of such crisis.26
the political science of crisis
To define a political science of crisis, Gramsci needs to extend his 
analytical scope beyond the historical experience from which the 
problem emerged – the years immediately after the First World War – 
in order to identify the political regularities and constants of times of 
crisis also by comparing the various different historical developments 
following such times: 
the modern world is currently experiencing a phenomenon similar to 
the split between the ‘spiritual’ and the ‘temporal’ in the Middle Ages 
[…]. Regressive and conservative social groupings are shrinking back 
more and more to their initial economic-corporative phase, while 
progressive and innovative groupings are still in their initial phase – 
which is, precisely, the economic-corporative phase.27
Considered in relation to the Middle Ages, the reflection Gramsci 
makes is once again derived from the two principles stated in Marx’s 
‘Preface’ to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (1859). 
This is thus a recurrent characteristic of the large-scale transitions 
between organic systems, which rarely witness the players in the new 
order as already established and ready to take on the role of leading a 
new society when the preceding order has been delegitimized. The 
construction of the revolutionary subject, although carefully prepared, 
therefore seems to require experience of the crisis,28 either when it is 
latent or during periods in which the contradictions in question surface. 
Thus, at this point Gramsci formulates a number of general principles 
characteristic of these times of acute crisis, the first of which has to 
provide the coordinates of the phenomenon in question:
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When studying a structure one must distinguish the permanent from 
the occasional. The occasional gives rise to political criticism, the 
permanent gives rise to sociohistorical criticism; the occasional helps 
one assess political groups and personalities, the permanent helps one 
assess large social groupings.29
Gramsci thus makes a distinction here that at first sight appears to 
refer to an understanding of crisis as an exceptional event, one that 
sweeps over the system when the equilibrium between its fundamental 
components – seen as of a ‘permanent’ nature – is altered, but which 
does not arise when the ‘occasional’ aspects of the system clash. 
However, upon closer examination this distinction does not appear so 
clear-cut. In fact, the permanent level remains such as long as the old 
social structure preserves a certain unity and strength, that is, as long 
as ‘regularities’ and ‘automatisms’ subsist in the majority of cases. (cf. 
Chapter 4, section ‘Gramsci’s “sociological operators”’). As long as this 
unity is preserved, even if only to a partial degree – and it only ceases 
to exist when the social order collapses altogether – the opposing forces 
necessarily only ever operate at the ‘occasional’ level – or rather, at that 
level that is occasional when seen from the point of view of the existing 
system – even when faced with a crisis of legitimacy. Only the victory 
of those forces opposing the system seals the definitive transformation 
thereof, thus permitting the actions and deeds of those forces to acquire, 
in practice and not a priori, permanent status: 
The great importance of this distinction becomes clear when a 
historical period is studied. A crisis exists, sometimes lasting for 
decades. This means that incurable contradictions have come to light 
within the structure and that the political forces positively working 
to preserve the structure itself are nevertheless striving to heal these 
contradictions, within certain limits. These insistent and persistent 
efforts (since no social formation ever wants to admit that it has 
been superseded) form the terrain of the ‘occasional’, wherein one 
gets the organization of those forces that ‘strive’ to demonstrate (in 
the final analysis through their own triumph, but in immediate terms 
through ideological, religious, philosophical, political, juridical, etc., 
polemics) that ‘the necessary and sufficient conditions already exist to 
render the accomplishment of certain tasks historically possible and 
therefore obligatory’.30
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Thus, the immediate field of battle is that of the ‘occasional’, where 
the various forces in play organize themselves and a ‘superstructural’ 
battle – in the broad, non-peripheral sense of the term illustrated in 
Chapter 1 – is fought that, nevertheless, is also an integral part of the 
battle being fought at the permanent level. So the distinction between 
occasional and permanent does not appear to refer to any ranking of the 
importance of the levels at which the political battle is fought, or to any 
time sequence to be followed in order to be able to identify the system’s 
‘key’ elements. By renouncing any linear reading of the crisis, it could 
be said, on the other hand, that Gramsci perceived the two moments in 
time as coessential, that is, that no distinction can be made – this is vitally 
important – between the moment at which a given social order plunges 
into ‘permanent crisis’ from the ‘occasional’ level of struggle where crisis 
manifests itself as a surmountable contradiction. The transition from the 
occasional to the permanent, therefore, is not dictated by the gravity of 
the contradictions in question, or even by the importance of the various 
areas affected by the crisis (the economic, political or social fields), but 
by the strength of the alternative subjective forces that challenge the 
established order, and which demonstrate ‘in the final analysis through 
their own triumph’31 their capacity to impose the permanent level within 
the crisis. Gramsci then states that:
A frequent error in historical analysis consists in the inability to 
find the relation between the ‘permanent’ and the ‘occasional’; as a 
result, remote causes are presented as if they were the direct causes, 
or else direct causes are said to be the only efficient causes. On the 
one hand there is an excess of ‘economism’, on the other an excess 
of ‘ideologism’; one side overrates mechanical causes, and the other 
overrates the ‘voluntary’ and individual element.32
If the contrast between economism and voluntarism is put in such 
terms, it appears clear that Gramsci’s recommended direction cannot 
be any mere mediation between the two. The search for the causes of a 
historical upheaval is in fact strictly bound, also from the historiograph-
ical viewpoint, to the subsequent development of the subjective force 
dictating change. Thus, if it is not to take the form of a ‘passive revolution’ 
– that is, a programme for change formulated by the classes holding 
power – a revolutionary event needs, at least in part, to set in place its 
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own conditions within a situation of crisis that permits modification of 
the relationship between the occasional and the permanent.
Having formulated these two general principles – the principle of 
political action within the context of the transition between organic 
systems and that of the coessential character of permanent and 
occasional in such transition – Gramsci can then analyse the role that 
the economic element plays both within and outside such coordinates. 
Giving Rosa Luxemburg’s work The Mass Strike, the Political Party 
and the Trade Unions33 as an example, Gramsci notes that within this 
work ‘The immediate economic factor (crisis, etc.) is seen as the field 
artillery employed in war to open a breach in the enemy’s defences’.34 
Luxemburg’s book assigns a key role in the revolutionary process to the 
economic crisis, and as such it represents ‘the most significant theory 
of the war of manoeuver applied to the study of history and to the art 
of politics’.35 According to Gramsci’s reading of Luxemburg’s work, as 
well as ‘open[ing] a breach’ in the enemy lines, the economic crisis also 
managed to ‘organize in a flash one’s own troops’,36 thus operating as the 
aggregator and organizer of the antagonistic subject.
In Gramsci’s view this interpretation is flawed by a certain 
economistic prejudice since, on the one hand, it transposes, in an 
excessively mechanical manner, a military technical principle to the 
sphere of politics,37 while, on the other hand, it makes reference to a 
type of conflict that the advent of the First World War, with its lengthy 
trench warfare, had radically challenged. The immediate efficacy of the 
economic element, in fact, is ‘much more complex than the impact of 
field artillery in a war of manoeuver’.38 At the same time, the advent of 
the war of position cannot be ignored, given that ‘one cannot choose the 
form of war one wants’, but one must accept the form that is ‘“imposed” 
by the overall relation of the forces in conflict’.39
Despite criticizing this ‘rigid form of economic determinism’,40 
Gramsci, on the other hand, expands on the analogy between the art of 
politics and military techniques:
In my view, Ilyich [Lenin] understood the need for a shift from the 
war of manoeuver that had been applied victoriously in the East in 
1917, to a war of position, which was the only viable possibility in 
the West […]. In the East, the state was everything, civil society was 
primordial and gelatinous; in the West, there was a proper relation 
between state and civil society, and when the state tottered, a sturdy 
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structure of civil society was immediately revealed. The state was just 
a forward trench; behind it stood a succession of sturdy fortresses and 
emplacements.41
In this reformulation of military strategy, and by analogy of political 
strategy, the element ‘of manoeuver’ does not disappear altogether, but 
‘must be seen to have a reduced tactical function rather than a strategic 
function’.42 Rosa Luxemburg – like Trotsky, who with his ‘permanent 
revolution’ is the target of this latter citation – ultimately expresses a 
position that takes no account of the growing importance of the war 
of position, which in political terms takes the form of mass politics. 
One corollary of this element, which Gramsci adopts following Lenin’s 
example, is the question of ‘whether the fundamental historical crises are 
directly determined by economic crises’.43 Gramsci responds unequivo-
cally: ‘It may be ruled out that immediate economic crises of themselves 
produce fundamental historical events’.44
By defining the place reserved for the economic element in this 
manner, the concept of crisis may thus be specified by different 
adjectives, the most important of which is undoubtedly that of ‘organic 
crisis’. The organicity of a crisis is confirmed by the fact that ‘quantity 
becomes quality’,45 when an increase in the points of conflict and in ‘dis-
integrating’ subjective actions begin to challenge the system’s general 
equilibrium, its regularities and its automatisms, and consequently 
rearranges the relationship between the occasional and the permanent. 
In this case, ‘the crisis is now organic and no longer conjunctural’,46 since 
it challenges what is considered the ‘naturalness’, and thus the ‘insupera-
bility’, of that specific social system, of that specific ‘determined market’, 
of that specific relationship between what is permanent and what is 
occasional: 
But what is the ‘determinate market’, and what is it in fact determined 
by? It will be determined by the fundamental structure of the society 
under consideration; one must therefore analyse this structure 
and identify within it those elements that are <relatively> constant, 
determine the market, etc., as well as those other ‘variable and 
developing’ elements that determine conjunctural crises up to a point 
when even the <relatively> constant elements get modified and the 
crisis becomes organic.47
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Before an organic crisis is reached, the leading class must necessarily 
experience a specific political crisis that Gramsci refers to as the ‘crisis 
of authority’ or ‘crisis of hegemony’.48 In particular, this concerns the 
leading class’s loss of ideological domination, which happens when ‘the 
ruling class has lost consensus, that is, if it no longer ‘leads’ but only 
“rules”’.49 The unbalancing of the leading function, in favour of the 
repressive function marks, albeit not definitively, the start of a clear 
process of crisis. The crisis of hegemony, perceived in this sense as a 
political crisis, a crisis of legitimacy and consensus, represents one of the 
most important specifications of the concept of crisis made by Gramsci, 
which within the framework of his discourse takes the place that had 
been reserved for economic crisis in almost all of the analyses produced 
by the Marxism of the Second International. The importance of the crisis 
of hegemony in the Prison Notebooks is also dictated by the fact that it 
marks a structural change of that time, with the emergence of the masses 
in the political sphere, and the impossibility of preserving domination, 
on the one hand, through coercion alone, and, on the other hand, 
through a group of basically self-referential intellectuals who remain 
distinctly removed from all practical matters.
The last two Gramscian definitions of crisis – the ‘crisis of generations’ 
and the ‘crisis of libertinism’50 – represent two ‘cyclical’ moments of the 
phases of crisis. In fact, the ‘crisis of generations’ is that process whereby 
‘in the struggle between generations, the young get closer to the people, 
but when crisis reach the turning point, the young people return to their 
class’.51 Gramsci’s political experience during the immediate post-war 
years had seen this very transition in the younger generations of Italy’s 
bourgeoisie, from enthusiasm for the political potential of the working 
classes, to the sudden ‘realignment’ among the Fascist ranks. The ‘crises 
of libertinism’, on the other hand, are phenomena that derive from 
changes in the world of labour: 
In order to achieve a new adaptation to the new mode of work, 
pressure is exerted over the whole social sphere, a puritan ideology 
develops which gives to the intrinsic brutal coercion the external form 
of persuasion and consent. Once the result has been to some extent 
achieved, the pressure breaks up […] and is followed by the crisis of 
libertinism […]. This crisis, however, has no more than a superficial 
effect on the working masses […]; these masses, in fact, have already 
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acquired the new ways of life and remain subjected to the pressure 
because of the basic necessities of life.52
The crises of libertinism thus concern adaptation to the new mode 
of work, although they principally characterize the upper classes who 
do not materially require to follow this new ‘conformism’ that the 
productive apparatus calls for, and which, not having to deal with the 
changed conditions, can afford to have a ‘“libertarian” conception 
associated with the classes which are not engaged in manual production’.53 
The ‘“Puritanical” initiatives’ promoted by American industrialists in 
relation to the imposition of Fordist-Taylorist methods of production, 
for example, had ‘the purpose of preserving, outside of work, a certain 
psycho-physical equilibrium which prevents the physiological collapse 
of the worker, exhausted by the new method of production’.54 The 
prohibition of alcohol and the regulation of sexual conduct, which 
Gramsci discusses at length in the famous notebook on Americanism 
and Fordism, are just two examples of this need to rationalize the 
after-work conduct of workers. However, in this regard the conflicting 
response of the workers did not materialize through the development 
of a ‘libertarian’ conception, but, on the contrary, through the revolu-
tionary struggle for political control over this transformation, to ‘find 
for themselves an “original”, and not Americanised, system of living, to 
turn into “freedom” what today is “necessity”’.55 The crises of libertinism, 
despite being the sign of an ongoing ‘critical’ change, did not lay the way 
for any revolutionary struggle. 
crisis and organization
Within the various different forms that the concept of crisis takes in the 
Prison Notebooks, Gramsci identified one element that he believed to 
be key to allowing an antagonistic subject to develop and impose itself 
in a crisis. The element in question is organization, the most important 
weapon an antagonistic force may deploy when the equilibrium is 
constantly oscillating. What is it that proves decisive ‘in the last instance’ 
in situations of organic crisis, when the existing equilibrium is disrupted 
and the struggle between the old and the new intensifies?
the decisive element in every situation is the permanently organised 
and long-prepared force which can be put into the field when it is 
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judged that a situation is favourable (and it can be favourable only in 
so far as such a force exists, and is full of fighting spirit). Therefore the 
essential task is that of systematically and patiently ensuring that this 
force is formed, developed, and rendered ever more homogeneous, 
compact, and self-aware.56
This organized force, however, should not be conceived and used 
simply as a battering ram – an idea more suited to the war of manoeuvre 
– but also as a ‘counterweight’ (in keeping with the language of 
equilibrium theory) that may be moved and repositioned depending on 
how the crisis develops. This organized force must be used intelligently 
and ‘expended’ politically where it is most effective, within the context of 
a conflict that has expanded over the course of time, and is characterized 
by different levels of engagement and phases of differing intensity. In 
order to manage this force efficiently – following Machiavelli in wishing 
to shape the side that was ‘not in the know’ – in note 17 of Notebook 
13 Gramsci formulates a theory of the ‘relations of forces’ capable of 
indicating ‘the points of least resistance, at which the force of will can be 
most fruitfully applied’.57
This note is entitled Analysis of situations: relations of forces, and is 
the redrafted writing (c) of part of note 38 of Notebook 4 (a). This latter, 
the rough writing, before dealing with the question of relations of force, 
had already framed the question within the two principles of Marx’s 
‘Preface’ to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (1859) 
and reviewed the observations on the difference between the occasional 
and permanent features of the development of a system of power. Thus, 
Gramsci’s intention was to formulate one single argument delineating 
the field of possibility (the two principles), then to establish the specific 
conditions of the ages of crisis (the occasional/permanent relationship), 
and finally to provide, with his theory of the relations of forces, a rev-
olutionary political science permitting the most beneficial use of the 
organized force.
In regard to these relations of forces, Gramsci thus distinguishes 
between an initial phase when the relations of forces are objectively 
determined and two further phases – the political phase and the military 
phase – which depend on the organizational forms achieved and on the 
hegemonic elements present. The first phase is ‘closely linked to the 
structure […]. This relation is what it is, a refractory reality: nobody can 
alter the number of firms or their employees, the number of cities or 
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the given urban population, etc.’58 Thus, this is a given fact that merely 
gives us to understand whether in society ‘there exist the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for its transformation’.59 The other two phases – 
the political and the military – on the other hand, establish the space 
within which ‘the decisive passage from the structure to the sphere of 
the complex superstructures’60 is revealed. The second, political phase in 
particular represents the moment at which, given the relation of social 
forces and the relation of military forces, ‘an evaluation of the degree of 
homogeneity, self-awareness, and organization attained by the various 
social classes’,61 that is, the result achieved by organizational endeavours 
over time, becomes of decisive importance.
This model of the relations of forces thus constitutes the embryo 
of a revolutionary political science laying out the construction of an 
organized force both before and during the phases of the system’s acute 
crisis. However, Gramsci’s political experience had led him to a very 
different situation, that of the post-war years characterized by an Italian 
Socialist Party insufficiently organized along revolutionary lines, and by 
an Italian Communist Party that had only seen the light of day in 1921, 
at the very beginning of the Fascists taking over power in Italy. What 
happens, therefore, when an acute crisis arises but the organized force is 
incapable of directing the spontaneous forces present within society? In 
such a case, the crisis is transformed from an opportunity to a situation 
of great danger for the subaltern classes:
Ignoring and, even worse, disdaining so-called ‘spontaneous’ 
movements – that is, declining to give them a conscious leadership 
and raise them to a higher level by inserting them into politics – may 
often have very bad and serious consequences. It is almost always the 
case that a ‘spontaneous’ movement of the subaltern classes is matched 
by a reactionary movement of the right wing of the dominant class, for 
concomitant reasons.62
There is a clear historical reference to the Fascist regime here, 
although it should be noted that the player in Gramsci’s writings remains 
the subaltern classes and their (more or less effective) leadership. In fact, 
it is this absence of any connection between spontaneous movements 
and a conscious leadership that is responsible for the emergence of a 
right-wing movement of the leading classes, rather than any random 
cause or historical necessity. The ‘failure of the responsible groups to give 
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conscious leadership to spontaneous rebellions and thus enable them to 
become a positive political factor’63 is the principal reason for the failure 
of the second phase of the relations of forces.
The movement always arises spontaneously from the masses, in fact, 
when the equilibrium is unbalanced and the crisis emerges into the 
open. The leadership of this movement, however, depends on the degree 
of organization and consciousness that has been established before the 
crisis, on the one hand, and during the process of crisis itself, on the 
other. At this point, Gramsci’s political science does not claim to establish 
any ‘scholastic and academic’ canons, whereby ‘the only authentic and 
worthy movement is one that is one hundred percent conscious’.64 On the 
contrary, it is precisely because ‘reality is teeming with the most bizarre 
coincidences’ that a revolutionary political science must be capable 
of creating a framework within which it is possible ‘to “translate” the 
elements of historical life into theoretical language, but not vice versa, 
making reality conform to an abstract scheme’.65
Thus, while the crisis has been, and continues to be, the backdrop to 
the history of capitalism, it is also, at the same time, the constant scenario 
in which the class struggle is played out: a scenario in which the effort 
of ‘translating’ society’s spontaneous movements into political practice is 
offensive and defensive at the same time, because in any political struggle 
one is never completely on the defensive against the reaction, just as one 
is never in a purely revolutionary attacking position: ‘In politics, the siege 
is reciprocal’.66 In certain moments, however, the struggle intensifies, the 
crisis deepens and the occasional level at which the competing forces 
had previously battled against one another is slowly transformed into 
a permanent level. The post-war period was an example of this, when 
the situation arose of a ‘struggle between “two conformisms”, that is, a 
struggle for hegemony, and a crisis of civil society’.67 In that particular 
case, the possibility of fighting at the level of the crisis depended on the 
political and organizational strength that the competing forces had been 
capable of establishing. While the ‘quiescence’ of the balancing elements 
is in fact a prerequisite for the emergence of a revolutionary process, 
the inescapable factor remains that of the ‘intensification’ of those forces 
pressing for the breaking of the existing equilibrium. In the post-war 
period, this organizational level was absent.
Ultimately, economic crises, despite making any rebalancing more 
difficult, do not actually produce any fundamentally important effects, 
but ‘they can simply create a terrain more favourable to the dissemination 
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of certain modes of thought, and certain ways of posing and resolving 
questions involving the entire subsequent development of national life’.68 
The economic crisis creates at least a terrain more favourable to a change 
in mentality, and it is just the detachment of the intellectuals from the 
dominant group that endorses the acute phase of the crisis: in doing so 
‘traditional intellectuals […] [perform] an act of incalculable historical 
significance; they are signalling and sanctioning the crisis of the state in 
its decisive form’69 (cf. Chapter 4, section ‘Organic intellectuals and mass 
intellectuality’).
In the same note containing this passage, one encounters once again 
the comparison between the medieval crisis and the crisis experienced 
during the transition to mass politics. The difference noted between the 
two situations of crisis once again highlights the importance of class 
organization within the crisis. In fact, contemporary traditional intel-
lectuals, despite detaching themselves from the dominant social group, 
have neither the kind of organization possessed by the church nor 
anything comparable to it; that is what makes the modern crisis more 
severe than the medieval crisis. The medieval crisis lasted for several 
centuries, until the French Revolution, when the social grouping that 
had become the economic driving force in Europe after the year 1000 
was able to present itself as an integral ‘state’ with all the intellectual 
and moral forces that were necessary and adequate to the task of 
organizing a complete and perfect society.70
The contemporary crisis is thus aggravated by the fact that traditional 
intellectuals do not have a solid ‘shore’ to land on, given that the new 
order, despite having to test the seeds of its organizational forms within 
existing society, is still not able, with its organic intellectuals, to allude 
to any new, alternative hegemony capable of recouping, at the level of 
its own hegemony, those traditional intellectuals freed by the crisis of 
the old system. Once again the difficulty of conceiving the forms of the 
‘organic recombination’, that is, the rearticulation of society’s different 
elements to form a new order, comes to the fore. This is the fulcrum that 
all of the Prison Notebooks revolve around: the analysis of the transition 
from one organic system to another that is not seen simply as a process 
of destruction and reconstruction, as it was in accordance with an 
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the dual character of gramscian time
The Prison Notebooks, for the best part of their existence as a political 
work, have regularly been interpreted in the same way with regard to their 
alleged temporal structure. In fact, Western Marxism’s use of Gramsci’s 
work has been heavily conditioned by the Italian Communist Party’s 
political use of the notebooks, at least up until the 1970s.1 Gramsci’s 
thoughts were classified as part of the historicist school of thought, on the 
basis of the presumed continuity with an Italian tradition that, starting 
with Francesco De Sanctis, was later developed by Antonio Labriola, 
and ultimately by Benedetto Croce, and is thus also considered to take 
in Antonio Gramsci. This historicist school of thought implied a linear, 
progressive conception of time, in which each historical moment could 
be broken down and comprehended on the basis of the relationship 
between its component parts.2 In addition to the political consequences 
of the aforementioned classification, which was so often reiterated that 
it became a cliché difficult to negate, the conception of time inherent 
in these interpretations concealed, for a long time, the much more 
complex temporal structure of Gramsci’s work. Interest in this topic has 
re-emerged in recent years, even though it has not been fully formulated 
as yet.3 The emphasis on the ‘multiple temporal levels’ present in the 
Prison Notebooks, on the other hand, has often led to the work’s interpre-
tation tending in the opposite direction, that is, towards the unreserved 
valorization of the temporal pluralities present in Gramsci’s works, thus 
offering an intriguing reading of the notebooks, but possibly one that is 
a little too audacious given the real content of the work.4
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Thus, whosoever wishes to analyse the question of the structure of 
time in Gramsci must first acknowledge that it is not an easy thing to 
identify. Together with an understanding of temporality as a plural entity 
– as in the case of the theory of personality, of linguistic phenomena 
and of considerations regarding common sense, all questions that will be 
shortly dealt with here – there is, in fact, a ‘hegemonic temporality’ in the 
Prison Notebooks that determines these relations in more ways than one, 
and acts as a type of ‘temporal unifying device’.5 This is not a case merely 
of one of the many temporal layers that, within a ‘presumed’ unit such as 
the individual or a language, carries on its battle by trying to impose its 
own course. In fact, this is also a case of the temporality of that force that, 
temporarily and not ‘naturally’ of course, prevails over others despite not 
managing to, or being able to, assimilate them completely. This force not 
only endeavours to get time to conform to it, as a specific mode if its own 
prevalence over other temporalities, but at least in part it also over-deter-
mines the rules of this struggle. These two forms of temporality – plural 
temporality that is always struggling to prevail and singular temporality 
represented by the hegemonic force at the time – are simultaneously and 
constantly at play in Gramsci’s analysis. In the case of plural temporality, 
the outcome of the struggle is different each time, from one case to the 
next; within singular temporality, the upheaval occurs at the beginning 
of every new age, when the ‘temporal line’ changes and points in another 
direction.
This dual character of time inherent in the Prison Notebooks reflects 
the dynamic character of the historical blocs, of the determined market 
and of the competing organic systems. The dominant bloc that, as we 
saw when analysing the concept of ‘automatism’ (Chapter 4, section 
‘Gramsci’s “sociological operators”’), ‘predominates and “dictates law”’,6 
in practice also dictates time. The over-determination of this ‘temporal 
force’ in relation to the plurality of conflicting times thus needs to be 
taken into account: the groups governing society fight their war of 
position with the benefit of this force that over-determines the conflict. 
This plurality does not therefore occur in neutral territory, but in a 
context partially structured by hegemonic time, and this privileged 
position of the dominant bloc is merely the thing that is at stake here, 
that is, hegemony: and the establishment of one given time structure is a 
specific development of this hegemony.
In this regard, Alberto Burgio was the first to point out the difference 
between the Gramscian concepts of ‘duration’ and of ‘constituting an 
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epoch’. Burgio identified the dual structure of historical temporality 
in Gramsci, which sees the continuity of duration interrupted by the 
intervention of an epoch-making phenomenon.7 However, Burgio 
appears to situate these two temporalities in succession, on the basis of 
a linear model that, rather paradoxically, seems to reassemble historical 
development. The only possible asynchronous movement in this model 
is represented by the geographical differences that stagger the levels of 
linear temporality, producing the effect of a ‘contemporaneity of the 
non-contemporaneous’, as in the case of French history compared to the 
histories of the other European nations fighting a battle that had already 
been won in France by the Revolution.8 However, the dual structure of 
Gramscian time that we are trying to reconstruct here is based in the 
Prison Notebooks on the consubstantiality of these temporalities rather 
than on their consecutiveness, following that relationship between the 
permanent and the occasional that we have already analysed (Chapter 
5, section ‘The political science of crisis’), whereby the two terms are 
not determined a priori, but are dependent upon the organic system of 
which they are part. 
Duration and epoch thus co-exist as temporal courses. The former 
is the stage for the imminent struggle between social forces within a 
system of hegemonic power. The latter is the unequal background in 
which this struggle is played out. In regard to duration, there are no 
novelties at the level of overall social organization, but only diverse forms 
of organization of the system. Constituting an epoch, on the other hand, 
entails establishing a new civilization, destroying the old automatisms 
and creating new ones, and modifying the relationship between the 
occasional and the permanent. However, if the event that constitutes 
an epoch arises only rarely, this does not mean that the temporality 
inscribed in an epoch is not present and does not play a decisive role 
in the epoch’s duration. On the contrary, an epoch manifests itself in 
every hegemonic conflict, both in the force that at that moment governs 
the process and in the structure of the battlefield that, at least in part, is 
determined by this same force. Likewise, while it is true that duration 
characterizes homogeneous, linear time, and any ripples in that time are 
relegated to the ranks of the accidental, it is also true that it is impossible 
to determine the precise moment at which duration becomes epoch; 
likewise, it is not possible to determine the moment at which the struggle 
at the occasional level becomes permanent struggle.9
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There are four notes in the Prison Notebooks in which the concept 
of ‘constituting an epoch’ emerges. These four notes refer, respectively, 
to four movements: 1) the idea of progress; 2) what Gramsci termed 
the ‘Dreyfus movement’; 3) Fascism; and 4) Americanism. In Gramsci’s 
view, only the first of these constitutes an epoch, while the other three are 
expressions: 2) of ‘movements [that] can have a relatively “progressive” 
content’ but are not epoch-making in that ‘They are rendered historically 
effective by their adversary’s inability to construct, not by an inherent 
force of their own’;10 3) of political phenomena that seem to take society 
backwards to an absolutist form, but in reality are only of a ‘“transitory” 
character’;11 4) of reorganizations that fail to create a new civilization 
but simply ‘remasticate the old European culture’.12 While Dreyfusism, 
Fascism and Americanism do not constitute an epoch but are simply 
‘transitory’ moments within the capitalistic epoch, the idea of progress, 
on the other hand, is epoch-making since it marks the emergence of a 
new ‘mentality’, of a new ‘relationship […] between society and nature’ 
that may be rationally interpreted, which means that ‘mankind as a 
whole is more sure of its future and can conceive “rationally” of plans 
through which to govern its entire life’.13 This is a revolution in mentality 
comparable solely with Soviet efforts to construct a ‘new Man’ for a new 
epoch-making transition.
Adopting a less theoretical, more analytical approach, we shall now 
render this analysis of Gramsci’s writings concrete by retracing the path 
followed by this book up to now, this time in regard to the question of 
temporality: from the theory of personality (the individual) to common 
sense and language (collective organisms), and the distinction between 
East and West (society). In this way we can analyse the question of the 
temporal nature of epochal change, armed with the appropriate tools. 
signs of time: the theory of personality,  
common sense, language, east and west
How can we incorporate the question of temporality in the reconstruc-
tion formulated in Chapter 2 regarding the theory of personality? The 
key element to be borne in mind is the individual as a stratified being 
composed of strictly individual elements together with others that are 
socially determined. The conflict between these two components is 
summed here with the conflict inherent in the social elements of individ-
uality, which reproduce in the individual those conflicts that characterize 
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a society divided into different social classes. The individual is thus the 
object of different, competing temporalities that express present and past 
conflicts:
it contains Stone Age elements and principles of a more advanced 
science, prejudices from all past phases of history at the local level and 
intuitions of a future philosophy which will be that of a human race 
united the world over.14
This temporal plurality is the point of departure for each individual, 
who experiences his own life according to the different times – just 
for the sake of example – of folklore and of ‘disenchantment’ of the 
world,15 of dedication to one’s work and of Taylorist-Fordist rationality, 
of superstition and of science. This temporal plurality should not be 
confused, however, with an objective, eternal condition that sees frag-
mentariness as a value in itself, and which consequently expresses 
a politics that tends to incorporate these diverse temporalities into 
one ‘harmonious plurality’.16 The Gramscian approach, linked to a 
progressive, unifying vision of emancipation – whether this is to be 
considered an advantage or a limitation makes little difference here – on 
the other hand, is characterized by the acknowledgement of a struggle 
aimed at temporal uniformity:
Having established that the contradictory nature of the system of social 
relations implies that people’s consciousness is inevitably contradic-
tory, the question arises as to the manner in which this contradiction 
manifests itself, and how unification can be gradually achieved.17
This urge for temporal unity is characteristic of all the forces at play 
within the hegemonic struggle, each of which tries to bring its adversaries 
into its ‘own temporality’. Even the working class has to move in this 
direction, through individual coherence, control over its own actions, the 
systematic and organic development of a ‘new Man’, and consequently 
of a new order. The October Revolution was greeted by Gramsci as an 
epoch-making event also because it laid the basis for such possible unity: 
For a mass of people to be led to think coherently and in the same 
coherent fashion about the real present world, is a ‘philosophical’ 
event far more important and ‘original’ than the discovery by some 
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philosophical ‘genius’ of a truth which remains the property of small 
groups of intellectuals.18
In this case, coherence is the result of that action designed to encompass 
the diverse temporalities within the temporality of revolution.
Of course, one should not underestimate the importance of Gramsci’s 
willingness to accept plurality, compared to the monistic view of the 
working class in vogue during his time. One should not forget that 
Gramsci’s innovation was radical, not only in considering the struggle 
within each formally perceived political unit (including the individual) 
to be fundamental, but also in valorizing this plurality in the phases 
of transition to the new order. The revolutionary process, as we have 
seen, is for this reason among others rethought on a longer timescale 
and in terms of its ‘consensual’ characteristics. However, the ultimate 
purpose of Gramsci’s politics remains that of social unity and individual 
coherency, to be achieved through a process that unfolds parallel to 
transformation.
The two types of temporality therefore manifest themselves through 
the co-existence of: 1) diverse temporal layers and 2) a strained tendency 
towards unity, or rather, towards diverse, diverging unities. If one moves 
from the individual level to that of collective phenomena, this dual 
temporal structure emerges with equal force. Common sense, on the one 
hand, and language, on the other, in fact represent the collective forms of 
this temporal plurality that must tend towards unification.
Common sense is the plural ‘residue’ that the intellectual history of 
humanity has rooted in popular consciousness, and it thus manifests 
itself as the incoherent stratification of worldviews, prejudices and 
beliefs. It contains all and everything, from the most conservative and 
reactionary elements to the ‘intuitions of a future philosophy’.19 This 
latter aspect, identified as ‘good sense’, is what interests Gramsci: ‘This is 
the healthy nucleus that exists in “common sense”, the part of it which can 
be called “good sense” and which deserves to be made more unitary and 
coherent.’20 The plurality and incoherence of common sense contribute 
towards reproducing domination, because they fragment individual 
wills and prevent the formation of collective wills as an alternative to 
the dominant one. Such alternative collective wills, on the other hand, 
may emerge from the combination of the development of good sense 
and of criticism of common sense: ‘At those times in history when a 
homogeneous social group is brought into being, there comes into being 
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also, in opposition to common sense, a homogeneous – in other words 
coherent and systematic – philosophy.’21 The time of common sense is of 
a plural character because it is within that time that a hegemonic struggle 
is fought; however, the time of the dominant group over-determines 
this plurality because it forces it in a certain direction, at least until an 
opposing homogeneous social group forms.
Gramsci’s writings in his Notebook 29 reflect this same temporal 
structure in regard to the question of language. Language is also plural 
on two different levels: the internal level of the individual’s linguistic 
capacity, which sees the individual sharing a dialect and the national 
language (if not more than one language); and on the level of the national 
and international communities, which sees dialects and languages take 
their respective shares of the territory, but also sees them superimposed 
to a certain extent. It has been repeatedly pointed out, and rightly so, that 
in Gramsci the dynamics of divulgation, struggle and contamination of 
language reflect the dynamics of power relations. Thus, ‘linguistic power’ 
possesses the same features, and operates in the same ways, as political 
power.22 Following this isomorphism, what Gramsci calls ‘immanent 
or spontaneous grammars’ correspond to individual consciousness, 
to the extent that ‘one can say that each person has a grammar of his 
own’.23 ‘“Normative” grammar’, on the other hand, is that process that 
tends to standardize language, and may take two different forms: the 
first is through the prestige of a language deriving from its expression 
of a progressive force, which gains hegemonic supremacy through the 
‘“spontaneous” expression of grammatical conformity’.24 This process is 
not coercive but ‘imitative’ and evolves through ‘reciprocal monitoring, 
reciprocal teaching’;25 the second is the form dictated by the State’s action 
in imposing a national language through the educational/coercive force 
of its institutions.26
The choice therefore is not between conserving a plurality of languages 
and imposing a single language, but between two different ways of 
achieving unity. The opportunity to master a national language, in fact, 
is in Gramsci’s view an essential prerequisite for the emancipation of 
the subalterns. It is something that cannot be sacrificed in the name of 
linguistic plurality.27 Temporality comes to the fore once again here: this 
is a question of standardizing languages at a national level – because only 
languages possess the instruments with which modern thought can be 
expressed in full28 – rendering them translatable and thus getting away 
from the myth of the universality of language (Esperanto) in order to 
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synchronize different national linguistic structures to the same (revo-
lutionary) time. The temporality of duration, linguistically represented 
by the plurality of dialects and languages competing for prestige, is 
superimposed by the epochal temporality of national languages, which 
are the only ones that can enable a strong link to be established between 
popular culture and national politics, between the people and the 
leading groups.
One final consideration regarding the dual temporal nature of 
the Prison Notebooks concerns one of the most famous Gramscian 
distinctions, the one that makes reference to the diverse relationship 
between State and civil society in the East and in the West. In the East, 
Gramsci writes, society was ‘primordial and gelatinous’, whereas in 
the West it was ‘a succession of sturdy fortresses and emplacements’.29 
In reality, this spatial division refers to a temporal division, that is, it 
points to the development of Western societies. In the West, power 
cannot be taken by attacking the ‘places’ of power, because power has 
been disseminated throughout society, rendering society a conservative 
inertial force within which the revolutionary use of the war of manoeuvre 
is no longer sufficient. Often scholars have insisted on this idea of the 
contemporaneity of the non-contemporary, that is, on the multiplicity 
of temporal levels in the diverse functional spaces globally dominated by 
capitalism, in particular in relation to theories of uneven development.30 
There are undoubtedly good reasons in support of this interpretation, 
and the identification of plural temporalities remains, even within the 
context of our insistence on the duality of Gramscian time, a significant 
feature of Gramscian analysis. However, in analysing this distinction, 
perhaps too much attention has been paid to the ‘Western’ side of the 
process, that is, to the changes displayed by Western societies having 
resisted the challenge of revolution in the West. Nevertheless, in keeping 
with Gramsci’s work, the focus should also be in the other direction, that 
of the East described in this famous quotation.
In Gramsci’s analysis, ‘Eastern’ civil society was certainly considered 
more primordial and gelatinous at the end of the war, when the 
Bolsheviks dealt the fatal blow to Russia’s Tsarist regime. However, the 
advent of the Worker’s State, with the intense period of politicization of 
the masses right through the 1920s, had radically changed the political 
panorama. There is substantial evidence of this. For example, the revo-
lutionary event itself had already established the basis for the possible 
unification of the contrasting temporalities within individuals, creating 
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a ‘densification’ of social life. Then during the 1920s, the attempt to 
stabilize relations between factory workers and peasants through the 
New Economic Policy (NEP) had created that social fabric subject to the 
hegemony of the workers that had been missing before. It was this very 
process that led Gramsci to use the concept of hegemony, and to consider 
Lenin as its precursor, being the first person to put it into practice: 
the theoretical-practical principle of hegemony has also epistemolog-
ical significance, and it is here that Ilich’s [Lenin] greatest theoretical 
contribution to the philosophy of praxis should be sought […]. The 
realisation of a hegemonic apparatus, in so far as it creates a new 
ideological terrain, determines a reform of consciousness and of 
methods of knowledge: it is a fact of knowledge, a philosophical fact.31
Gramsci was thus aware that the transition to mass politics had 
changed the scenario not only in the West, in relation to the liberal 
order, but also in the East in relation to the forms through which the 
revolution had been achieved. The post-revolutionary era in the USSR, 
just like mass politics in the West (Fascism and Americanism), thus both 
presented the scenario of a war of position in which neither side was 
any longer characterized by a primordial and gelatinous civil society. 
For this reason, Gramsci was able to translate the social bloc from the 
economic terms of the USSR at the time of the NEP to superstructural 
terms, that is, of the intellectual blocs of the capitalistically stabilized 
western countries. While in the writings of Bukharin – the greatest 
theoretician of the NEP – the formation of the bloc is driven first and 
foremost by the economic forces politically manoeuvred by the Workers’ 
State, in Gramsci it is hegemony, specifically that of an intellectual and 
cultural nature, that underlies the formation of that bloc.32 In this case, 
it was the ‘economically backward’ Soviet Russia (albeit more advanced 
politically, as the first experimental Workers’ State) that dictated the 
guiding principles and the theoretical-political problems to the interna-
tional communist movement.
Thus, the global scenario is one of diverse, competing hegemonic 
times that massively effect the synchronization of the plural temporal-
ities to be found within each of the blocs. Planism,33 Corporatism and 
Soviet planning all represent different, competing ‘temporal rhythms’ 
whereby States endeavour to hegemonically (but also coercively) unify 
their respective societies.
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the shape of duration: the passive revolution
Having thus illustrated the bases for the dual structure of time in the 
Prison Notebooks, we can now turn to the concept that Gramsci uses 
to analyse the temporal nature of duration as characterized by the 
hegemonic force that prevails, operating as a ‘temporal unifying device’. 
The concept in question is that of passive revolution. As often is the 
case in the Prison Notebooks, Gramsci does not coin a new word out of 
nothing. Instead, he utilizes a concept previously formulated by others 
and shifts its meaning,34 thus formulating a new concept in practice (a 
process in keeping with the linguistic observations on the historicity of 
language and against its artificiality).
As previously mentioned (Chapter 3, section ‘Bureaucracy and 
officials: Gramsci and Weber’), Gramsci takes the term from the 
Historical Essay on the Neapolitan Revolution of 1799 by Vincenzo Cuoco, 
where the expression indicated the absence of popular involvement in 
the revolution due to the gap between the leaders and the people. Italy’s 
political ‘moderates’ – as Gramsci calls the diverse members of the ranks 
of Italian liberalism who were behind the unification of Italy – based a 
precise political programme around the concept of passive revolution, 
transforming it into a political strategy, into their hegemonic and 
pedagogic action vis-à-vis the other forces of the Risorgimento.
By taking a broader view, Gramsci pointed out that Cuoco used this 
expression to indicate the development of ‘countries that modernize the 
State through a series of reforms or national wars without undergoing 
a political revolution of a radical-Jacobin type’.35 Thus, the French 
Revolution, which established a clean break with the feudal past, was 
compared with the passive revolutions witnessed in the other European 
States, in which:
the needs that found a Jacobin-Napoleonic expression in France 
were satisfied in small doses, legally, in a reformist manner, thereby 
managing to safeguard the political and economic positions of the 
old feudal classes, avoiding agrarian reform and making especially 
sure that the popular masses did not go through a period of political 
experience such as occurred in France in the Jacobin era.36
The absence of the masses’ political involvement, together with the 
slow, partial acceptance of certain revolutionary demands on the part of 
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the leading groups, may be considered those features of the hegemonic 
programme known as passive revolution.
According to Gramsci, this manner of historical development, charac-
terized by the temporality of duration, conceals a ‘domesticated dialectic 
because it “mechanically” presupposes that the antithesis should be 
preserved by the thesis in order not to destroy the dialectical process’.37 
The thesis (the hegemonic group) determines the antithesis (the 
subaltern group) and guides the actions, and eventually incorporates 
the demands, of such. Thus, the situation that arises is that of ‘historical 
inertia’, where time flows homogeneously and politics is transformed 
from subjective action aimed at changing the world to the administration 
of the existing power structure. The only undisciplined movement that 
remains in society is the inconsequential (in terms of power) ‘sporadic 
and incoherent rebelliousness of the popular masses’.38
The unification of Italy is the historical example of this flowing of time. 
In his notes on the Risorgimento, Gramsci pointed out the limitations 
of the Italian democrats (the Action Party) when it came to bringing 
the masses to the centre of the political stage. These limits were due to 
the decision to secretly organize groups of ‘Carbonari’, which did not 
permit the masses to get involved. In doing so, the democrats placed 
their faith in the episodic temporality of conspirational action. However, 
Gramsci was also interested in grasping those mechanisms by which the 
Moderates managed to produce a ‘centripetal hegemonic field’ capable of 
engulfing the rival leading group, and with it the possibility of a possible 
alternative unity:
Out of the Action Party and the Moderates, which represented the real 
‘subjective forces’ of the Risorgimento? Without a shadow of doubt it 
was the Moderates, precisely because they were also aware of the role 
of the Action Party: thanks to this awareness, their ‘subjectivity’ was of 
a superior and more decisive quality.39
Gramsci continues by arguing that ‘the Action Party was led historically 
by the Moderates’, who proved ideologically appealing to the Party, and 
succeeded in controlling, and taking advantage of, the fragmented nature 
of the Party’s political action. The Moderates managed to impose a unitary 
temporality because: 1) they ‘represented a relatively homogeneous 
social group, and hence their leadership underwent relatively limited 
oscillation’;40 2) they were ‘intellectuals already naturally “condensed” by 
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the organic nature of their relation to the social groups whose expression 
they were’ and consequently 3) they ‘exercised a powerful attraction 
“spontaneously”, on the whole mass of intellectuals of every degree who 
existed in the peninsula’.41 The unity of intentions, a close relationship 
with the social group they represented, and the ‘ideological’ appeal they 
had for traditional intellectuals: these were the three key characteris-
tics in Gramsci’s view. Only an equally coherent force of the same kind 
could have struggled in the hegemonic field, contending the position of 
leading group and establishing a different temporality. This counterforce 
was resoundingly absent: the Action Party 1) ‘did not base itself 
specifically on any historical class, and the oscillations which its leading 
organs underwent were resolved, in the last analysis, according to the 
interests of the Moderates’;42 2) was composed of characters ‘steeped in 
the traditional rhetoric of Italian literature’,43 who ‘only offered woolly 
statements, and philosophical allusions’44 to ‘popular masses who were 
foreign to that cultural tradition’;45 and finally 3) ‘was itself attracted and 
influenced’ by the Moderate Party, ‘on the one hand, as a result of the 
atmosphere of intimidation […] and, on the other, because certain of 
its leading personalities (Garibaldi) had, even if only desultorily (they 
wavered), a relationship of personal subordination to the Moderate 
leaders’.46 The Action Party ‘considered as “national” the aristocracy and 
the landowners, and not the millions of peasants’,47 whereas the French 
Jacobins, who proved capable of imposing their own temporality on 
the revolutionary process, ‘strove with determination to ensure a bond 
between town and country’,48 promoting an agrarian reform that in 
rural areas permitted the synchronization of two different times: ‘Rural 
France accepted the hegemony of Paris; in other words, it understood 
that in order definitively to destroy the old regime it had to make a bloc 
with the most advanced elements of the Third Estate, and not with the 
Girondin moderates.’49 The exclusion of the great peasant masses from 
the newly founded Italian State resulted instead in a territorial and social 
divide between a South that created savings from the exploitation of the 
peasants and North that drained these resources to finance industrial 
development. This is how Gramsci interpreted the onset of the ‘Southern 
question’: he saw it basically as the failure to synchronize revolutionary 
developments, thus leaving a contradictory temporal plurality in place 
within the framework of the dominance of the Moderates.50 This was the 
time of duration and of passive revolution.
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Once the nation had been unified, the process of ‘gradual but 
continuous absorption’ of democratic leaders was to continue in the 
form of ‘transformism’, which in this case consisted in ‘the parliamentary 
expression of this action of intellectual, moral and political hegemony’.51 
Transformism operated in this manner not only as the leading classes’ 
attempt to defend the power structure that had been consolidated with 
the unification of Italy, but also as a (passive) political dynamic that 
slowly led to the gradual expansion of the State’s foundations. Thus, 
transformism became a genuine ‘form of historical development’,52 a 
form of historical time. Seeing transformism purely as a conservative 
response, in fact, does not help us grasp Gramsci’s intuition whereby 
transformism is the parliamentary expression of hegemonic action. In 
fact, by preserving power relations and the specific interests on the basis 
of which national unity had been built, transformism also operates as a 
filter for the new demands of a changing society. The new industrial and 
financial bourgeoisie is in this way gradually included in the mechanisms 
of representation of interests within the political system, through the 
dynamics of inclusion ‘from above’. Thus, transformism renews the basis 
of the State’s consensus without compromising its power structure, and 
therefore avoids involving the masses – ‘simultaneously’53 in Gramsci’s 
words – in the reorganization of the State. The 1882 electoral reform, 
which extended voting rights on the basis of individuals’ education 
rather than wealth, may be interpreted in this way.
The school system was also part of the hegemonic project of Italy’s 
leading classes, through implementation of the only educational plan 
capable of challenging the ‘“Jesuitical” school’,54 by means of which 
the Moderates were able to present themselves as the only ‘effective 
collective force in operation’ during the Risorgimento, thereby limiting 
the contribution of the Action Party to ‘individual figures […] ten-
dentiously exalted in order to incorporate them’, thus breaking their 
‘collective ties’.55 Thus, the historical reconstruction of the Risorgimento 
in schools – its temporal rhythm once again – will aid the construction 
of a possible national history rooted in moderate values, that will disrupt 
the formulation of any alternative historical accounts. The historical 
truth of the Risorgimento was to be that of the Moderates, helped by 
the fact that the Action Party ‘was incapable of offering any effective 
alternative to this propaganda which, through the schools, became the 
official version taught’.56
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the form of epoch: how novelty emerges
We have seen how Gramsci views the passive revolution as representing 
the bourgeois model of the ‘historical management’ of development and 
change: a model that was implemented immediately after the French 
Revolution, with the formation of the Nation States in Europe in reaction 
to these upheavals. The characteristic temporality of this development is 
that of the passive revolution, which unfolds across a linear timescale, 
the development of which is controlled by a ‘false’ dialectic in which the 
thesis presupposes the antithesis prior to conflicting with it.
Just a few years after Gramsci had formulated these reflections, Walter 
Benjamin wrote his theses On the Concept of History, containing a similar 
criticism of bourgeois time:
The concept of mankind’s historical progress cannot be sundered 
from the concept of its progression through a homogeneous, empty 
time. A critique of the concept of such a progression must underlie 
any criticism of the concept of progress itself.57 (Thesis xiii)
The homogeneous, empty time described by Benjamin seems to copy 
that of the passive revolution described by Gramsci: homogeneity entails 
conformism, just as emptiness precludes any chance of an alternative 
subjective construction. This comparison, in addition to being 
fascinating due to the fact that the two writers did not know each other’s 
work,58 could be useful in particular when investigating the features of 
the second temporality that Gramsci alludes to: ‘epochal time’. However, 
it should be said that this is an aspect that is not specifically dealt with in 
the Prison Notebooks, but one that emerges every now and then without 
being formulated in full. The problem of how the ‘time of revolution’ 
emerges in Gramsci’s writings, and in particular how it is to be triggered 
– apart from its phenomenology, which as we have seen is characterized 
by the synchronization of different times – remains unresolved (cf. note 
78 to Chapter 4). Certain cues for a reflection on the question – which 
do not purport to include Gramsci in present-day discussions regarding 
immanence/transcendence or articulation/event – may be found, 
nevertheless, when comparing the notebooks with Benjamin’s Theses. In 
Thesis xiv, Benjamin states that:
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History is the subject of a construction whose site is not homogeneous, 
empty time, but time filled full by now-time [Jetztzeit]. Thus, to 
Robespierre ancient Rome was a past charged with now-time, a past 
which he blasted out of the continuum of history.59 (Thesis xiv)
The first thing to be said here is that for Benjamin, ‘epochal’ time – 
his Jetztzeit, the messianic now-time introducing the novelty – is the 
time that makes history. History that sees a subject refer to fragments of 
the past in order to break the continuity of bourgeois time: the Jacobins 
could thus trace themselves back to the ancient Romans in order to 
break the homogeneous, empty time of the feudal system. Materialist 
historiography is thus called upon to oppose historicism (that of the 
Second International) that culminates in universal history, and whose 
‘procedure is additive: it musters a mass of data to fill the homogeneous, 
empty time’.60 Historical materialism, on the contrary, develops a histo-
riography contemplating radical interruptions in the temporal linearity 
of a dominion: ‘Thinking involves not only the movement of thoughts, 
but their arrest as well.’61 For materialists, historical time is that full of 
Jetztzeit, in which the present recalls fragments of the past in order to 
redeem and revive them. The link between two moments in time thus 
disrupts the linearity of bourgeois time and reveals a different movement. 
This image of non-linear temporality constituted by historical highs and 
lows of particular intensity appears to be present in the Prison Notebooks 
as well: for example, in the relationship that Gramsci portrays between 
Machiavelli and the French Jacobins. Both are treated as ‘fragments’ 
of the past that may be reactivated within the context of a history that 
proceeds with an oscillating intensity rather than through any process of 
accumulation. Along this new temporality, even the historical sequence 
is questioned. With regard to the need for a simultaneous incursion of 
the peasant masses into political life, Gramsci wrote: 
That was Machiavelli’s intention through the reform of the militia, 
and it was achieved by the Jacobins in the French Revolution. That 
Machiavelli understood it reveals a precocious Jacobinism that is the 
(more or less fertile) germ of his conception of national revolution.62
Thus, in Gramsci’s writings the relationship between the Jacobins 
and Machiavelli marks a break in the linearity of bourgeois time. Not 
only did the Jacobins evoke Machiavelli, but the reference also holds if 
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the normal sequence of time is inverted: while the ‘Jacobins […] were 
certainly a “categorical embodiment” of Machiavelli’s Prince’, Machiavelli 
also shared a ‘precocious Jacobinism’.63 Their destinies were also similar 
from the historiographical point of view: both were ‘used’ by the history 
of the victors – Machiavelli becoming a symbol of political cynicism, 
imprisoned in a political science synonymous with the administration of 
power, while the Jacobins were reduced to symbolizing extremism and 
fanaticism – but both could also live on in the temporality of a revolution-
ary force capable of identifying itself with them.64 Gramsci’s references to 
the Jacobins and to Machiavelli thus served the following purpose in the 
Prison Notebooks: to force the present to identify itself with their actions, 
thus offering the working class the key to an alternative historical time to 
that of passive revolutions. 
A further example of this ‘intense’ non-linear temporality is regards 
the problem of the relationship between town and countryside, between 
factory workers and peasants. Besides, this was the point on which the 
Workers’ State that emerged from the October Revolution hinged. In 
criticizing the Action Party’s indifference towards the peasant masses 
– unlike the Jacobins, who had imposed a radical agrarian reform65 –, 
Gramsci pointed out how it also possessed a specific historical ‘tradition 
to which it could go back and attach itself ’ in order to promote this syn-
chronization. This was the medieval tradition of the Communes that bore 
witness to a ‘nascent bourgeoisie [that] seeks allies among the peasants 
against the Empire and against the local feudalism’.66 The historical bloc 
of town and countryside, the synchronization of these two times to revo-
lutionary time, was already the key to democratic revolution at the time, 
and this is one of those aspects of ‘epochal time’ that chronologically 
links distant events on the basis of their intensity: 
the most classic master of the art of politics for the Italian ruling 
classes, Machiavelli, had also posed the problem – naturally in the 
terms and with the preoccupations of his time. In his politico-military 
writings, the need to subordinate the popular masses organically to the 
ruling strata, so as to create a national militia capable of eliminating 
the companies of fortune, was quite well understood.67
In Gramsci’s view, an alternative historical time to that of passive 
revolution is thus potentially ever-present, even within the context of the 
linear development of a time that is over-determined by the practice of 
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the hegemonic subject. It is up to the revolutionary subject that wishes 
to establish hegemony to be able to reconnect with those moments in 
history that have expressed such intensity, and to bring to contempora-
neity those attempts made to overturn the old organic system in order 
to create a new one. The hegemony of an emergent subject thus always 
presupposes the urge to synchronize the diverse temporalities of the 
subaltern groups. This is the only way that the latter may get free from 
the depoliticizing uniformity of bourgeois time. In this sense, Gramsci 
views contemporariness as the product of political endeavour: it does 
not exist originally, but needs to be created.
How such a process is to be started, that is, how the synchronization of 
the times of the subaltern groups is to disrupt the unity of homogenous, 
empty time, is a question that is destined to remain unanswered in the 
Prison Notebooks. Gramsci does not manage to (or perhaps cannot) 
illustrate the forms by means of which ‘novelty’ is to be produced 
within an organic system. The only epoch-making event that had seen 
the working class as protagonist had been triggered, in fact, by a war of 
manoeuvre (the October Revolution), within the context of a weak civil 
society that no longer existed following the advent of mass politics. It is 
likely that this ‘unspoken aspect’ of Gramsci’s work corresponds to an 
‘unspoken’ structural aspect of political theory, an aspect that remains 
unspeakable for the simple reason that it cannot be rationalized within 
the categories of politics. It comes as no surprise that all of the classical 
dichotomies of Marxist thought – theory and practice, structure and 
superstructure, ideology and class consciousness – bear witness to the 
impossibility of rationally defining the transition from the one to the 
other. At this point, the fact that Gramsci’s writings permit a reflection 
on this question without forcing a solution is a strength, and not a 
weakness, for all those who wish to utilize his open Marxism to interpret 
and change contemporary society.
Conclusion
The path followed in this volume is one of the possible paths that 
may be taken within the Prison Notebooks, but certainly not the only 
one. The rich, complex structure of the notebooks, in fact, is open to 
various, not necessarily convergent, readings guided in the main by the 
type of interest the work elicits in the reader: that of historical-political 
reconstruction, or of philosophical reflection, or of literary or political 
criticism and so on. However, it is also true that Gramsci has not left the 
reader with a hotchpotch of random reflections, to be assembled as one 
likes in order to support one theory or another. In fact, his thought is 
constantly situated, never generic; it is always historical, never absolute; 
and rooted in a specific circumstance such as that of the prison, which 
did not allow for any immediate, more direct transfer to the sphere of 
political practice. His imprisonment, in fact, defines the form of Gramsci’s 
work, at least in part, through those restrictions resulting from the lack 
of contact with the outside world; from the impossibility of having the 
materials he required in order to study more systematically; from the 
necessarily precarious, contracted, allusive character of his brief notes. 
This form of writing, which in prison became a form of thinking, forced 
Gramsci to channel his thought through constant marginal notes to a 
‘diverse’ thought which at that moment in time is, explicitly or implicitly, 
the subject of study or interpretation. This way of proceeding, which 
constantly forced Gramsci’s arguments, rather than impoverishing his 
reasoning, produced a series of deviations, reformulations and openings 
that would be unthinkable under different conditions of ‘theoretical 
production’.
Gramsci therefore constantly reformulated and reutilized the 
vocabulary of other theoretical traditions different from Marxism – such 
as sociology, anthropology and linguistics – which today, 80 years after 
his death, has been revived in contemporary debates. It is no coincidence 
that many of the themes dealt with in this volume have had a direct 
influence on social and political studies over the last decade. These 
intellectual terrains have seen part of what we may call the ‘Gramscian 
challenges’ being played out, namely, the study of the ideological levels 
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of modern capitalism, the critique of methodological individualism, 
the general crisis of the ‘intermediate bodies’, the new form of global 
society, the analysis of the economic crisis and the nature of time in a 
globalized world. Thus, Gramscian tools may be fruitfully employed on 
such terrains, without any ‘Gramscianism’ – as a political programme, or 
worse as a ‘worldview’ of a non-existent political subject – polluting the 
wells of scientific curiosity in order to provide sustenance to small-scale 
political experiments. 
So we need to proceed along that narrow path permitting us to 
maintain a broad view of the text together with the interpretative accuracy 
required in order to avoid simple generalizations. Thus, specification of 
the viewpoint from which the interpretation of the writings proceeds 
not only clarifies the adopted approach, but is also a sign of scientific 
seriousness. My interpretation of the Prison Notebooks is character-
ized by the attempt to emphasize the explicit and implicit fundamental 
theoretical articulations of Gramsci’s thought within a given historical 
framework, but in the absence of any precise prescriptive pointers. In 
fact, Gramsci’s reflections are situated at a time of epochal transforma-
tion – a period that marks the transition from ‘free-market competitive’ 
capitalism to ‘organized-monopoly’ capitalism, from bourgeois society 
to mass society, from the ‘liberal’ nineteenth century to the ‘political’ 
twentieth century – and he constantly endeavours to regulate and 
calibrate his own theoretical tools in order to take on this new reality. This 
is another reason why one century later, within the context of similarly 
epochal changes, there is renewed interest in Gramsci’s writings. 
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Veränderung der Umstände und der Erziehung vergisst, dass die Umstände von 
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65. There are numerous passages in which Sorel reiterates the importance of the 
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those human phenomena that arise around machinery’, ibid.: 174.
66. Cf. Dario Ragazzini, Leonardo nella società di massa: teoria della personalità in 
Gramsci [Leonardo in Mass Society: The Theory of Personality in Gramsci], 
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76. Q15§9, in QC: 1764, author’s translation.
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chapter 3
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[The Concept of Revolution at the Edge of Political Modernity], in Maurizio 
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1969: 14.
 5. Q3§18, in PN2: 25.
 6. Ibid.
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State, translated by D. Fernbach, London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1980 (1st ed. 
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Nelson Coutinho, Gramsci’s Political Thought, translated by P. Sette-Camara, 
Leiden: Brill, 2012 (1st ed. 1989): 77–92.
10. Q1§47, in PN1: 153.
11. Q8§130, in PN3: 311.
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FSPN: 208.
14. Perry Anderson accuses Gramsci of inconsistency and incoherence in ‘The 
Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci’, New Left Review, 100, 1976: 12–34; for a 
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Q6§88, in PN3: 75.
16. Q8§142, in PN3: 317. Gramsci utilizes a broad concept of ‘official’, assigning such 
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with ‘official’ (as Buttigieg does in the PN, rather than using the term ‘functionary’ 
as is found in the SPN) bearing in mind Gramsci’s own observation regarding the 
meaning of the term in English: ‘The word “ufficiale” or “officiale”. This word 
causes misunderstanding, or at the very least incomprehension and astonishment, 
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in Italian, has increasingly narrowed its meaning, and now it is likely to refer only 
to military officers; it has retained its broader meaning only in some expressions 
that have become idiomatic or in expressions of bureaucratic origin: “pubblico 
ufficiale”, “ufficiale dello stato civile”, etc. In English, on the other hand, “official” 
refers in general to functionaries of all kinds (in the case of the army, “officer” 
is used, but that, too, denotes a “functionary”, generally speaking), not just to 
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trade union functionary, etc.); it even refers to a simple “employee”’, Q5§130, in 
PN2: 383.
17. Q8§142, in PN3: 317.
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19. Q8§142, in PN3: 317.
20. Cf., respectively, Q6§138 (PN3: 109), Q4§49 (PN2: 199–210), Q8§52 (PN3: 266–
7).
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(Economy and Society: 1148–56), it was Gerhard Oestreich (Neostoicism and Early 
Modern State, translated by D. McLintock, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2008 [1st ed. 1969]: 258–73) who specified the contents thereof in relation 
to the formation of the modern State.
22. Weber, Economy and Society: 54, emphases in the original.
23. Q13§36, in SPN: 185-6, emphasis in the original (translation amended from 
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tedesca nel pensiero di Max Weber [German Democracy in the Thought of Max 
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on the role of the bureaucracy.
25. Weber distinguishes between Herrschaft and Macht: ‘A. “Power” (Macht) is the 
probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to 
carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this 
probability rests. B. “Domination” (Herrschaft) is the probability that a command 
with a given specific content will be obeyed by a given group of persons […]. 
The concept of power is sociologically amorphous. All conceivable qualities of 
a person and all conceivable combinations of circumstances may put him in 
a position to impose his will in a given situation. The sociological concept of 
domination must hence be more precise and can only mean the probability that 
a command will be obeyed’, Weber, Economy and Society: 53. ‘Domination’ thus 
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26. Weber, Economy and Society: 983, emphasis in the original.
27. Q13§36, in SPN: 186.
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bureaucratic rule’, Weber, Parliament and Government in Germany: 222.
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Vincenzo Cuoco, Historical Essay on the Neapolitan Revolution of 1799, translated 
by D. Gibbons, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014 (1st ed. 1801): 91.
35. Cf. Q15§62, in SPN: 114.
36. Weber, Parliament and Government in Germany: 159, emphasis in the original.
37. Gramsci writes how ‘the historico-political individual is not the “biological” 
individual but the social group’, Q6§10, in PN3: 8.
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Max Weber], Milan: Franco Angeli, 2003: 422.
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Political Theory, Cambridge, MA-London: MIT Press, 1992: 156–9). All other 
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shops of the future’), they indicate the direction taken by a process: ‘the state is 
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italics).
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declared political purpose, and also that ‘multiplicity of private associations […] 
[that] prevails, relatively or absolutely, constituting the hegemonic apparatus of 
one social group over the rest of the population’, Q6§136, in PN3: 107. Gramsci 
went on to state that: ‘In the absence of centralized and organized parties, in 
Italy, one cannot ignore the newspapers: it is the newspapers, grouped in sets, 
that constitute the real parties’, Q1§116, in PN1: 201. In this context, ‘nobody is 
unorganized and without a party’ (Q6§136, in PN3: 107) and the organization of 
society – not only that of the party’s avant-garde – is the only way of organizing 
the revolution in the West.
41. Q8§21, in PN3: 247.
42. Q7§39, in PN3: 190.
43. Q2§75, in PN1: 323.
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Modern Democracy, translated by E. and C. Paul, New Brunswick: Transaction 
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